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PREFACE
A graduate thesis on Rui Barbosa sparked the au­
thor's interest in Brazil's attendance at the Second Hague 
Peace Conference and the fascinating relationships between 
and among individuals and countries that developed on the 
occasion of the conference. The search for materials for 
this study led the author to the examination of holdings at
the United States National Archives in Washington, D.C., and 
».
those at the Fundagao Casa de Rui Barbosa, the Arquivo Na- 
cional, the Arquivo Historico de Itamarati, the Arquivo 
Joaquim Nabuco, and the Arquivo Barao do Rio-Branco, all in 
Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.
This study examines the Brazilian concern for status 
and prestige at the personal, national, and international 
levels as reflected in private and official correspondence 
during 1905-1908, the period bracketing the Second Hague 
Conference. The study seeks to emphasize the human dimen­
sion that is often obscured in the chronology of events.
For.this purpose, extensive use has been made of written 
communications.
The author is grateful to the staff of the diploma­
tic section of the National Archives for assistance in iden­
tification of pertinent United States embassy and consular
ii
material and State Department communications with the United 
States delegation to the Second Hague Conference. He grate­
fully acknowledges a debt of gratitude to Dr. Francisco de 
Assis Barbosa, director of the Fundagao Casa de Rui Barbosa, 
and the archival staff, especially Maria Elena. Dr. Raul 
Lima and the staff of the reading room provided invaluable 
assistance in the use of the Arquivo Nacional, Arquivo Joa- 
quim Nabuco, and Arquivo Afonso Pena. Dra. Martha Gongalves 
and her staff at the Arquivo HistSrico do Itamarati were 
most helpful with Foreign Ministry records and archival rec­
ords of the Arquivo Barao do Rio-Branco.
A special debt of gratitude is owed to my disserta­
tion committee, especially Dr. Jane DeGrummond who offered 
aid, advice and encouragement through many long years. Dr. 
Paul Hoffman is highly commended for his incisive critiques 
and helpful suggestions for the manuscript. As directors of
the Latin American Studies Institute (LASI) during prepara­
tion and completion of this dissertation, Dr. Roland Chardon 
and Dr. Leonard Cardenas gave indispensable guidance and 
support. Dr. Peter Lunardini and Dr. Charles Patterson, 
representatives of my minor fields, provided much helpful 
support and advice. These individuals are responsible for 
the success of this study, but the author assumes full re­
sponsibility for any errors and omissions. I thank LASI for 
fellowship support, and the Education Commission of the 
Southern Baptist Convention for a scholarship/loan, without 
both of which the study could never have been completed.
iii
A special vote of thanks is due Mrs. Miriam DeHart, 
secretary of LASI, who was always a friend eager to give aid 
with so many details of scheduling, deadlines, etc. The 
support and assistance of my collegues at Mobile College was 
indispensable to the success of this venture. Finally, I 
wish to thank my family, especially my wife, for patience 
and forbearance during the long years of study, preparation, 
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ABSTRACT
This study traces the two traditional Brazilian for­
eign policy objectives of securing recognition as an impor­
tant member of the international community, and friendship 
with the United States, during the period 1905-1908. These 
two objectives are examined in the light of Brazilian con­
cern for status and prestige at the personal, national, and 
international levels. The themes of gaining international 
recognition, and Brazilian-American friendship are inter­
woven with the interpersonal relations that developed on the 
occasion of the Second Hague Peace Conference.
The Second Hague Conference (1907) was the first 
global meeting in which Brazil was represented. It was an 
opportunity for Brazil to distinguish herself from lesser 
powers and to enhance her image as a leader in Latin Amer­
ica. An aspiration for great power status led to the culti­
vation and projection of an image of Brazil as a nation that 
was European in culture and orientation in spite of its geo­
graphic isolation. To support her claims, Brazil mounted an 
impressive public relations campaign. Furthermore, economic 
and political considerations fostered a special relationship 
with the United States. The world conference was the stage 
upon which the emerging nation made its debut.
vi
Baron Rio-Branco, Joaquim Nabuco, and Rui Barbosa 
were the principal Brazilian actors on stage and behind the 
scenes at the conference. The search for status was the 
principal motivation for Brazil's attendance at the Hague 
Conference and played a role in the selection of her dele­
gate, her stance on the conference issues, and her relation­
ship with the United States. Brazil's unrealistic goal of 
becoming the ninth world power and her conference stance, 
jeopardized her special relationship with the United States.
During this period these two traditional Brazilian 
foreign policy objectives were not mutually exclusive, de­
spite some incompatability. Through the tenacious efforts 
of Nabuco, the Brazilian-American relationship was salvaged 
in spite of the hostility of Rui, and the indifference of 
Rio-Branco. Despite the conflicts over status, the Second 
Hague Conference did gain for Brazil the reputation of a 
cultured and cosmopolitan nation able to give a respectable 
showing in a meeting with the powerful nations of the world.
vii
INTRODUCTION
World events test national goals and aspirations 
giving rise to new courses of action while providing the op­
portunity for nations to make an imprint on history. Such 
was the challenge posed to the emerging Brazilian nation in 
1907 by the Second Hague Conference. The Second Interna­
tional Peace Conference (Second Hague Conference) was the 
first global meeting in which Brazil was represented. It 
was an opportunity for Brazil to distinguish herself from 
lesser powers and to enhance her image as a leader in Latin 
America, especially vis-a-vis Argentina. The aspiration for 
great power status led to the cultivation and projection of 
an image of Brazil as a nation that was European in culture 
and orientation in spite of its geographic isolation. A 
competent and cosmopolitan foreign service was displayed as 
evidence. Furthermore, the desire to be the hegemonic power 
of South America, and thus an equal of her neighbor to the 
north, fostered a special relationship with the United 
States. The world conference was the stage upon which the 
emerging nation made its debut.
Earlier studies dealing with the Second Hague Con­
ference and with the three principal men responsible for 
Brazil's role there, do not provide a comprehensive treat­
ment of their interpersonal relations nor do they address 
the concern for status and prestige on the three levels; 
personal, national, and international.
The two most important books dealing with the Second 
Hague Conference say little about Brazil's role during that 
meeting.̂  Calvin D. Davis' The United States and the Second 
Hague Peace Conference is concerned primarily with the Amer­
ican role at the Hague Conference and only cursorily men­
tions Brazil or Rui Barbosa, the Brazilian delegate. Wil­
liam I. Hull makes some reference to Brazil and her delegate
t
in The Two Hague Conferences and Their Contributions to In­
ternational Law, but his primary concern is a comparative 
study of the two Hague peace conferences, with emphasis on 
international law and the role of the United States delega­
tion. The Two Hague Conferences by Joseph H. Choate, leader 
of the American delegation to the second conference, should 
also be mentioned. Choate emphasizes the proceedings of the 
conference, with primary reference to the American role, 
hardly making mention of Brazil.
Brazil's conference role is best covered by E. Brad­
ford Burns in his study, The Unwritten Alliance, Rio-Branco 
and Brazilian-American Relations. Burns devotes sixteen 
pages to the Hague Conference, providing an excellent sum­
mary of the issues addressed and emphasizing the impact of 
the deliberations on Brazilian-American relations. In deal-
^Complete citations of sources discussed in the in­
troduction may be found in the footnotes of the main body 
of the paper and in the Selected Bibliography, pp. 221-30.
ing with individuals, Professor Burns' primary interest is 
in Rio-Branco and thus he does not treat in depth the com­
plex interrelationships among Baron Rio-Branco, Joaquim Na- 
buco, and Rui Barbosa. Burns does not mention the extensive 
Brazilian international public relations effort nor does he 
acknowledge Nabuco's secret mission to aid the Hague delega­
tion.
Luiz Viana, A Vida de Rui Barbosa, the standard bi­
ography of Rui, has one chapter dealing with Rui's role as 
Brazilian delegate to the Second Hague Conference and with 
the events in which Rui was involved preceding and follow­
ing the conference. The major emphasis of Viana's work is 
biographical and he deals sympathetically (and not impar­
tially) with Rui and Brazil concerning this episode in his 
country's history.
Curiously, Carolina Nabuco does not mention in The 
Life of Joaquim Nabuco, that Nabuco went to Europe for four 
months during the summer of 1907 and that she and the rest 
of the family accompanied him. She only devotes two pages 
to the Hague Conference, most of the space dealing with the 
controversy surrounding the selection of the Brazilian con­
ference delegate.
Raymundo Magalhaes in Rui, o Homem e o Mito deals 
with portions of Brazil's Hague episode in some detail, but 
as a revisionist, his primary objective is to debunk the 
"myth" or legend which he says overshadows the life of Rui, 
and to expose the "intrigue and maneuvering" of Rui and Rio-
Branco during the conference. Magalhaes is particularly in­
terested in bringing to light part of the details surround­
ing the publication of an illustrated magazine supplement 
which praised Rui highly. He makes much of the fact that 
this article was paid for by the Brazilian government and 
was later translated into Portuguese as a "book" purportedly 
by an "impartial witness" to Rui's magnificent "victories" 
before the assembled nations of the world. Magalhaes iso­
lates this incident and does not put it into the larger con­
text as part of a campaign for publicizing Brazil.
None of these, nor other published material provides 
comprehensive treatment of the complex interrelations among 
all three of the Brazilians who together were responsible 
for Brazilian foreign policy during the Second Hague Confer­
ence, although the individuals are treated separately. Na­
buco 's role during the conference has been virtually ignored 
by earlier studies, as has the extensive international pub­
lic relations campaign conducted by Brazil during this meet­
ing.
The essence of Brazil’s traditional foreign policy 
has been succinctly stated by Brady B. Tyson. He lists the 
four "pillars" of this policy as: expansion then stabiliza­
tion of her frontiers, maintenance of a balance of power in 
the Rio de la Plata area, gaining recognition as an impor­
tant member of the community of nations, and friendship with
2the United States.
2Brady B. Tyson, "The Drive for Great Power Status:
By 1907 Brazil had stabilized her frontiers, but the 
second objective kept her in a continuing rivalry with Ar­
gentina. Brazil used her attendance at the Hague Conference 
to enhance her international prestige, but this threatened 
to undermine the fourth objective by causing difficulties 
with the United States.
This study traces the third and fourth "pillars" of 
Brazil's foreign policy objectives during the period from 
1905 to 1908. The themes of securing recognition for Brazil 
as an important member of the international community and 
Brazilian friendship with the United States are interwoven 
with the personal animosities, jealousies, concerns, poli­
tical styles, and the interpersonal diplomatic relationships 
that developed on the occasion of the Second Hague Confer­
ence.
Concern for status and prestige is seen throughout 
this study at the personal, national, and international 
levels. The behavior, personal idiosyncracies, personal 
goals and interests of Rui Barbosa, Joaquim Nabuco, and 
Baron Rio-Branco, gave form and substance to Brazil's for­
eign policy objectives during this period.
New Problems for Brazilian Foreign Policy," in Harold E. 
Davis, et al., Latin American Foreign Policies: An Analysis 




Rui Barbosa at The Hague, Joaquim Nabuco in Washing­
ton and in Europe, and Baron Rio-Branco in Rio were the 
principal Brazilian actors in their nation's debut on the 
world stage at the Second Hague Peace Conference. They col­
laborated closely in making the conference a worthwhile ven­
ture for Brazil in spite of disagreements, personality 
clashes among themselves, and Brazilian and international 
political realities. A better understanding of these men 
and their actions during the conference can be obtained if 
the life of each prior to the conference is sketched, with 
particular attention to demonstrating his position and stan­
ding in Brazilian life and culture of that period.
* * *
Jose Maria da Silva Paranhos, Junior (Baron Rio- 
Branco) , was born in 1845 and was thus slightly older than 
Rui and Nabuco.^- His father was in the diplomatic service
^The best biography of Rio-Branco is Luiz Viana, 
Filho, A Vida do Barao do Rio Branco (Rio de Janeiro: Liv-
raria Jose Olympio EditSra, 1959)7 another good biography 
is Alvaro Lins, Rio-Branco; Biografia Pessoal e Historia 
Politica, 2nd ed. (Sao Paulo: Companhia Editora Nacional,
1965). For other materials on Rio-Branco see the excellent 
bibliographical essay in E. Bradford Burns, The Unwritten 
Alliance, Rio-Branco and Brazilian-American Relations (New
-6-
and rose to the postiion of prime minister in 1871. The 
elder Paranhos, whose ministry was the longest of the reign, 
was given the title of Viscount of Rio-Branco by Dorn 
Pedro II.
Baron Rio-Branco was a student of Brazilian history 
from his school days, but he also led the life of a bohe­
mian. After six years in Parliament (1869-1875), Rio-Branco 
sought a diplomatic appointment, and finally in 1876 was ap­
pointed Brazilian consul in Liverpool, where he remained 
until 1891.2
While assigned to Paris as director of the Brazilian 
Immigration Service (1891-1901), Rio-Branco went to Washing­
ton to represent his country in the Missions territory dis­
pute with Argentina. He gained a resounding victory for 
Brazil. After thus successfully defending Brazil's claims 
to Amapa in a dispute with French Guiana, Rio-Branco went 
briefly to Berlin (1901-1902). In 1902, after living in Eu­
rope for twenty-six years, he accepted the post of foreign 
minister, which he would occupy until his death in 1912. 
Rio-Branco was wildly cheered as a national hero upon his 
return to Brazil, where he joined the administration of the
3newly-elected president, Rodrigues Alves.
Rio-Branco's years of diplomatic service prepared
York: Columbia University Press, 1966), pp. 265-74.
2Burns, Unwritten Alliance, pp. 22-27; and Viana, 
Vida do Rio Branco, pp. 70, 73, 57-62.
3Viana, Vida do Rio Branco, pp. 183-91; and Burns, 
Unwritten Alliance, pp. 30-32.
him well for the post of foreign minister:
Those years in Europe gave Rio-Branco practical exper­
ience in diplomacy, introduced him to the sources of 
Western culture, required him to perfect his knowledge 
of foreign languages, expanded his personal acquaint­
anceships in diplomatic and social circles, permitted 
him to visit European libraries and archives, and pro­
vided the historian with leisure hours which he could 
devote to the study of history.4
During the years (1902-1912) that he served as for­
eign minister, Rio-Branco's foreign policy was based on 
gaining international prestige for Brazil, settling the re­
mainder of Brazil's disputed Boundaries, and achieving lea-
5dership for Brazil in South America. He also modernized 
the antiquated foreign policy organization of Brazil, in 
order to implement his new policy. Continuing the tradition 
of boundary claim settlements, Rio-Branco arbitrated dis­
puted boundaries with British Guiana, Colombia, Peru, and 
Bolivia. Greatly aided by Nabuco, the Baron also strength-
gened Brazilian-American friendship during his tenure.
Rio-Branco served as Brazilian foreign minister for 
over nine years, under four presidents. He ran the ministry 
as he wished, considering himself accountable only to the
4Burns, Unwritten Alliance, p. 29.
5Ibid., pp. 37-38; and E. Bradford Burns, A His­
tory of Brazil (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970), 
pp. 234-38.
g
Frederic W. Ganzert, "The Baron do Rio-Branco, 
Joaquim Nabuco, and the growth of Brazilian-American Friend­
ship, 1900-1910," Hispanic American Historical Review XXII 
(August 1944), p. 442; Richard Graham, Britain and the Onset 
of Modernization in Brazil, 1850-1914 (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1968), p. 311; and Lins, Rio-Branco, 
pp. 336-37.
president and to public opinion. His greatest service to
Brazil during his long tenure was the settlement of Brazil's
7extensive boundaries.
* * *
According to his biographers and other observers,
Rui Barbosa was probably the most important Brazilian lib-
Oeral of the nineteenth century. He was deeply committed to 
liberal ideals, was an expert on law, had a brilliant mind, 
and was a great public speaker. A.M. Gibson, a New York
7Burns, Unwritten Alliance, pp. 37, 49, 56.
O The best biography is probably Luiz Viana Filho,
A Vida de Rui Barbosa (7th ed., Sao Paulo: Livraria Mar­
tins Editora, 1965); hereinafter cited as Vida de Rui.
The only biography in English is Charles W. Turner, Ruy 
Barbosa: Brazilian Crusader for the Essential Freedoms
(New York: Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, 1945). This latter
book is not comprehensive, has a strong pro-Barbosa bias, 
and the documentation is incomplete. Other representative 
biographies in Portuguese are: Carlos Viana Bandeira, La-
do a Lado de Rui, 1876 a 1923 (Rio de Janeiro: Ministerio
Da Educagao E Cultura, Casa de Rui Barbosa, 1960); Maurilio 
de Gouveia, Rui— O Apostolo do Direito (2nd ed., Rio de > 
Janeiro: Grafica Tupy Limitada Editora, 1952); Mario de
Lima Barbosa, Ruy Barbosa na Politica e na Historia, 1849- 
1914 (Rio de Janeiro: F. Briguiet, 1916); Rubem Nogueira,
Historia de Ruy Barbosa (2nd ed., Salvador: Livraria Pro-
gresso Editora, 1957); Americo Palha, HistSria da Vida de 
Rui Barbosa (2nd ed., Rio de Janeiro: Casa de Rui Barbosa,
1954); and Pireira Reis Junior, A Vida de Rui Barbosa (Rio 
de Janeiro, 1949). Raymundo Magalhaes Junior, Rui# o Ho- 
mem e o Mito (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Civilizagao Brasi-
leira, 1965) is the major revisionist biography which first 
appeared in 1964 and prompted several rebuttals, notably 
Osvaldo Orico, Rui, o Mito e o Mico (Rio de Janeiro: Dis-
tribuidora Record, 1965). For other materials in English 
see the excellent summary of the life and accomplishments 
of Rui in Graham, Britain and the Onset of Modernization in 
Brazil, pp. 267-76? and Jose Maria Bello, A History of Mod­
ern Brazil, 1889-1964, trans. by James L. Taylor (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1966), pp. 59-61; hereinafter ci­
ted as Modern Brazil. In the text, Rui's name will be spel­
led with an "i," following current Brazilian orthography, 
but a "y" will be used if it appears thus in citations.
Times correspondent, reported the following after an 1889 
interview:
A perfect master of English, French, German, Italian, 
and Spanish, as well as his own language, Conselheiro 
Barbosa is thoroughly read in the legal, political, and 
economic literature of those countries. He is the first 
orator and writer of Brazil.9
Rui's inauspicious background hardly seemed to prepare him
for such a future.
Rui Caetano Barbosa de Oliveira (Rui Barbosa) was 
born in 1849 in Salvador, Bahia and his early years were 
spent in that northeastern part of Brazil, in the sugar 
plantation and slaveholding area. Rui came from a finan­
cially insecure middle class family. To offset this hin­
drance to his political ambitions, he cultivated members of 
the traditional ruling elite, especially Sousa Dantas, the 
leader of the Liberal Party in Bahia, a member of the Im­
perial Parliament, and briefly prime minister (1884-1885). 
Dantas subsequently aided him in rising to political promi­
nence .
Rui began the study of law at the age of sixteen and 
during his latter student days became an ardent abolition­
ist. He attended both Brazilian law schools, matriculating 
at Recife in 1866 and after two years transferring to Sao 
Paulo to complete the five-year course. After graduation he 
became editor of the Liberal Party newspaper in Salvador and
gNew York Times, January 20, 1890, p. 5.
11
worked in the law office of Sousa Dantas.'*'0 His reward was 
legislative seats, first in the provincial assembly, and 
later in the Imperial Parliament, As a member of the Imper­
ial Parliament from 1877 to 1884, he concerned himself with 
problems of abolition, direct election, religious liberty, 
and the spread of education. He was defeated for reelec­
tion in 1884, primarily because of his abolitionist stance. 
After his defeat he continued the abolitionist campaign 
through speeches and the press.'*'’*'
Slavery was abolished in 1888 and Rui then turned 
his attention to governmental reform in the interest of more 
representative government. He at first preferred to support 
the monarchial structure, but accepted a cabinet post in the
1889 Provisional Government which was formed by republicans
12with the support of the military. As minister of finance
and acting minister of justice, Rui soon became the leading
13figure of the new government. As a lawyer he drafted many
Rubem Nogueira, 0 Advogado Rui Barbosa, (2nd ed., 
Salvador: Edigoes GRD, 1967), pp. 52-56; and Fernando Nery,
Rui Barbosa: Ensaio Biografico (Rio de Janeiro: Casa de
Rui Barbosa, 1955), p. 15.
■^Viana, Vida de Rui, pp. 86, 132-35; Magalhaes,
Rui, o Homem e o Mito, p. 112; Luiz Viana, Filho, Rui & 
Nabuco: Ensaios (Rio de Janeiro: J. Olympia, 1949, p. 39;
and Nery, Rui Barbosa: Ensaio Biografico, p. 25.
12Magalhaes, Rui, o Homem e o Mito, pp. 420-21; and 
Bello, Modern Brazil, pp. 38, 48.
13Rui was a member of the government from November 
15, 1889 to January 21, 1891; he was minister of finance 
during this entire period and vice-president from December 
31, 1889 to August 19, 1890. He was appointed acting minis­
ter of justice on November 15, 1889 and served until Campos 
Sales, the appointed minister, arrived in Rio to assume the
important decrees and was largely responsible for writing
14the final draft of the 1891 Constitution. Rui devised an 
elaborate scheme to rescue Brazil from inflation and other 
economic difficulties of the period. By the time he re­
signed the financial post on January 21, 1891 after fourteen 
months, he had extensively modified this theoretical plan in 
an attempt to make it workable. For almost a decade the 
country's finances remained in a disastrous state and Rui
received the blame, although his plan was completely altered
15by his successors before it had received a fair test.
After the republican constitution went into effect, 
Rui attempted to interpret this document and to protect it 
from the dictatorial tendencies of the president. His op­
position made him unpopular with the administration and he 
had to flee into exile. During the time abroad and upon his
return he opposed all acts he considered to be illegal or
16unconstitutional.
post. Bello, Modern Brazil, pp. 69, 81-82, 92.
14Viana, Vida de Rui, pp. 201-02; Charles W. Simmons, 
Marshal Deodoro and the Fall of Dorn Pedro II (Durham, N.C.: 
Duke University Press, 1966), p. 141; Americo Jacobina La- 
combe, Rui Barbosa e a Primeira Constitugao da Republica 
(Rio de Janeiro: Casa de Rui Barbosa, 1949), pp. 7-9.
^Viana, Vida de Rui, pp. 196-98, 203-04; Humberto 
Bastos, Rui Barbosa, Ministro da Independencia Economica do 
Brasil (2nd ed., Sao Paulo: Livraria Martins Editora,
1951), p. 85; and Pedro Calmon, HistSria da Civilizacao Bra- 
sileira (4th ed., Sao Paulo: Companhia Editora Nacional,
1940), pp. 336-37.
"^June E. Hahner, Civilian-Military Relations in Bra­
zil, 1889-1898 (Columbia, S.C.: University of South Caro­
lina Press, 1969), pp. 45-51; Rui Barbosa, Rui Barbosa e o 
Exercito (Rio de Janeiro: Casa de Rui Barbosa, 1949),
Rui was chosen as the Brazilian delegate to the 
Second Hague Peace Conference (June 15-0ctober 15, 1907) 
because of his cosmopolitan image and brilliant oratorical 
ability. Joaquim Nabuco was Rio-Branco's first choice, but 
disagreements between the two led to Rui's appointment. As 
leader of the Hague delegation Rui made a name for himself 
and his country by opposing the United States and by vigor­
ously supporting the demands of smaller nations for equality 
with the larger nations in international disputes. This 
Brazilian antipathy toward the United States and support of 
the equality of sovereign states was very popular with the 
other Latin American countries and all of the smaller na­
tions, but apparently ran counter to the long-range strategy
of Rio-Branco, who was attempting to forge an informal alli-
17ance with the United States.
Back at home, he became a perennial candidate for 
the presidency, seeking to revise the constitution in such a 
manner as to permit more representative government. In 
three successive campaigns he stumped the country in an un­
precedented effort to take the issues to the people. Know­
ing that he had little chance of success against the en­
trenched politicians, he still campaigned vigorously for the 
presidency in 1910, 1914, and 1919. When Rui died in 1923,
pp. 113-23, 128; Bello, Modern Brazil, p. 97; Rui Barbosa, 
Cartas de Inplaterra (2nd ed., Sao Paulo: Livraria Academ-
ica, SARAIVA & C.-^Editores, 1929); and Lacombe, Rui e a 
Primeira Constitugao, pp. 20-27.
17See Burns, Unwritten Alliance, pp. 116-31.
at the age of seventy-three, he still occupied his seat in 
the Brazilian Senate and on the World Court (since 1921) and 
was considered one of the outstanding citizens of his coun-
* * *
Joaquin Aurelio Nabuco de Araujo (Joaquim Nabuco)
another important Brazilian liberal, was born in Recife in
191849, the same year as Rui Barbosa. Nabuco's father was
a member of the Parliament during Nabuco's earliest years.
Nabuco attended law school in Sao Paulo, and two of his
class mates were Rui Barbosa and Afonso Pena, who was later
20to be president of Brazil (1906-1909). After law school 
he entered law practice in his father's firm, then took up
18Homero Pires, Anglo-American Influences on Rui 
Barbosa, translated by Silvia Medrado Clinton (Rio de Jan­
eiro: Casa de Rui Barbosa, 1949), pp. 28-29, 50; Burns, A
History of Brazil, pp. 222, 247-49; Bello, Modern Brazil, 
p. 206, 236-38; Orico, Rui, o Mito e o Mico, p. 170; Rui 
Barbosa, "Manifesto A Nagao," in his Ruinas de urn Governo 
(Rio de Janeiro: Editora Guanabara, 1931), pp. 255-261;
and Rui Barbosa, Campanha Presidencial, 1919 (Bahia: Liv­
raria Catilina, 1919).
19The best biography of Nabuco is Luiz Viana, Pilho, 
A Vida de Joaquim Nabuco, (2nd ed., Sao Paulo: Livraria
Martino Editora, 1973). Nabuco's daughter wrote the only 
other biography of consequence: Carolina Nabuco, A Vida de
Joaquim Nabuco (4th ed., Rio de Janeiro: Livraria Jose
Olympia Editora, 1958) and it has been translated into Eng­
lish as Carolina Nabuco, The Life of Joaquim Nabuco, trans­
lated and edited by Ronald Hilton (Stanford: Stanford Uni­
versity Press, 1950). Several dual biographies have also 
appeared; among them are: Levi Carneiro, Dois Arautos da
Democracia: Rui Barbosa e Joaquim Nabuco (Rio de Janeiro:
Casa de Rui Barbosa, 1954); Osvaldo Orico, Rui e Nabuco:
Duas Vidas num Confronto (Lisbon: Ottosgrafica, Ltda.,
1950); and Viana, Rui & Nabuco.
20Viana, Rui & Nabuco, pp. 30-31.
journalism. From 1876 to 1878 Nabuco held minor positions 
in the Brazilian legations in Washington and London. He was 
elected to Parliament in 1878 and became a crusader for abo­
lition of slavery, direct election, and religious liberty.
Nabuco was a born orator and his eloquence was put to good
21use in the anti-slavery campaign. There was a rapid turn­
over in ministers and governments during the last years of 
the Brazilian monarchy, with frequent elections. Rui and 
Nabuco both often had difficulty being reelected to Parlia­
ment because of their abolitionist sympathies and only once
22were they both elected at the same time.
Nabuco was intensely loyal to the monarchy and, as
23he feared, the abolition campaign did help to destroy it. 
After the overthrow of the monarchy in 1889, Nabuco remained 
loyal to that form of government; but as the years passed, 
the hopes of a monarchist restoration gradually faded. Dur­
ing that period he withdrew from politics and public life,
24and for ten years his main interests were literary.
In 1899 Nabuco finally accepted an offer to serve 
the republican government as Brazil's representative in a 
dispute with Britain over the Guiana frontier. He accepted
21Graham, Britain and Modernization in Brazil, pp. 
177-81; C. Nabuco, Life of Nabuco, pp. 1-20.
22Viana, Rui & Nabuco, pp. 36-37.
23Graham, Britain and Modernization in Brazil, p.
267; C. Nabuco, Life of Nabuco, pp. 31-32; and Viana, Rui & 
Nabuco, pp. 24-25.
24C. Nabuco, Life of Nabuco, pp. 196-97; and Viana, 
Rui & Nabuco, pp. 13, 44.
the assignment because he felt it was not a political one.
Nabuco worked very closely with the Brazilian minister in
London, who was deeply involved in the negotiations. Upon
the sudden death of the minister, Nabuco temporarily assumed
his duties. He was asked to accept the post as a permanent
appointment, and finally agreed to do so in December of 
251900.
At the turn of the century, Washington was becoming 
increasingly important to Brazil. In 1905 the Americans and 
Brazilians agreed to raise the status of their diplomatic 
delegations to embassy status, and Nabuco was appointed as 
Brazil's very first ambassador. Shortly after Nabuco pre­
sented his credentials, Elihu Root was appointed as secre­
tary of state. He and Nabuco had many interests in common
26and became good friends,
Nabuco was considered the dean of the Latin American 
ambassadors in Washington because of his prestige and active 
leadership in promoting better understanding between the 
United States and Latin America. Nabuco was strongly pro- 
American and travelled widely in the United States in an at­
tempt to dispel some of the American ignorance of Bra-
2^Viana, Vida do Rio Branco, pp. 74-84, 182-95? 
Burns, Unwritten Alliance, pp. 21, 27-33? and C. Nabuco,
Life of Nabuco, pp. 245, 247, 249.
26C. Nabuco, Life of Nabuco, pp. 301, 313, 306-07? 
Ganzert, "The Baron do Rio-Branco, Joaquim Nabuco, and the 
Growth of Brazilian-American Friendship, 1900-1910," pp. 
432-51? and Graham, Britain and Modernization in Brazil, 
pp. 311-13.
27zil. Both Nabuco and Root strongly supported Pan Ameri­
canism and were intimately involved in planning the Third 
Pan American Conference which was held in Rio in 1906. Na­
buco persuaded Root to make a personal appearance at the 
conference, the first official foreign visit by a secretary
of state while in office. Nabuco was a delegate to the Rio
28Conference and was elected president.
Nabuco assisted in Brazilian preparations for the 
Second Hague Peace Conference. Through his friendship with 
Root he had access to the instructions to the American dele­
gation, and he succeeded in obtaining American support for 
an honorary position for Brazil at The Hague. During most 
of the conference proceedings, Nabuco was in Europe, osten­
sibly on leave for a health cure. In connection with this
trip he was on an official, secret mission to aid the Bra-
29zilian Hague delegation. He was very upset because of 
strong differences between the Brazilian and American dele­
gations at the Hague Conference. He did all he could to
27Ganzert, "The Baron do Rio-Branco, Joaquim Nabuco, 
and the Growth of Brazilian-American Friendship, 1900-1910," 
pp. 440-41, 450.
28C. Nabuco, Life of Nabuco, p. 317; and Graham, 
Britain and Modernization in Brazil, p. 312.
29Rio-Branco to Nabuco, Rio, April 23, 1907, Arquivo 
Historico de Itamarati, archive 235, mago 3, pasta 15, tele- 
gramas expedidas; hereinafter cited as AHI, 235/3/15 tel. 
exp.; Nabuco to Rio-Branco, Washington, May 22, 1907, AHI, 
235/3/IB telegramas recebidas; and Nabuco to Root, Washing­
ton, May 25, 1907, United States, National Archives, Record 
Group 59, General Records of the Department of State, Case 
Number 40, document 290; hereinafter cited as DS, 40/290; 
and Rio-Branco to Nabuco, Rio, May 9, 1907, AHI, 235/3/15 
tel. exp.
prevent these incidents from affecting the Brazilian-
American friendship. Nabuco died at his post in 1910 and
Secretary Root eulogized him at the dedication of the Pan-
30American Union building.
* * *
The talents of these three eminent Brazilians com­
bined to produce the desired results from Brazil's atten­
dance at the Hague Conference. They cooperated, and at 
times clashed with each other, but for the most part kept in 
mind the national interests of their country.
The following chapter will examine the interpersonal 
relationships of these three men, highlighting the status of 
each in relation to the other during the period preceding 
the conference. The pre-conference policy of Brazil toward 
the United States will also be discussed.
30Ganzert, "The Baron do Rio-Branco, Joaquim Nabuco, 
and the Growth of Brazilian-American Friendship, 1900-1910," 
p. 442; and C. Nabuco, Life of Nabuco, pp. 361-63.
CHAPTER II
FRIENDSHIPS, PERSONAL STATUS, AND POLICY TOWARD
THE UNITED STATES
During the year preceding the Second Hague Confer­
ence, maneuvering related to the selection of the Brazilian 
delegate became increasingly intense. Varying loyalties 
were involved and Joaguim Nabuco, Rui Barbosa, and Baron 
Rio-Branco were all concerned with their own status and the 
personal status of the other two individuals. Nabuco and 
Rui generally supported each other and both came to dis­
trust Rio-Branco. Rio-Branco, for his part, played Nabuco 
and Rui against each other in order to gain his own politi­
cal ends. Foreign Minister Rio-Branco was committed to a 
pro-American policy but was jealous of Nabuco, who as am­
bassador to the United States, had become a close friend of 
American Secretary of State Elihu Root and threatened to 
pre-empt Rio-Branco*s initiative in Washington.
* * *
Nabuco had been a personal friend of Rui since law 
school and he was pleased to see Rui's prestige increase—  
this presented no threat to him. Nabuco was willing to 
support and increase the status of Rio-Branco as foreign 
minister as long as it did not conflict with Nabuco*s own
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pro-American ideas. He was not interested in becoming for­
eign minister, but was dedicated to promoting United States- 
Brazilian friendship.
When the Brazilian monarchy was overthrown in 1889 
Joaquim Nabuco, a confirmed monarchist, severed his ties 
with the government, preferring to remain loyal to the de­
posed emperor.̂  Rui Barbosa, on the other hand, supported
the republican government, serving as vice-president, fi-
2nance minister, and acting minister of justice. He also 
rendered additional service by drafting the republican con­
stitution, drawing heavily from the United States Constitu­
tion. ̂
These differing political persuasions caused the
two boyhood friends to drift apart. However, after ten
years of retirement from political life, Nabuco finally
agreed to serve as Brazilian representative in the dispute
with Great Britain over the Guiana frontier. He left for
4Europe on May 3, 1899 to take up this assignment. On the 
eve of his departure, Nabuco wrote Rui a friendly note, rec­
onciling their differences:
^C. Nabuco, Life of Nabuco, p. 208; and Victor L. 
Tapie, Joaquim Nabuco, 1844-1910, trans. by Jacob Bean 
(Paris: UNESCO, 1949), p. 33.
^Bello, Modern Brazil, pp, 38, 48.
OJViana, Vida de Rui, pp. 201-02; Simmons, Marshal 
Deodoro and the Fall of Dorn Pedro II; and Lacombe, Rui Bar­
bosa e a Primeira Constitugao da Republica, pp. 7-9.
^C. Nabuco, Life of Nabuco, pp. 240-44.
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My dear Ruy,
On parting I wish you the best of everything and 
hope that you will always remember me with the friend­
ship which bound us in the time of our youth, certain 
that you do not have any greater desire than I to see 
the perfecting of your talent, the universality of your 
name, and the immortality of your work. I am more de­
sirous than you yourself to see it enter into its true 
and superior sphere, and it is sincere satisfaction that 
accompanies the fullness of your intellectual orb.
Always yours 
Joaquim Nabuco
This flattering note was evidence of the effort at reconcil­
iation between the two.
In the selection of the Brazilian representative 
for the Third Pan American Conference, both Rui and Nabuco 
were considered for the post. This situation did not cause 
further friction between them, but rather presented an op­
portunity for renewal of their friendship.
In May of 1906, the Brazilian foreign minister, 
Baron Rio-Branco, wrote to Rui Barbosa requesting an ap­
pointment to talk with him for a few minutes, in the name of
gthe president, about the Third Pan American Conference. 
Rio-Branco asked Rui to accept the position of Brazilian 
representative to the conference, which was to meet in Rio
5Joaquim_Nabuco to Rui Barbosa, Rio, May 22, 1899, 
Arquivo da Fundagao Casa de Rui Barbosa, Pasta J. Nabuco; 
(hereinafter the archive will be cited as CRB). Rui had been 
one of the first to applaud the acceptance of the position 
by Nabuco, in "A Missao Nabuco," A Imprensa, March 13, 1889. 
On that occasion Nabuco replied, "Thank you for your article 
of yesterday. It is most gratifying to me, that after so 
long a separation, we return to the old comradeship of our 
youth when we were both part of the liberal group in law 
school." Nabuco to Rui, March 14, 1889, quoted in Viana,
Rui & Nabuco, pp. 58-59.
gBaron Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, May 8, 1906, CRB, 
Pasta Rio-Branco (Acre).
de Janeiro later that year. Rui, complaining of poor health
at the moment, was not disposed to accept the assignment and
7asked for time to consider it. After deliberating for fif­
teen days he refused to accept, stating his reasons in a
Oletter on May 25th.
Joaquim Nabuco, now Brazilian ambassador to the
United States, arrived in Rio on July 17, 1906 for the Third
Pan American Conference. Soon after his arrival he wrote to
Rui, thanking him for his visit and asking to be allowed a
few more days before repaying it because he wanted to see
Rui when they would have time to talk. He went on to say
that he would like to have seen Rui accept the position of
gBrazilian representative at the conference. Nabuco asked 
Rui if a joint session of Congress, or at least a session of
the Senate, could be arranged to honor Secretary of State
Elihu Root and the United States. He said Rui's eloquence 
at such a session would certainly further the politics of 
approximation between the two countries.^ Rui granted Na- 
buco's request on the social call, saying that old compan-
7Rui to Rio-Branco, Rio, May 25, 1906, Arquivo do 
Barao do Rio-Branco, Mago 18, pasta 8; hereinafter cited as 
ABR-B, 18/8.
Q Ibid. Rui here protests that he is in ill health 
from overwork and consequently is taking treatment requiring 
relative rest and is thus unable to accept the position.
^Nabuco to Rui, Rio, July 21, 1906, CRB, Pasta 
J. Nabuco. See also Nabuco to Evalina Nabuco, aboard the 
Thames, July 16, 1906, cited in Viana, Vida de Nabuco, 
p.376.
■^Nabuco to Rui, Rio, July 21, 1906, CRB, Pasta 
J. Nabuco.
ions did not have to stand on ceremony. He did not reject
the idea of a special congressional session, but declined to
be the orator, pleading that
I am too old, sick, and . . .  no longer assume initia­
tives, nor expose myself to reckless actions. The years 
and the attrition of hostile things . . . have devel­
oped in me a distrust which is only overcome when some 
irresistable desire commands my blind obedience.H
Rui went on to tell Nabuco, confidentially, that this was 
the reason he excused himself from the Pan American Confer­
ence.^^
In reply, Nabuco asked Rui to serve as Brazilian
spokesman at the reception for Mr. Root. He begged Rui to
accept this role, for Rui's own sake and for the sake of
Brazil. He then gave detailed suggestions on what topics to
13cover at the reception and again implored Rui to do it.
Rui, after some reluctance, agreed to welcome Root in the 
Senate.
Rui to Nabuco, Rio, July 22, 1906, CRB, Pasta 
J. Nabuco. Viana, Vida de Rui, p. 295, says Rui accepted the 
role of orator, citing this letter. However, the letter 
reads, "Nao seria, com efeito, sem analogias na historia dos 
parliamentos a sua lembranca de uma manifestagao ao secre- 
tario de estado americano pelas camaras de Congresso. Mas 
no que nao convenho, e no papel, que Voce me designa." In 
the same letter Rui later says, "Mas a postura de porta-voz 
do Congresso, que Voce me quer dar, a outrem deve cair."
On June 26th, Nabuco paid the promised visit to Rui. At 
that time Nabuco persuaded Rui to change his mind about 
being orator for the Root banquet on August 2nd. Viana, Rui 
& Nabuco, p. 70.
12Rui to Nabuco, Rio, July 22, 1906, CRB, Pasta
J. Nabuco.
13Nabuco to Rui, Rio, July 23, 1906, CRB, Pasta
J . Nabuco.
14Viana, Vida de Nabuco, p. 380.
The relationship from their youth seems now to have
been renewed. Nabuco sent some gifts and Rui responded by
saying, "I thank you very much for these souvenirs, which
will be a reminder of the renewal of our good relationship,
15which I value greatly."
* * *
Rio-Branco was wary of increasing the status of Na­
buco. He knew that Nabuco was being considered as a pos­
sible replacement for himself, and he felt that Nabuco had 
become too pro-American and was independently pursuing that 
policy without regard to the desires of the Foreign Minis­
ter. He believed that Nabuco had seized Rio-Branco's own 
iniative of Brazilian-American friendship and had wrested 
it from him.
Nabuco was welcomed as a hero in Brazil on his way
to the Third Pan American Conference (Rio Conference) and he
attributed that fact to the popularity of his "American Pol- 
16icy." Rodrigues Alves, the Brazilian president, as well
as Afonso Pena, the president-elect, had been law school
17classmates of Nabuco and Rui. In organizing the govern­
ment for 1906-1910 there was speculation about whether or 
not Pena would replace Baron Rio-Branco as foreign minister.
15Rui to Nabuco, Rio, July 30, 1906, Arquivo Par­
ticular de Joaquim Nabuco? hereinafter cited as AJN.
■^Nabuco to Evalina Nabuco, aboard the Thames, July 
16, 1906, quoted in C. Nabuco, Life of Nabuco, p. 322? let­
ter also cited in Viana, Vida de Nabuco, p. 376.
17Ronald Hilton, translator and editor, in preface
to C. Nabuco, Life of Nabuco, p. xxii.
It was said that Pena favored Joaquim Nabuco, but public
18opinion leaned toward Rio-Branco.
Rio-Branco had long been an intimate friend of Nabu­
co and had sought his advice on whether or not to accept the
Foreign Ministry post in the new government of Rodrigues Al- 
19ves in 1902. After deciding to accept, Rio-Branco had
written of his decision to Nabuco indicating that he only
intended to retain the post for two years, saying,
It is resolved, then that in 1904 I shall try to hand 
you my staff of office in Rio; if you want nothing of 
this, then return to London. . . .  I shall occupy my­
self with the Foreign Ministry only until you are freed 
by a victory in Rome.20
Later events were to prove that Rio-Branco changed his mind 
in regard to this matter.
At the time Rio-Branco sought his advice, Nabuco had 
been the Brazilian representative on the commission for ar­
bitration of the boundary dispute between Brazil and British 
Guiana. King Victor Emmanuel III of Italy was the arbitra­
tor and thus Nabuco, who was assigned to London, was spend­
ing much of his time in Rome. Raul, the son of Rio-Branco,
21was secretary to this special mission in Rome.
18Lins, Rio-Branco, p. 369.
19Rio-Branco to Nabuco, telegram, Berlin, August 7, 
1902, quoted in C. Nabuco, Life of Nabuco, p. 260; and Vi­
ana, Vida do Rio Branco, p. 315.
20Rio-Branco to Nabuco, Berlin, August 30, 1902, 
quoted in C. Nabuco, Life of Nabuco, p. 261.
21Ronald Hilton, trans. and ed., in C. Nabuco, Life 
of Nabuco, p. 260. Nabuco and the Brazilian minister in 
London, Arthur de Souza Correa, were jointly working on the 
arbitration. Upon the sudden death of Souza Correa, Nabuco
During his stay in Rio for the Third Pan American
Conference, Nabuco learned that he was to be invited to take
22over the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. However, Rio-Branco 
changed his mind about leaving the position and wished to 
continue under Afonso Pena. Since Riq-Branco wished to re­
main, Nabuco felt it was not difficult for him to refuse the 
position. However, he also was convinced that his health 
could not stand the hard work, and he believed he could not
be adequately replaced in Washington, which he considered a
23crucial post for Brazil. By the end of September everyone
believed that Rio-Branco would remain as foreign minister
after the inauguration of the new administration, and Nabuco
was relieved that he did not have to refuse an invitation to
24the post by his boyhood friend, Afonso Pena.
The highlight of the Rio Conference was the visit by 
Elihu Root, American Secretary of State. His presence at 
the conference was primarily due to the persuasion of Joa-
took complete charge of the negotiations and also virtually 
ran the London ministry, although declining an official ap­
pointment. However, he finally was forced to make a deci­
sion whether or not to join the government; in December of 
1900 he accepted appointment as Brazilian minister to Lon­
don. C. Nabuco, Life of Nabuco, pp. 245, 247, 249.
22Viana, Vida de Nabuco, p. 383.
23C. Nabuco, Life of Nabuco, pp. 329-30.
24Viana, Vida de Nabuco, p. 384. While assembling 
a cabinet Afonso Pena, perhaps sensing Nabuco's predicament, 
wrote him, "For whatever motive, you can bestow your cooper­
ation during my presidency in the post which you judge to be 
better able to serve our Country." Pena to Nabuco, August 
30, 1906, quoted in C. Nabuco, Life of Nabuco, p. 437.
25quim Nabuco. In 1905 Nabuco had been appointed as the
first Brazilian ambassador to Washington when the two coun-
2 6tries agreed to elevate their legations to embassy status.
One of Nabuco's first official acts in Washington was to at-
27tend the funeral of Secretary of State John Hay. Root, 
then Secretary of War, succeeded Hay on July 1, 1905. Nabu­
co and Root soon became good friends and both recognized the
desirability of closer relations between their two coun- 
28tries. Nabuco helped Root a great deal on many Latin 
American matters, but he proved to be a handicap in some re­
spects because the other Latin American countries resented 
Brazil's self-assigned role of second great power in the
25Theodore Roosevelt informed Nabuco that the ambas­
sador was responsible for Root's going to the Rio Confer­
ence. C. Nabuco, Life of Nabuco, p. 317. Burns says that 
persuading Root to attend the conference was one of the four 
greatest achievements of Nabuco as Brazilian ambassador. 
Burns, Unwritten Alliance, p. 141. The visit was especially 
notable because it was the first foreign trip by an American 
secretary of state while in office.
2 6Rio-Branco's first telegram to the new ambassador 
read: "Nabuco, Brazilian Ambassador, Washin£ton. Affec­
tionate regards / to the_7 new ambassador /_ who is_7 cer­
tain to remain there many years, ever developing closer re­
lations with the influential so that in this post you may 
apply your knowledge and patriotism. Rio Branco." Rio- 
Branco to Nabuco, Petropolis, May 23, 1905, AHI, 235/3/15 
tel. exp.
27C. Nabuco, Life of Nabuco, p. 312.
28Root to Nabuco, Washington, November 28, 1905, 
quoted in Philip C. Jessup, Elihu Root, 2 vols. (New York: 
Dodd, Mead, and Company, Inc., 1938), I, pp. 472-73; Nabuco 
speech at the Casino Pluminense, July 20, 1906, quoted in 
C. Nabuco, Life of Nabuco, p. 325; Viana, Rui & Nabuco, 
p. 65; and Viana, Vida de Nabuco, p. 356.
29Americas.
Secretary Root left for Rio on July 4th in a new
Navy cruiser and, at the suggestion of Nabuco, called at
30three Brazilian ports enroute. At Recife, Nabuco's home,
a large crowd turned out to hear a speech by Root in which
31he praised the Brazilian ambassador highly. When the
American secretary of state and his family arrived in Rio,
the enthusiastic reception accorded them presaged the fes-
32tivities meticulously arranged for this visit. Nabuco
strongly supported Rio-Branco's policy of aligning Brazil
with the United States and Root's visit signified the suc-
33cess of this policy.
The Third Pan American Conference convened on July
23rd in the newly constructed Monroe Palace. Naming of the
edifice for President Monroe was another of the moves by the
Brazilian government calculated to arouse Brazilian public
34opinion in favor of the United States. Rio-Branco deliv-
29Jessup, Root, I, pp. 471-72.
30 , . ,Ibid.
31Nabuco to Rui, Rio, July 23, 1906, CRB, Pasta 
J. Nabuco? and Root speech, Recife, July 22, 1906, in Robert 
Bacon and James B. Scott, Latin America and the United 
States: Addresses by Elihu Root (Cambridge: Harvard Uni­
versity Press, 1917), pp. 47-48.
32Lloyd Griscom to Root, July 16, 1907, DS, 1113/2.
33Burns, Unwritten Alliance, p. 114.
34For a summary of Brazilian efforts to influence 
public opinion in that direction see a long memorandum by 
Lloyd Griscom, U.S. Ambassador to Brazil. The memorandum, 
destined as a background paper for Mr. Root's visit, also 
supplies good, informed, contemporary opinion on political
ered the opening address of the conference, and its first
act was to elect Nabuco president and Root and Rio-Branco
35honorary presidents.
The Root family arrived in Rio early on July 27th
and they were soon involved as spectators or participants in
numerous parades, receptions, banquets, and speeches during
their week-long stay. On July 31st Secretary Root addressed
a special session of the Conference and Nabuco introduced
him as the one largely responsible for the meeting and for 
36its program.
The Rio Conference helped to determine the course of 
the Second Hague Peace Conference and also Brazil's course 
in that later conference. Root tried to impress upon the 
delegates the importance of the upcoming Hague conference.
In his first speech to the conference he reminded the assem­
bled delegates that, for the first time, all of the American 
nations would be represented at The Hague, and he hoped that 
their equal rights as sovereign states would be recognized. 
He saw this representation as formal acceptance by the 
world that no part of the American continents was subject to
conditions in Brazil. Griscom to Root, PetrSpolis, July 16, 
1906, DS, 1113/2.
35Burns, Unwritten Alliance, p. 110.
36Jessup, Root, I, pp. 478-79. In preparation for 
the Rio Conference three major items for the agenda had the 
potential for substantial conflict among the countries rep­
resented. However, the commission preparing the agenda left 
these three items to be decided at the Hague Conference.
The commission was chaired by Root and was composed of am­
bassadors of the major Latin American countries in Washing­
ton. Viana, Vida de Nabuco, p. 371-72.
37colonization.
In the discussions of the arbitration committee, the 
close connection between the Rio and Hague conferences was 
emphasized. Some members wanted the committee report to de­
clare compulsory arbitration as a necessary part of any ar­
bitration agreement. Despite much sympathy for this posi­
tion, it was agreed that such a declaration would unduly 
complicate the Hague negotiations. Instead of such a decla­
ration, the committee drew up a strong resolution on arbi-
38tration, which the conference adopted.
Discussion of the Dr ago Doctrine (.named for the Ar­
gentine foreign minister) was perhaps the most exciting
topic at the Rio Conference and was the second item deferred
39 *to the Hague Conference. In December 1902, Luis M. Drago,
foreign minister of Argentina, had formulated a principle
stating that no public debt should serve as the excuse for
armed intervention or occupation of territory in the Western 
40Hemisphere. Root's instructions to the American delegates 
approved of the Drago Doctrine, but instructed them to rec­
37Calvin DeArmond Davis, The United States and the 
Second Hague Peace Conference; American Diplomacy and In­
ternational Organization, 1899-1914 (Durham, N.C.: Duke
University Press, 1975), pp. 133-34; and Elihu Root, speech, 
July 31, 1906, in 59th Congress, 2nd Session, Senate, Docu­
ment No. 365, Report of the Delegates of the United States 
to the Third International Conference of the American States 
Washington, 1907).
38"Resolutions of the 1906 International Conference 
of the American States,1 in Report of Delegates of the U.S.
39Davis, U.S. and the Second Conference, p. 134.
40Burns, Unwritten Alliance, p. 170.
ommend that the conference refrain from taking action on the 
matter, since by such action it would appear that the deb­
tors were attempting to dictate the actions of their credi­
tors. Root recommended that the topic be reserved for con-
41sideration at The Hague. However, after much debate a
strong resolution was approved, recommending that the Second
Hague Peace Conference examine the issue with a view toward
42diminishing conflicts exclusively pecuniary in origin.
In his speech at the closing session of the Third 
Pan American Conference, Joaquim Nabuco recognized the ac­
complishments, but he emphasized the importance of the Sec­
ond Hague Conference and the relationship of the Rio confer­
ence to the forthcoming one at The Hague:
Although we confirmed thus the existence of an American 
political system, yet by reserving to The Hague the so­
lution of two important questions, we have shown that we 
do not recognize the existence of a private system of
international law for ourselves and that we do not form
a separate community from world civilization. . . . You 
ratified the adhesion of the American republics to the 
principle of arbitration, and you made an appeal to the 
coming Hague Conference to perpetuate this principle in 
a treaty worthy of the approbation of the entire civi­
lized world . . . .  You recommended that our govern­
ments consider the advisability of asking the Hague Con­
ference to study the question of the collection of pub­
lic debts by force and more generally to investigate 
methods for diminishing the possibility for conflicts 
exclusively pecuniary in o r i g i n . 43
41Root's "Instructions to the American Delegation," 
June 18, 1906, pp. 41-42, cited in Davis, U.S and the Sec­
ond Conference, p. 134.
42"Resolutions of the 1906 Conference," in Report of 
Delegates of the U.S., p. 116; and Davis, U.S. and the Sec­
ond Conference, p. 134.
43Joaquim Nabuco, speech, August 27, 1906, quoted in
C. Nabuco, Life of Nabuco, pp. 327-28.
Thus the American nations assembled at Rio referred for dis­
cussion at The Hague several topics of importance to them.
* * *
Since Rio-Branco's policy of Brazilian-American 
friendship was being pre-empted by Nabuco, the Baron began 
seeking ways to counteract the Ambassador's influence with 
the Americans. Thus, while the friendship of Rui and Nabuco 
was growing closer, the relationship between Rio-Branco and 
Nabuco was becoming increasingly strained. This situation 
was to have an effect on the makeup of the Brazilian delega­
tion to the Hague Conference and cause a delay in the ap­
pointment of the Brazilian representative.
Nabuco remained in Rio after the close of the Third 
Pan American Conference because of the terminal illness of 
his father-in-law. While in Rio he had hoped to spend some 
time with Rui, but this did not prove to be possible. Two 
dsys before his departure for the United States, he wrote to 
Rui lamenting the fact that, because of the death in the 
family, he had been unable to accept Rui's invitation to 
spend a night at the home of "my old comrade and friend."
He asked Rui to send word if he could help him in any way in
Washington where he was "serving as the agent of the approx-
44imation between Brazil and the United States."
Nabuco also wrote to Rio-Branco, praising the Baron 
for his service to Brazil then saying,
44Nabuco to Rui, Rio, October 15, 1906, CRB, Pasta
J. Nabuco.
for my part, I congratulate myself on the role that is 
right for me, because you will not disavow me and will 
give me liberty of action, without which I can do noth­
ing for our friendship with America.45
Nabuco was serving notice that he intended to pursue his
pro-American policy and hoped Rio-Branco would not order a
change.
Ambassador Nabuco sailed for the United States, go­
ing to New York via London where he took the opportunity to
46visit his old friends at the Brazilian legation. Upon ar­
rival in New York, there occurred an incident which gave 
ample opportunity for Nabuco's enemies in Rio to poke fun at 
him and his American policy. The American immigration au­
thorities, in enforcing a new law, reportedly subjected the 
ambassador to "humiliating" questions such as whether or not 
he was a polygamist or anarchist, if he had ever been in
prison, if he had been in an insane asylum or poor house,
47and where he got the money to pay his passage. Evidently
45Nabuco to Rio-Branco, Rio, October 12, 1906,
ABR-B, 18/1. Since presenting his credentials in Washing­
ton, Nabuco had deliberately exceeded his instructions in 
seeking approximation with the U.S. He later threatened to 
resign on several occasions if Rio-Branco would not support 
his position. Nabuco to Evelina Nabuco, Washington, May 28,
1905, quoted in Viana, Vida de Nabuco, p. 354; Nabuco to 
Rio-Branco, Washington, January 18, 1908, ABR-B, 74/1, rec. 
See also Nabuco to Graga Aranha, Washington, March 4, 1907, 
AJN; Nabuco to Pena, Washington, January 23, 1908, AJN; Pena 
to Nabuco, PetrSpolis, February 10, 1908, AJN; and Nabuco to 
Gomes Feirerra, Washington, February 18, 1908, AJN.
46Regis de Oliveira to Nabuco, London, November 1,
1906, AJN.
47Griscom to Root, Petropolis, November 23, 1906,
DS, 3464/1; and Jornal do Brasil, November 18, 1908.
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the incident was blown out of proportion because over a
month later Root sent the following telegram in code:
Griscom, Rio de Janeiro. Your number 57, Nov. 23rd. 
Ambassador Nabuco positively denies that any such inci­
dent as you refer to ever occurred. Immediately upon 
reading the story in American newspapers I called upon 
him personally and was informed by him that the story 
was entirely false. Please have false statements cor­rected in Rio. R o o t . 4 8
Since Griscom's original report on November 23rd,
Rio-Branco had made reference on several occasions, with
obvious irritation, to the alleged incident in New York in-
49volving the Brazilian ambassador. The American ambassador 
followed Root's instructions and soon smoothed over the 
"incident." The case was closed after Rio-Branco published 
in a newspaper a letter from Nabuco denying that a confron­
tation had taken place and satisfactorily explaining the 
50incident. Until Griscom called on him, Rio-Branco made no 
effort to correct the negative impression conveyed by the 
incident as it was reported in the press. He told Griscom 
that he had no more authoritative information on the inci­
dent than what he read in the press until he received Nabu-
51co's letter of November 28th. Rio-Branco's explanation 
was considered satisfactory and the matter was dropped, but
48Root to Griscom, Washington, December 28, 1906,
DS, 3464/2.
49Griscom to Root, Petropolis, December 31, 1906,
DS, 3464/4.
50Note from Nabuco to Rio-Branco, published in the 
Jornal do Commercio, December 30, 1906.
51Griscom to Root, Petropolis, December 31, 1906,
DS, 3464/4.
Griscom foresaw that adverse consequences would be felt for 
52a long time. Rio-Branco was apparently beginning to re­
treat from the position of blind adulation of the United 
States which he had adopted at the Rio Conference. The Bar­
on was also envious of Nabuco's popularity and he perceived 
the ambassador's growing independence of action as threaten­
ing to undermine his authority.
Upon his return to Washington Nabuco received a dis­
quieting letter from Jose Pereira da Costa Mota, a diploma­
tic colleague now in Petersburg. This sixteen-page letter 
marked "confidential," severely attacked Rio-Branco, who had 
just exiled the author to Russia, to make a place for one of 
his favorites. Costa Mota quoted Jose Carlos Rodrigues as 
saying, truthfully, "Rio Branco is the world's greatest ego­
tist and his friends are only for his own ends; and one
deputy told me he is a vain drunkard, and another: he is
53conceited!" He went on to tell Nabuco that the ambassador 
would be disillusioned when he recognized the situation, and 
advised him to avoid it as much as he could. Costa Mota 
said Rio-Branco wanted to be the only one:
52Ibid. Nabuco confirmed that Root came to his 
residence early the next morning to present the apologies of 
the American government for the reported incident. Nabuco 
said he told Root there was no discourtesy, and considered 
the matter settled. Nabuco to Rio-Branco, November 28,
1906, published in the Jornal do Commercio, December 30, 
1906.
53Quoted in Costa Mota to Nabuco, November, n.d., 
1906, AJN. Jose C. Rodrigues was owner and editor of the 
Jornal do Commercio at this time. Ambassador Griscom de­
scribed him as "one of the principal factors in moulding of 
public opinion in Brazil." Griscom to Root, Petropolis,
July 16, 1906, DS, 1113/2.
How he has thought of your triumphal march in America 
and your popularity; everything not of his own making 
causes him to be envious, and jealous. You will be 
bowled over to read this; It is the truth. . . . Rio- 
Branco is now a hard man, who has entrails of steel anda heart of b r o n z e . 54
This attack on the foreign minister could perhaps be passed
off as that of a bitter man striking back at his supposed
tormentor, if Nabuco would not soon come to hold and pri-
55vately express similar views.
Rio-Branco hoped to have Nabuco lead the Hague dele­
gation, where Nabuco would be obliged to follow Rio-Branco's 
direct orders and would surely come into conflict with the 
Americans, thus decreasing his stature and standing in Wash­
ington and bringing him back under Rio-Branco's control. 
Meanwhile, regardless of his private opinions, Rio-Branco 
continued publicly to praise Nabuco. For example, on Novem­
ber 10th, he spoke to a delegation of Brazilian army offi­
cers, responding to their presentation to him of bound cop­
ies of speeches delivered by himself and Root at the Rio 
Conference. After congratulating outgoing president Rodri­
gues Alves for his American policy, he continued,
I only deserve the merit of having proposed the creation 
of an Embassy in Washington and the appointment to it of 
Joaquim Nabuco, who occupies it with such distinction 
and has known how to do so much there to make Brazil 
better known and esteemed. The sympathetic movement 
which has so greatly increased in the United States of 
America in favor of Brazil is due, without doubt to the 
rare qualities of our worthy Ambassador, to the perfec-
54Costa Mota to Nabuco, November, n.d., 1906, AJN.
55See Nabuco to Graga Aranha, Washington, February
25, 1907, AJN; and Nabuco to Graga Aranha, Washington, March
4, 1907, AJN.
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tion with which he knows how to translate the__ideas of 
the Government of his country and the charm /_ with_7 
which he inspires all those who come closely in contact 
with him.56
Ambassador Griscom about this time took the opportu­
nity, on the occasion of a diplomatic reception, to congrat­
ulate the outgoing Brazilian president for the "consistent 
friendly attitude" which he had maintained throughout the
four years of his term of office towards Americans and Amer-
57ican interests. Griscom mentioned three incidents that 
had been of particular importance in furthering Brazilian- 
American friendship to this point: the Pan American Con­
gress in Rio, the visit of Secretary Root to Brazil, and
the elevation of the diplomatic missions to embassy sta- 
58tus.
On November 15th, Afonso Pena assumed the presidency 
and the only cabinet member to retain his post was Foreign 
Minister Rio-Branco. There had been considerable doubt as; to 
whether or not Pena would continue the trend of approximation 
with the United States advocated by his predecessor. The 
retention of Rio-Branco seemed to portend little change in 
Brazil's foreign policy, and the American ambassador was
5^Rio-Branco, speech, quoted in Griscom to Root, 
Petropolis, November, s.d., 1906, DS, 1113/4.
57Griscom to Root, PetrSpolis, November 28, 1906,
DS, 2372/3.
5 8Ibid. Rio-Branco and Nabuco had both been inti­
mately involved with, and primarily responsible for, these 
three noted achievements of President Rodrigues Alves.
59delighted with Pena's inaugural address. The United
States was the only foreign nation mentioned in the message
and the new Brazilian leader left no doubt that he intended
that the closer relations between the two countries should 
60continue.
At Griscom's insistence a telegram was sent from
Root, which was delivered personally to Pena, expressing the
thanks of the American government for the remarks in his in-
61augural address. Pena was very pleased with the message 
from Root and assured the ambassador that it would be the 
policy of his government to bring their two nations ever 
closer together. Griscom reported, "I received a most fa­
vorable impression from the conversation I had with the
President. He appeared forceful and alert and his method of
62dealing with business was simple and direct."
The ambassador concluded his dispatch by thus sum­
marizing his appraisal of the Pena government:
You may feel confident that the personnel and the dis­
position of the new Government is in every way favorable 
to the ideas entertained by President Roosevelt and 
yourself, as propounded by you during your recent tour 
of South America, concerning the relations which should 
exist between the United States and the Republics of
59Ibid.
60 ^Griscom to Root, Petropolis, November 16, 1906,
DS, 2372/1.
6 XRoot to Griscom, Washington, November 17, 1906,
DS, 2372/2? and Griscom to Root, Petropolis, November 28, 
1906, DS, 2372/3.
6 2Griscom to Root, Petropolis, November 28, 1906,
DS, 2372/3.
g 3South America.
Thus the stage was set for continuing cooperation between 
the two countries.
* * *
Nabuco was mentally and physically exhausted from 
his trip to Rio, as he told his long-time friend, Richard C. 
Shannon, who was concerned about Nabuco's health. Shannon 
recognized that Nabuco had been over-worked that year and 
gave him the following advice: "You will have to go to some
good watering place next Summer and have a good long rest;
taking Madam Nabuco with you, this time, and all the child-
,,64 ren."
Nabuco recognized the veracity and value of this ad­
vice, immediately writing to Rio-Branco that his health was 
not good and that he needed a year for a complete cure. He 
further said this cure could only be taken in Europe and 
that only after he were completely well could the question
of whether or not he would continue in his post be re- 
65solved. The request, coming at this particular time, may
63, . .Ibid.
64Shannon to Nabuco, Brockport, N.Y., December 10, 
1906, AJN. Richard Cutts Shannon served as a U.S. Congress­
man, 1895-99. He had spent twelve years in Brazil as secre­
tary to the U.S. Legation to Brazil, 1871-75, and as an ad­
ministrator of the Botanical Garden Railroad Company, an 
American enterprise, 1876-83. Shannon developed a friend­
ship with Nabuco shortly after his arrival in Brazil. Shan­
non to Nabuco, Brockport, N.Y., December 21, 1906, AJN; and 
Who Was Who in America, Vol. I, 1897-1942 (Chicago: A.N.
Marquis Company, 1943), p. 1109.
65Nabuco to Rio-Branco, Washington, December 12,
1906, AJN.
have been due at least in part to Rio-Branco's delay in cor-
6 6recting the impressions of the New York incident. The am­
bassador, however, apparently considered himself to be Rio- 
Branco' s "dedicated old friend," as he admonished the Baron 
to care for his own health. He also was deeply sympathetic 
to his long-time colleague in his lonely position of foreign
minister saying, "I very well understand the horror of that
6 7solitary prison of Itamarati."
It is important to determine the state of Nabuco's 
health during this period, for he was later to cite ill 
health as a reason for declining nomination as a delegate to 
the Hague Peace Conference. The veracity of his claim of
S 8ill health would also be questioned by many at that time.
In reply to a letter from a Mr. Sours, Nabuco apolo­
gized for a tardy response, saying, "I have not been in very
69good health & that obstructed all my correspondence."
However, the Brazilian ambassador continued to honor as many
70speaking engagements as possible. The day after he wrote 
Sours, Nabuco wrote Shannon:
6 6See pp. 33 and 34, above, for details of the inci­
dent.
6 7Nabuco to Rio-Branco, Washington, December 12,
1906, AJN.
6 8Hilario de Gouvea to Nabuco, Petropolis, March 24,
1907, AJN? and Graga Aranha to Nabuco, Petropolis, April 1, 
1907, AJN.
69Nabuco to Sours, Washington, February 18, 1907,
AJN.
70Nabuco to Root, Washington, February 18, 1907,
AJN:
It is a true sacrifice for me to leave tonight for Buf­
falo. I had to speak the other night at the University 
Club Dinner and to remain seating / sic 7 from 7 1/2 to 
12 1/2 in a room vitiated by the smoke of 400 cigars.
And my poor digestive power did not allow me to touch 
any of the dishes. As I had already a cold, with the 
effort I made to stand on trembling legs, like my Fa­
ther, I came home very tired by one o'clock and had to 
keep in bed next day until dinner time, when we had a 
party of friends. My chest is painful and the Doctor, 
who has been here twice since, says I must be very care­
ful. 71
This illness was due to the continued hard work and busy
schedule of the ambassador and to the strain of preparation
for and attendance at the Rio Conference, combined with the
death of his father-in-law. On doctor's orders Nabuco took
a month of relative rest, which caused his health to improve
72quite a bit, but he would be ill again the following year.
During Nabuco's stay in Rio, Rio-Branco evidently
had asked him to represent Brazil at the Second Hague Peace
Conference. In any event, Nabuco was convinced that he
would lead the Brazilian delegation to the conference and
73had discussed it with Shannon. In an effort to prod Nabu­
co into officially accepting, Rio-Branco evidently prompted 
a report in a Brazilian paper in Paris, which then appeared
71Nabuco to Shannon, Washington, February 19, 1907, 
AJN. Leao Zagury, of the Brazilian ministry in London, ac­
companied Nabuco from Rio to London in November, 1906. He 
now wrote to Nabuco, "I hope that these last months have 
given you opportunity for complete rest after your long trip 
and great labors during the last year." Zagury to Nabuco, 
March 15, 1907, AJN.
72Nabuco to Graga Aranha, Washington, March 4, 1907,
AJN.
73Shannon to Nabuco, Brockport, N.Y., December 21,
1906, AJN.
in the Rio press. The following announcement appeared in
the December 27, 1906 issue of the Courier du Bresil: "Our
envoy to The Hague will be the diplomat who has represented
us in Washington for over a year with great prestige, Mr.
74Joaquim Nabuco." In January the Correio da Manha quoted 
that announcement with approval, saying, "It appears that
75the choice of our government could not have been better."
However, just two days later the same paper proposed Rui
76Barbosa as Brazil's representative to the conference.
Rui's candidacy soon caught the public imagination, 
and as other papers got on the bandwagon, Rio-Branco real­
ized Rui's popular support. The Baron had not yet made pub­
lic his selection of Nabuco, so instead he recommended to
77President Pena that Rui receive the nomination. Until
about the end of February 1907, Nabuco was commonly accepted
as the Brazilian representative and several persons had ap-
78proached him for a position in the delegation. Rio-Branco
7 4Courier du Bresil, December 27, 1906, quoted in 
"0 Brasil Na Haya," Correio da Manha, January 14, 1907, p.l.
75Correxo da Manha, January 14, 1907, p. 1.
76Graga Aranha to Nabuco, Gramier, (Cabo Frio), Jan­
uary 16, 1907, AJN.
77 *•Ibid. See also Lins, Rio-Branco, p. 373; Americo
Jacobina Lacombe, Rio-Branco e Rui Barbosa (Rio de Janeiro:
Imprensa Nacional, 1948), p. 71; Viana, Vida de Rui, p. 295;
Viana, Vida de Nabuco, p. 397; C. Nabuco, Life of Nabuco,
pp. 342-43; and Hildebrando Accioly, "O Barao do Rio Branco
e a 2a Conferencia da Haia," Revista do Instituto HistSrico
e Geografico Braslleiro, CLXXXVII (April-June, 1945), 64.
78Oscar Lopes to Nabuco, Rio, January 23, 1907, AJN;
and Jose Verissimo to Nabuco, Rio, February 26, 1907, AJN.
However, as early as March 1st, Rui began to receive similar
invited Rui to go to the Second Hague Conference without
withdrawing the invitation to Nabuco. A delicate situation
79ensued, which took some time to resolve.
Thus, before Nabuco officially agreed to head the 
Hague delegation, Rio-Branco conceived the idea of sending 
Rui instead, or both Rui and Nabuco. He perceived Nabuco's 
reluctance to jeopardize his position in Washington by going 
to The Hague. Rio-Branco had the idea of advancing Rui's 
name in the press in order to gauge public reaction and at 
the same time to prod Nabuco toward acceptance. Rui's can­
didacy got a surprisingly good reception and Rio-Branco then 
used a different tactic to undermine Nabuco's position. He 
offered Rui the position and insisted that both Nabuco and 
Rui go. Rio-Branco believed that the presence of both would 
be a big boost for the status of Brazil and would somewhat 
modify Nabuco's independent pro-American bent. Rio-Branco 
was convinced that a Hague delegation led by Nabuco, Rui, or 
both Rui and Nabuco would accomplish his three-fold purpose 
of increasing Brazil's international status, modifying Bra­
zil's extremely pro-American foreign policy, and decreasing 
Nabuco's personal influence in Washington. Rio-Branco
requests. J.G. de Sousa Bandeiral, Rio, March_l, 1907, CRB, 
Haia, Pasta XVII; and Magalhaes Castro to Augusto Preital, 
telegram, Bahia, March 2, 1907, CRB, Haia, Pasta XVII, which 
reads, "Please obtain Ruy's nomination of my son Leopoldo 
as his secretary."
7 9 Hilario de Gouvea to Nabuco, Rio, March 6, 1907, 
AJN; and Graga Aranha to Nabuco, Rio, March 7, 1907, See 
also Lins, Rio-Branco, p. 373; and Lacombe, Rio-Branco e 
Rui, pp. 71-72.
finally convinced Rui to accept the nomination, but failed 
to get Nabuco to accompany him, even after the foreign min­
ister persuaded the president to exert pressure on Nabuco.
As the relationship between Nabuco and Rio-Branco 
became more strained, Nabuco felt isolated from the politi­
cal situation in Rio. He maintained official correspondence 
with the foreign minister, but he' relied on personal corres­
pondence with two friends to feel the Brazilian political 
pulse. The two friends, with whom he maintained frank, reg­
ular correspondence, were Hilario de Gouveia and Graga 
Aranha.
Hilario de Gouveia, a physician, was Nabuco's 
brother-in-law and faithful confidant. He was evidently one 
of the better Brazilian medical doctors, as he had been one 
of the six specialists called to treat the fatal illness of 
Viscount Rio-Branco, father of Baron Rio-Branco, who died in 
1880. Hilario, a boyhood friend of the Baron, was his per­
sonal physician and had also treated the terminal illness of
80the Baron's wife in Paris in 1898.
Graga Aranha is best known for his novel, Canaan, 
which was published in 1902. He was a functionary in the 
diplomatic service and was serving in Rio at the time. Gra­
ga and Nabuco had been together in diplomatic service and
81Nabuco regarded him as his favorite disciple. Graga was
80C. Nabuco, Life of Nabuco, p. 343; and Viana, Vida 
de Rio Branco, pp. 104, 221, 238-39.
81Ronald Hilton, trans. and ed., in preface to C.
Nabuco, Life of Nabuco, p. xxiv.
with Nabuco on the British Guiana boundary commission in 
Rome; after Nabuco took over the Brazilian ministry in Lon­
don, Mrs. Nabuco remained in Paris for a few days and he
82and Graga had dinner together every day. When Rio-Branco
offered Nabuco the post of ambassador in Washington, he ad-
83vised him to talk it over with Graga Aranha. In 1906 Gra­
ga and Domicio da Gama (who was later to succeed Nabuco as 
ambassador in Washington) organized the demonstrations wel­
coming Nabuco to Rio for the Third Pan American Conference, 
and Griscom reported to Root,
The same men /~Graga and Domicio_7 have arranged that a 
motion will be made in both chambers of Congress to wel­
come you to Brazil, and here again the matter has been 
carefully organized and the eloquence prepared and se­
lected in advance. I mention this to show you that 
these young men have power and are making active use of it.84
This influential confidant was an important contact for Na­
buco because his distance from the Brazilian political cen­
ter in Rio made it difficult for him to learn of political 
maneuverings there. Nabuco felt it imperative to have this 
intelligence so as to protect his own interests and position 
in that political arena. Graga proved his value to the am­
bassador when he wrote a sixteen-page letter to Nabuco on 
Christmas Day, 1906, saying that Rio-Branco had been very
82Nabuco to Evalina Nabuco, Rome, April 24, 1904; 
and Nabuco to Evalina, London, August 1, 1900, quoted in 
C. Nabuco, Life of Nabuco, p. 280.
83C. Nabuco, Life of Nabuco, p. 305.
84Griscom to Root, Petropolis, July 16, 1906, DS,
1113/2.
deceptive and citing several examples. He also told Nabuco
O Cthat Afonso Pena was being misled by his foreign minister.
Toward the end of February Rio-Branco notified Nabu­
co by telegram that Jose Rodrigues Alves, Brazilian consul 
in Washington was to be transferred to The Hague, "Where you
will encounter him." Nominated to be the new consul was
86Gurgel de Amaral. Nabuco was furious over the change in
embassy personnel, and wrote to Graga,
I don't know who has been nominated here in place of 
Rodrigues Alves, that is, I know, but am not acquainted 
with him. I am completely disgusted with Rio-Branco.
He no longer has any friendship for me; he is one of 
those men whose intimacy (whose intimate sentiment) can 
be suspended or cut off at will. He ceased being my 
friend automatically upon being made Minister. The 
least little thing causes our friendship to become as 
icy as the north p o l e . 87
The same day a concerned Nabuco cabled Rio-Branco,
"Request you cable me as quickly as possible the composition
of the Hague delegation. Authorize me to take Velloso.
88Nabuco." Two days later came the partially encoded reply: 
"You, Eduardo Lisboa, Ruy invited /"and 7 I believe will
85Graga Aranha to Nabuco, Rio, December 25, 1906,
AJN.
86Rio-Branco to Nabuco, Rio, February 22, 1907, AHI, 
235/3/15 tel. exp. This was less than a week before Rio- 
Branco was to invite Rui to serve as Hague delegate.
87Nabuco to Graga Aranha, Washington, February 25,
1907, AJN.
88Nabuco to Rio-Branco, Washington, February 25, 
1907, AHI, 235/3/IB tel. rec. Velloso was Nabuco's long­
time secretary. See Nabuco to Rio-Branco, Washington, March 
1, 1907, AHI, 235/3/IB tel. rec., partially encoded, trans­
lation supplied.
89accept." This was a bombshell, to which Nabuco replied,
Thanks very much. A great pleasure to represent Brazil 
with Ruy. I will agree should we have the opportunity 
to improve ourselves in Europe. First name / on the_/ 
list having precedence and ambassador not able to be 
second, don't hesitate to scratch me if needed to help 
Ruy decide. Argentina is working for the vice-presi- 
dency of a commission. I will need to take Velloso as 
Secretary. You will not refuse me this aide of many 
years. Nabuco.90
Rio-Branco was stung by Nabuco's reply and immedi­
ately cabled the following:
Request you decipher personally. I consider your tele­
gram on the case of Rui and the question of precedence to 
be unofficial and as sent friend to friend. Also this 
reply is from your old friend Rio-Branco. You two have 
been friends since law school and ought to well under­
stand the division of labor. You will complement each 
other. Chile has here various delegates of different 
parties and everything goes well. You are indispensable 
at The Hague, being acquainted with all the antecedents. 
Presence of Rui also considered necessary in the opinion 
of the Government. Superior men such as yourselves must 
put aside questions of precedence when the glory of our 
country is involved. At The Hague there will not be am­
bassadors, all are delegates.
Rio-Branco then cited several examples relating to preced­
ence. In one example, he said that the previous month at a 
banquet where Rui was also in attendance, he was given the 
place of honor. However, if the order of precedence had 
been followed, Rui (as vice-president of the Senate and 
third in line of succession for the presidency) would have
89Rio-Branco to Nabuco, Rio, February 27, 1907, AHI, 
235/3/15 tel. exp., partially marked for encoding.
90Nabuco to Rio-Branco, Washington, March 1, 1907, 
AHI, 235/3/IB tel. rec., partially encoded, translation sup­
plied.
91Rio-Branco to Nabuco, Rio, March 2, 1907, AHI, 
235/3/15 tel. exp., partially marked for encoding.
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had the place of honor. The Baron closed with this appeal:
Having explained the situation, I expect the two of you 
to be together at The Hague, as it is advantageous. You 
well know that I am interested in maintaining the dig­
nity of the office of ambassador, since I only obtained 
creation of it through great effort, overcoming much re­sistance. Rio B r a n c o . 92
Nabuco's response was not long in coming,
I am not disputing precedence. Between Rui and me there 
is no doubt. Even ignoring the fact that, at The Hague, 
he remains the Vice-President of the Senate, I always 
understood that Rui has to be the leader which all dele­gations h a v e . 93
Nabuco argued that Rio-Branco's cited examples were not 
analogous, then put forth his reasons for not accepting:
(1) Ambassadors must not attend as second delegate. He said 
that not one nation sent an ambassador to the First Hague 
Peace Conference, except as first delegate. Some did send 
a minister in second place, but this lowers the prestige of 
the office. "We have only one ambassador. We can not make 
an exception." (2) Having been president of the Third Pan 
American Conference, serving as second delegate to the Hague 
Conference would diminish the prestige of the former.
(3) Going to The Hague could cause him to lose Washington if 
Brazil's attitude there were to displease Roosevelt. (4) He 
needed six months rest and his poor health required treat­
ment in Europe. C5J He could help Rui by.,collecting and
94sending information to him from Washington.
92* Ibid.
93Nabuco to Rio-Branco, Washington, March 5, 1907,
AHI, 235/3/lB tel. rec., mostly encoded, translation supplied.
943 Ibid.
Nabuco's contacts in Rio were hard pressed to keep 
him abreast of the developments in Brazil. Hilario wrote 
that he was pleased with Nabuco's resolve not to accept the 
secondary post at the Hague Conference. After Rui was invi­
ted, Hilario strongly protested to Rio-Branco, telling him 
that it appeared he was being pressured into inviting Rui, 
since the invitation was proffered just after the appearance 
of an article in the Correio da Manha attacking Nabuco and 
praising Rui as the only Brazilian of the caliber to repre­
sent Brazil at The Hague. Dr. Gouveia also rebutted Rio- 
Branco 's examples dealing with precedence, with a few exam­
ples of his own. Rio-Branco had asked the physician to ap­
peal to Nabuco's patriotism to accept the position. Gouveia 
closed by saying, "Rio-Branco told me today that he sent my 
telegrams and yours to Pena, and that Pena promised him to 
cable you asking you to reconsider. I doubt that he will do 
it.-95
Graga Aranha observed that Rui's nomination was gen­
erally well received. He attributed this reception to the 
fact that Rui was recognized to be an excellent delegate to 
a conference such as this, where the principal discussion 
would revolve around juridical questions. He also ventured 
the opinion that the salary was very low for Rui, who had 
the habit of spending much more. Graga reported that Rui 
had not yet accepted, in spite of many appeals by his
95Hilario de Gouveia to Nabuco, Rio, March 6, 1907,
AJN.
96friends, and he still might refuse to go.
Rui was a friend of Nabuco and was happy to see Na- 
buco's status increase. He could not directly increase Na- 
buco's status, but hesitated to accept the offer to lead the 
delegation for fear of offending Nabuco and lowering the 
status of his friend. Rui distrusted Rio-Branco and detest­
ed the idea of being in the position of carrying out someone 
else's orders. He coveted the honor of the position and 
hoped that it would overcome the negative political .influen­
ces remaining from the encilhamento nearly twenty years ear­
lier and would give a boost to his political career.
Once the president had agreed to invite Rui to at­
tend the Hague Conference, Rio-Branco had set about to ob­
tain his consent:
Once the idea was embraced by the president and by Rio- 
Branco, his minister, the latter came in person to my 
house in the Largo Dorn Afonso, Petropolis, to invite me, 
in the name of the Chief of State, to this high post.9?
Rui said that Rio-Branco came back to his house more than
once to get him to agree. The foreign minister also sent
98many others to beg him to accept the nomination.
At the time of Rui's nomination, and since, it has 
been commonly accepted that Rio-Branco invited Rui because
96Graga Aranha to Nabuco, Petropolis, March 7, 1907, 
AJN. Rui said his friends, without exception, urged him to 
accept. Rui to Rio-Branco, Petropolis, March 31, 1907, 
ABR-B, 18/8 receibidas.
97Rui, speech, quoted in Lacombe, Rio-Branco e Rui,
pp. 71-72.
98Lacombe, Rio-Branco e Rui, p. 72.
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of the pressure of public opinion, as expressed in Rio news-
99papers of the period. However, it is not beyond the realm 
of possibility that Rio-Branco authored the original news­
paper article.100 It is even more probable that he wrote, 
or caused to be written, subsequent articles in the cam­
paign.101 The Baron wrote extensive propaganda for the 
press, most of which was published in the Jornal do Commer­
cio, whose proprietor and editor was Jose Carlos Rodri- 
102gues. Rodrigues, "one of the pillars of Rio-Branco," was
99See Viana, Rui & Nabuco, p. 71; Viana, Vida de Rio 
Branco, p. 380; Lins, Rio-Branco, p. 373; C. Nabuco, Life of 
Nabuco, pp. 342-43; Osvaldo Orico, Momentos Estrelares de 
Rui Barbosa, (Rio de Janeiro: Casa de Rui Barbosa, 1954),
pp. 84-85; Burns, Unwritten Alliance, p. 116; and Accioly,
"O Barao do Rio Branco e a 2a Conferencia," p. 64.
100Rio-Branco1s experience as a journalist dated 
from as early as March of 1873 when he became one of the 
principal editors of A Nagao. During his many years in Eu­
ropean diplomatic posts, he wrote the historical section for 
the Jornal do Brasil. Viana, Vida de Rio Branco, p. 62; 
Burns, Unwritten Alliance, pp. 29, 34; "O Barao do Rio Bran­
co e o Jornal do Commercio," Jornal do Commercio, April 21, 
1957, p. 2; and Elmano Cardim, "A Imprensa na Vida e na Obra 
de Rio Branco," Revista do Instituto Historico e Geografico 
Brasileiro, CLXXXVIII (July-September, 1945), 123-37.
101Graga Aranha stated that, "the nomination of Ruy 
was the idea and the initiative of Rio Branco. . . . "  Graga 
to Nabuco, PetrSpolis, April 1, 1907, AJN. Rio-Branco, in a 
speech to some students, later said,"I confess, however, 
that the indication of Rui for such an important mission was 
not accomplished solely by me, but also by many of our au­
thorized organs of public opinion." Quoted in "Ruy Bar­
bosa," A Imprensa, December 30, 1907, p. 1. Accioly states 
that during the conference Rio-Branco spent much time in the 
editorial offices of the Jornal do Commercio where he often 
"inspired or furnished notes or articles." Accioly, "0 
Barao do Rio Branco e a 2a Conferencia," pp. 95-96.
102Viana, Vida de Rio Branco, pp. 380, 383. In re­
lation to this point Griscom says, "In fact Baron do Rio 
Branco is in the habit of himself writing announcements and 
denials which, although published anonymously in certain of
initially displeased by Rui's nomination. However, in spite 
of the fact that Rodrigues was opposed to Rui, the Jornal 
later published most of the notices about the Hague Confer-
There has been debate as to the actual date on which
the invitation was first extended to Rui. In his letter of
104acceptance, Rui remembered the date as February 26th.
105However, others set the date as February 25th. It is
certain that it was prior to February 27th, because on that
106date Rio-Branco officially informed Nabuco of the fact.
The invitation to Rui complicated the selection of
the Brazilian delegation to the Hague Conference. Rui and
Nabuco were both reluctant to rupture their recently renewed 
107friendship. While Nabuco deferred to Rui, Rui wavered,
the daily papers, are well known to be written by him and 
published at his request." Griscom to Root, October 13,
1906, DS, 1070/5. Ganzert says, "It was Rio-Branco's prac­
tice to use the press to defend his opinions whenever occa­
sion warranted." Ganzert, "The Baron Rio-Branco, Joaquim 
Nabuco, and the Growth of Brazilian-American Friendship, 
1900-1910," p. 436.
103Viana, Vida de Rio Branco, p. 382. See also Gra­
ga Aranha to Nabuco, Petropolis, April 1, 1907, AJN.
■^^Rui to Rio-Branco, Petropolis, March 31, 1907, 
ABR-B, 18/8 receibidas.
105Hildebrando Accioly, "Rui Barbosa na Segunda Con­
ferencia da Haia," Revista do Instituto Historico e Geogra- 
fico Brasileiro, CCXXXVII (October-December, 1957), p. 65.
106Rio-Branco to Nabuco, February 27, 1907, AHI, 
235/3/15 tel. exp.
107See Rui to Rio-Branco, Petropolis, March 31,
1907, ABR-B, 18/8 receibidas; Graga Aranha to Nabuco, Petro­
polis, April 1, 1907, AJN; and Nabuco to Rui, Washington, 
telegram, April 2, 1907, AJN.
in spite of strong governmental pressure to accept. There
were many rumors about whether or not Rui would accept the
nomination. On one occasion Rui sent the following note to
the Jornal do Brasil: "My declaration was not that I would
108accept, but rather that I had not yet decided." On March 
13th, the following notice appeared in the Jornal do Commer­
cio;
We hear it said that Senator Ruy Barbosa declined the 
invitation made to him by Baron Rio Branco, Minister of 
Foreign Relations, to be a part of the commission which 
shall represent our country at the Conference at The 
Hague.10*
Rui quickly notified the newspaper that the notice was in 
error. He also cabled to Rio-Branco that the paper had no 
authorization from him to make such a statement. On the 
contrary, he was inclined to accept, but first had to re­
solve some difficult personal problems.1'1'0 Rio-Branco re­
sponded in the following terms, "I quickly perceived that 
the notice had not been authorized by you. I am convinced 
that the difficulties to which you refer are not invinci­
ble."111
Just when it seemed as if Rui were about to accept,
108Rui to Oscar Rosas, Jornal do Brasil, note, Rio, 
n.d., CRB, Pasta Rio Branco.
109 "Varias Noticias," Jornal do Commercio, March 13, 
1907, CRB, Haia, Pasta IV-A.
110Rui to Rio-Branco, telegram, Petropolis, 10:00 
A.M., March 13, 1907, CRB, Haia, Pasta IV-A.
IllRio-Branco to Rui, telegram, Petropolis, 11:50
A.M., March 13, 1907, CRB, Pasta Rio Branco; draft of same,
AHI, 273/2/1.
an article appeared in the March 22nd issue of the Jornal do
Commercio, which cast doubt on Rui's loyalty to the govern­
ment. The article, by J.J. Seabra, almost caused Rui to
112decline the invitation at that time.
Because of the accusations in Seabra's article, Rui
felt compelled to decline the offer of the Hague appointment
and wrote to Rio-Branco saying,
Today,_in the same paper, I responded to this despicable 
plot l_ of Seabra_/. As for myself, I consider the case 
closed. My conscience is clear. Not everyone, however, 
knows me well enough to give me a fair hearing. . . .  In 
view of this deplorable situation, I request that you 
ask the President to allow me to decline the high post 
/ of Hague delegate_7f and to accept my gratitude for 
this distinction with which he so spontaneously honored me.113
Rio-Branco replied that the incident would not alter his ad­
miration, affection, and respect for Rui. He appealed to 
Rui's patriotism and vanity, saying,
112Rui to Rio-Branco, PetrSpolis, March 23, 1907, 
ABR-B, 18/3/34; draft of same in CRB, Pasta Rio Branco.
See also Hilario de Gouveia to Nabuco, PetrSpolis, March 24, 
1907, AJN. Seabra, a native of the same state as Rui, had 
served as a federal deputy and was a good friend of Rui's. 
Seabra was Minister of Justice under Rodrigues Alves (1902- 
1906) and served in the cabinet with Rio-Branco (Foreign 
Minister) during that period. In 1903 Rui served with Rio- 
Branco on the boundary commission for Acre. Rui resigned 
from that commission over a difference of opinion with the 
foreign minister. The resignation of Rui did not affect his 
friendship with Rio-Branco, and they remained on friendly 
terms. Seabra, whose motive was unclear, in the March 1907 
newspaper article attempted to cause a break between Rui and 
the government by attributing to Rui clandestine and dis­
loyal motives against Rio-Branco and Rodrigues Alves in the 
1903 incident. See Lins, Rio-Branco, pp. 289-92; Viana,
Vida de Rio-Branco, pp. 342-43; Jornal do Commercio, March 
22, 1907; and Rui to Rio-Branco, Petropolis, March 23, 1907, 
ABR-B, 18/8/34.
113Rui to Rio-Branco, Petropolis, March 23, 1907,
ABR-B, 18/8/34.
Now we are discussing a service which the President asks 
of you in the interest of greater glory for our country 
in a great international conference. I respect your 
opinion very much, but I think that an incident of this 
nature must not cause you to refuse the service which 
the nation expects of your patriotism and exceptional 
competence. You can be certain of the confidence of the 
President and myself in the complete and brilliant out­
come of your m i s s i o n . 114
In the meantime Nabuco had written to Graga Aranha
giving a complete explanation of why he was unable to accom-
115pany Rui on the Hague Conference delegation. Graga felt
it was preferable to wait until after Rui accepted to show 
him Nabuco's letters. Graga had talked with Rui, but did 
not intend to divulge Nabuco's reasons until after Rui's ac­
ceptance because he did not want to impede Rui's deci-
Privately, Nabuco had expressed the dilemma in which
he found himself:
Rio Branco wants to send me to The Hague with Ruy, and 
as much as I wish to give to Ruy this proof of friend­
ship and confidence, as much as I will lose by not being 
with him in Europe, and to renew our relationship inter­
rupted for so many years by Revolutions, in a word I
Rio-Branco to Rui, PetrSpolis, March 24, 1907, 
CRB, Pasta Rio Branco; draft of same in AHI, 273/2/1, 35. 
Afonso Pena cabled Rio-Branqo, "Completely in accord with 
your thinking about the delegate to the Hague Conference." 
Pena to Rio-Branco, telegram, Rio, March 25, 1907, ABR-B, 
1/2/81. To Rui, Pena wrote, "My dear Ruy Barbosa, I wish 
you and all of your family very good health. Once more I 
stated to you that I will not cease demanding your services 
and advice. I already claimed your services at The Hague, 
and now I claim your legal opinion on the following ques­
tion." Pena to Rui, Rio, March 27, CRB, Pasta Afonso Pena.
115Nabuco to Graga Aranha, Washington, March 4,
1907, AJN.
116Graga Aranha to Nabuco, Petropolis, April 1,
1907, AJN.
covet a chance for intimacy with him under conditions in 
which intimacy can become more intimate, you well know 
as my bosom friend: I can not go to The Hague as second
delegate and he can only go as the first.
Nabuco then expounded on the reasons he gave Rio-Branco for
118not attending the conference. He was also disturbed by
the fact that all of the Latin American ministers, his col­
leagues in Washington, were going to The Hague as first 
delegates. He professed to be more satisfied than anyone 
else with Rui's selection and would be honored to serve un­
der him. However, with his deafness and poor health, he
119would not be the second that Rui would need.
* * *
Rio-Branco and Nabuco had been good friends at least
120as early as 1871, when both were in their twenties. How­
ever, the old, intimate friendship began to break down in 
1902 shortly after Rio-Branco accepted the post of foreign 
minister. Rio-Branco was Brazilian minister in Berlin at 
the time of the invitation to join the cabinet of Rodrigues 
Alves. He had, however, already accepted the post of Bra-
117Nabuco to Graga Aranha, Washington, March 4,
1907, AJN. Nabuco said he sent this letter, "very confiden­
tially," to be used for his defense in Rio, and most of all 
for Rui. He said that his only regret was that Rui did not 
understand his motives and that Rio-Branco would use this to 
drive a wedge between them.
1X8See Nabuco to Rio-Branco, Washington, March 5, 
1907, AHI, 235/3/IB tel. rec., summarized above on page 
48.
119Nabuco to Graga Aranha, Washington, March 4,
1907, AJN.
120Viana, Vida de Rio Branco, p. 50.
zilian minister in Rome. On the way to Rio to assume the 
post of foreign minister, he met with Nabuco in London. He 
asked Nabuco to accept the legation in Rome, but Nabuco re­
fused. Apparently Rio-Branco had the idea that Nabuco would
hold the post for a couple of years, then they would ex-
121change positions. The post of minister in London was the
highest step in the Brazilian diplomatic corps at that time
and Nabuco did not wish to relinquish it, even though he was
spending much time in Rome on the British Guiana boundary 
122arbitration.
Nabuco's refusal to accept Rio-Branco's offer pro­
voked a heated discussion. Nabuco could not understand Rio- 
Branco ' s insistence. To him, the idea was preposterous, but 
apparently Rio-Branco was enchanted with the prospect of 
being minister in Rome. Rio-Branco had tried his best to 
avoid accepting the position of foreign minister, and was
already perturbed because he had not been able to persuade
123Nabuco to accept in his stead.
121Nabuco to Graga Aranha, Washington, March 4,
1907, AJN; Rio-Branco to Nabuco, Berlin, August 30, 1902, 
quoted in C. Nabuco, Life of Nabuco, p. 261; Viana, Vida de 
Rio Branco, pp. 321-22; and Viana, Vida de Nabuco, 316, 344.
122C. Nabuco, Life of Nabuco, p. 255.
123Nabuco to Evelina Nabuco, quoted in Viana, Vida 
de Rio Branco, p. 322; Viana, Vida de Nabuco, p. 344; Viana, 
Vida de Rio Branco, pp. 311, 315, 321-22; and C. Nabuco,
Life of Nabuco, pp. 260-61. Rio-Branco's first post in the 
diplomatic corps had been that of consul in Liverpool.
While there and in Paris he had served on several Brazilian 
boundary commissions with spectacular success. Then he evi­
dently coveted the London post and was chagrined that it 
went to Nabuco instead. Viana, Vida de Rio Branco, pp. 74- 
84, 182-195; and Burns, Unwritten Alliance, pp. 21, 27-33.
Nabuco now felt that he was being persecuted by Rio- 
Branco in the matter of the formation of the Brazilian dele­
gation to the Second Hague Peace Conference. He wrote to 
Graga,
What did I ever do to this man? I had the misfortune to 
be nominated Minister in London by Dr. Campos Salles 
without the position being offered to him. While / For- 
eign_7 Minister, his first idea was to take me from my 
Legation, offering me the one in Rome. Solely to remove 
me from London, he created this Embassy. Now he does 
not even want me to occupy it tranquilly. He is trying 
to place me in a false position from which I can perhaps 
escape only by relinquishing this post.124
The relationship between the foreign minister and his ambas­
sador in Washington was at a low ebb. Rio-Branco told Hi­
lario that Nabuco was doing him an injustice, always at-
125tributing to him "egotistical visions." Nabuco felt that
a month of relative rest had done him a lot of good and the
requested leave should allow him to recover his health.
"However," he said, "my major rest shall be to feel that I
126am free from the official relations with Rio-Branco."
Nabuco had reached the point where he felt that a break with
127Rio-Branco was inevitable.
Nabuco, concerned about his image being tarnished by 
the political intrigues of Rio, bared his soul in a letter
124Nabuco to Graga Aranha, Washington, March 4,
1907, AJN.
125Hilario de Gouveia to Nabuco, Petropolis, March 
24, 1907, AJN.
126Nabuco to Graga Aranha, Washington, March 4,
1907, AJN.
127Ibid.
to Graga Aranha, asking him to show parts of it to their 
mutual friends. Hilario de Gouveia, from whom he kept no 
secrets, would be permitted to read it all. He begged Gra­
ga, "Do not allow Dr. Afonso_7 Pena to turn against me be­
cause of the intrigues which Oliveira Lima, Correio da Man­
ha, and others may make with my refusal to go to The Hague 
in second place."'*'2®
Graga responded that he had talked with Rio-Branco, 
and that Jose Carlos Rodrigues, in the Jornal do Commercio, 
defended Nabuco because Rio-Branco had not mentioned that he 
refused to serve because of ill health. Rodrigues, at Gra­
ga 's request, was going to explain everything to Pena. Rio- 
Branco persuaded the president to draft a cable to Nabuco 
insisting that Nabuco accept the position and questioning
the basic motives of his excuse. Graga also said he thought
129Nabuco must write to Pena.
Nabuco had already drafted a letter to President 
Pena further explaining his position:
129Graga Aranha to Nabuco, Petropolis, April 1,
1907, AJN. Graga said he did not see the terms of the tele­
gram, which was not sent. The following unsigned note ap­
pears on the president's letterhead; at the top is written, 
in Rio-Branco's hand, "Sent, 2 April." The note, in an uni­
dentified hand, reads, "(Copy.) Draft of a telegram to be 
transmitted to Dr. Joaquim Nabuco: 'Reasons for refusal to
accept Hague Delegation do not appear to be of consequence.
I expect you to go with Rui and render new, brilliant Ser­
vice to the Country in the Conference of Worldwide impor­
tance. Regards.'" ABR-B, 4/1/74 expedidas. Apparently the 
cable was not sent in that form, but was incorporated into 
Rio-Branco to Nabuco, telegram, Rio, April 1, 1907, AHI, 
235/3/15 tel. exp.
The political question has now arisen which has a grea­
ter scope. It does not appear advantageous for me to go 
to The Hague, being Ambassador here. The instructions 
of our government could oblige me to displease this gov­
ernment. You know I oppose the Drago Doctrine. . . . 
Knowing their interest in this question, as Ambassador 
in Washington, I could not weaken the North American po­
sition at The Hague without sustaining resentment here, 
where I would be labeled as dishonest. Baron Rio-Branco 
also must have communicated to you the question of 
leave.^30
Before this letter was sent, Nabuco received a cable from
Pena, to which he replied,
Thank you for your telegram. The motives which I gave 
were inspired by the reasons which determined the crea­
tion of this post. The state of my health does not 
allow me, at this moment, to undertake new labors, for 
this reason I am obliged to request that you relieve me 
of the Hague mission. Respectful salutations. Na­buco. 131
Nabuco had tired of Rio-Branco's maneuvering and his own 
poor health gave him a pretext to request a leave of absence 
from his post in order to avoid being directly associated 
with the inevitable Brazilian-American clash at The Hague. 
Rio-Branco finally agreed to grant the leave to the ambas­
sador, but only agreed to supply extra funds on the condi­
tion that Nabuco undertake a secret mission to aid Rui while 
132in Europe.
130 _Nabuco to /_ Afonso Pena_7/ Washington, n.d., AJN. 
Handwritten note at the top in Nabuco's hand, "Not sent."
No addressee appears, but internal evidence shows it was 
meant for Pena. See also Nabuco to Graga Aranha, Washing­
ton, March 4, 1907, AJN, in which Nabuco says he can not 
agree to go to The Hague because in Rio he would be sus­
pected of being "too American," and in Washington he would 
be considered disagreeable.
131Nabuco to Pena, telegram, Washington, April 2,
1907, AJN.
132See below, pages 70-72.
Rui, meanwhile, continued to vacillate between ac­
ceptance and refusal until the last possible moment. He 
drafted a letter of acceptance on March 28th, made a smooth
copy, but failed to send it until later, at which time he
133changed the date to March 31st. In this letter Rui gave
his motives for accepting and his reasons for delaying his 
response:
Dearest Friend Baron Rio-Branco
The terms of your important letter of the 24th, 
which- rebutted the basis of mine of the day before, and 
the more than a month which has elapsed in waiting for a 
final solution will not permit me to continue to delay 
the response to the invitation to represent Brazil at 
the Hague Conference. I was honored when, on February 
26, you personally came to invite me in the name of the 
President of the Republic.
I hesitated a long time, and continued to resist: 
for fear that I completely lacked the competence for 
this mission, of such a special and extraordinarily ele­
vated nature; because I believed that other Brazilians 
could be found who much more merit the selection; fi­
nally, because I understood that the appointment would 
be best confided entirely to the talents and singular 
gifts of Joaquim Nabuco.
I felt restrained from quickly refusing, which was 
what my feeling of insufficiency and the fear of my 
weakness dictated that I should do, since in your visit 
you insistently invoked my patriotism. You reminded me 
that I had already refused the invitation for the Pan 
American Conference, and expressed the hope that, "this 
time," I would not again refuse my services.
Inclined to accept the invitation because of the 
desire to be useful to the country, but impressed with 
the solemnity of the situation, and restrained by diffi­
culties of a personal character, I appealed for time, 
waiting for prudence, or circumstances to bring the con­
fidence to accept, or the energy to resist.
To my sorrow, in appealing for the opinion of all 
who had helped and counseled me, I did not encounter a
133Rui to Rio-Branco, Petropolis, March 31, 1907, 
ABR-B, 18/8 receibidas; date obviously changed from 28 to 
31; written across the top in Rio-Branco*s hand, "From Sena­
tor Ruy Barbosa,^Received 1 April 1907." See also Rui to 
Rio-Branco, PetrSpolis, March 28, 1907, CRB, Pasta Haia IVA; 
draft of above, text unaltered.
single voice which would approve of my refusal. I 
probed, as much as I could, the judgement of our coun­
trymen as to what I should do, and found out that even 
my adversaries felt that 1 was obliged to accept. When 
my vacillations were communicated to the President of 
the Republic by a mutual friend, I found that he would 
reject my reasons for refusal as inadmissible.
Not finding anyone to defend me, and fearing that a 
negative reply would be attributed to hatred of our be­
loved country, and always doubtful of my abilities, with 
great trepidation I accede to this irresistible pres­
sure.
Please do me the favor of transmitting my assent to 
the President of the Republic. It is understood, of 
course, that after the nomination the Senate must give 
its permission, under terms of the Constitution, article 
23, paragraph 2.
Invested with this honor for which I am far from 
qualified, I ask God to help me so that my efforts will 
be sustained wherever my resourses are limited, aiding 
me to do the job, under your instructions, at least 
without dishonor to the country and without disappoint­
ment to the government, to whose esteem I owe this hon­
or.
Always with sincere and personal affection of Your 
Excellency, friend, admirer, and most obliging servant,Rui Barbosa134
The night Rui drafted this letter he had received a
letter from President Pena, reaffirming his support of Rui
135and urging his acceptance of the invitation. The next
day, Good Friday, was a soul-searching ordeal for Rui. On
Saturday he wrote Pena he had not yet decided to accept the
mission, saying in part,
Night before last I received your letter of the 27th, to 
which I did not respond yesterday because it was Good 
Friday. However, with satisfaction, I am writing today 
at dawn. . . .  In reference to the Hague mission, I have 
not yet decided. Truthfully, I did not accept immedi­
134Rui to Rio-Branco, PetrSpolis, March 31, 1907, 
ABR-B, 18/8 receibidas.
135Pena to Rui, March 27, 1907, copy not found; 
referred to in Rui to Pena, PetrSpolis, March 30, 1907, 
Arquivo Particular de Afonso Pena? hereinafter cited as AAP.
ately because of the fear I have of finding the job to 
be greater than my capacity. You can not imagine how 
much this vacillation has troubled m e . 136
At this point, Rui had not yet sent the March 28th 
letter of acceptance to Rio-Branco. Between the writing and 
the sending of that letter, Rui drafted another letter to 
Rio-Branco, declining the appointment in the following 
terms:
Having caused you to wait so long for my reply to 
the invitation with which the President of the Republic 
honored me in such a spontaneous and unexpected manner; 
it is with the most sincere and profound regret that I 
am, finally, obliged to decline this distinction.
If I delayed too long, it was because I was torn be­
tween the ardent desire to serve the country and a re­
straining, tenacious fear that I would not be able to 
perform with dignity because of my lack of the necessary 
aptitude.
As God knows, this fear, the dread of conscience, 
finally won, but only with the sadness of my soul. I 
know that this negative reply will be displeasing to you 
and to the President of the Republic. But I believe 
that ultimately you will do me justice, not condemning 
me for these scruples of a man whose own abilities and 
the abilities of others have caused to have less and 
less confidence in himself.
Meanwhile, in the short time remaining of my life, I 
shall remain at the disposition of you and the President 
of the Republic, whose government I support with the 
greatest confidence in the patriotism of both of you.
Despite the disclosure of this refusal, which I once 
again must present, I expect that you shall continue to 
consider me your servant, admirer and true friend, -37
Rui Barbosa
The next day, Sunday, Rui altered the date on his letter of
136Rui to Pena, Petropolis, March 30, 1907, AAP.
The remainder of the seven-page letter deals with a legal 
opinion with respect to a law judged unconstitutional by the 
Supremo Tribunal Federal.
^■^Rui to Rio-Branco, Petropolis, March 30, 1907, 
CRB, Pasta Rio Branco. This letter, filed separately from 
the above letter, has "not sent" scrawled across the top in 
Rui's hand.
March 28th and sent it to Rio-Branco. The foreign minister 
immediately informed the president, who was writing a letter 
to Rui at that moment. Pena closed the letter: "I just
found out by letter from Rio-Branco, that you accepted the 
Mission to The Hague. I am content. This confirms the
telegram which I sent you immediately. Accept an abrago
138from your colleague and old friend. Afonso Pena."
Rui's acceptance caused a flurry of activity in Rio
and PetrSpolis. When Nabuco's friends learned of it, they
agreed that Hilario should go apprise Rui of the situation.
He went to the Rio station at 7 A.M. the next morning and
waited for Rui to arrive from PetrSpolis. At the station he
completely explained Nabuco's position to him. The friends
felt it was necessary to see Rui early, before he had a
chance to see the newspapers, because they feared the papers
would make it appear that Nabuco resented Rui for accepting 
139the post.
Rio-Branco rushed off a coded telegram to Nabuco in 
Washington:
Personal. Rui accepted. The President thinks your rea­
sons are without foundation and that you will not deny 
your services at The Hague. There is already a ministry 
of eagles, and we shall have there a delegation of ea­
gles if you wish. Since the principal work will be on 
the commissions, division of labor and reciprocal good
138Pena to Rui, Rio, April 1, 1907, CRB, Pasta Afon­
so Pena. In the first part of the letter Pena thanks Rui 
for his "magnificent opinion," on the legal question submit­
ted to him earlier.
139Graca Aranha to Nabuco, Petropolis, April 1,
1907, AJN; Hilario de Gouveia to Nabuco, Rio, April 2, 1907, 
AJN; and Hilario de Gouveia to Nabuco, Petropolis, April 
/ 4 7f 1907, AJN.
will would prevent misunderstandings. The delegation 
will not have a chief . . . but in the arrangement of
names we must observe the rules of precedence which are
established by internal politics.140
Rio Branco then cited examples in which he said no prestige
was lost by delegates assuming a secondary position at a
conference or meeting. However, none of his examples was
entirely analogous to Nabuco's situation. He continued,
But I do not wish to discuss nor contradict you on that 
which I desire, namely to make a last attempt to per­
suade you not to miss the opportunity to also serve 
brilliantly for our Country at The Hague on this occa­
sion which will not happen again in our lifetime. ' How­
ever, be sure that no one shall respect your resolution
in opposition more than I if you assure me that it is
definite; and for the public I shall only give as a rea­
son that which constitutes the last part of your tele­
gram, that is, some months of rest and treatment are 
necessary after eight years of incessant work. We wish 
to make the nominations on the 5th. R i o - B r a n c o . 141
After learning of Rui's acceptance, Nabuco first
cabled Rui, "Health obliges me to decline, but I shall be at
your side in spirit, proud to see Brazil thus represented
142among nations. Many, many congratulations. Nabuco."
The next day he sent this reply to Rio-Branco:
Since you and the President do not judge my reasons ac­
ceptable, there was nothing left for me to do but recon­
140Rio-Branco to Nabuco, telegram, Rio, April 1, 
1907, AHI, 235/3/15 tel. exp.; Rio-Branco's hand and signa­
ture, partially marked for encoding.
141Ibid. The nomination apparently did not wait, 
however, because two "registered" / i.e., notarized_7 copies 
of the decree nominating Rui exist with the date of April 1, 
1907. CRB, Haia Pasta Decretos; on back of the copies ap­
pears this inscription, "Registered on page 4 of Book 1 of 
Leis, Decretos, e Portarias, April 1, 1907."
142Nabuco to Rui, telegram, Washington, April 2,
1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XVII; draft copy (typescript) in AJN.
sider whether or not I could now undertake new labors of 
such great responsibility. Unfortunately, the state of 
my health obliges me to ask to decline it in the terms 
of the telegram. N a b u c o . 143
Nabuco was both disappointed, and relieved at the turn of 
events. He was disappointed that he would not be leading 
the Brazilian delegates to The Hague. However, he was also 
relieved that his frail health would not again be put in 
jeopardy by attendance at the conference, and that he would 
not be in the untenable position of defending Brazil against 
the United States.
Finally the weeks and months of turmoil, contro­
versy, and indecision ended. Brazil was at a disadvantage 
for having waited so long to designate her representative to 
the Hague Peace Conference. Rui had barely six weeks be­
tween his appointment and his departure in which to assemble 
the Brazilian delegation and make other preparations for the 
conference. To make up for lost time, there would have to 
be much cooperation among Pena, Rio-Branco, Nabuco, and Rui. 
However, such close cooperation appeared unlikely, because
of the divisive circumstances surrounding the selection of
144the conference delegate.
143Nabuco to Rio-Branco, telegram, Washington, April 
3, 1907, AJN.
144As late as May 1, Nabuco still felt it necessary 
to defend his position to the president: "I never disputed
precedence with Ruy. I well knew that I rank after him. If 
in my first telegram I admitted the possibility of our going 
on the same plane, placing my name (as Ambassador), in first 
place, it was because Rio Branco thus casually placed it 
there as well in his telegram. Also I overlooked the fact 
that, even absent from the country on a Mission, Ruy would 
maintain his position of Vice-President of the Senate. . . .
Chapter III will examine Brazilian diplomatic maneu 
vering and intrigue in her successful attempt to gain pres­
tige at the Hague Peace Conference at the expense of the 
other Latin American nations.
I took my stance purely to preserve the dignity of Ambas­
sador, based on the unanimous precedence of other nations 
. . . . Here is my explanation, my dear Friend, Mr. Presi­
dent. You and Rio Branco are not able to feel the official 
and diplomatic atmosphere of Washington as I am. . .
Nabuco to Afonso Pena, Washington, May 1, 1907, AJN.
CHAPTER III
THE SEARCH FOR NATIONAL STATUS AT THE CONFERENCE
In this her first world-wide conference, it was im­
portant for Brazil to persuade the other delegations at the 
Second Hague Peace Conference of the culture and intelli­
gence of her delegates, and thus make a favorable impres­
sion. Rui, with his broad knowledge, command of the French 
language, and brilliant oratory, was a definite asset in the 
Brazilian effort. However, the attempt to project an image 
on the international stage challenged the status quo. The 
great powers became irritated at the impertinence of Brazil 
in taking frequent part in discussions of matters which they 
considered to be their sole province.^ Nabuco said, how­
ever,
. . .  if, Ruy had not done this he would not have thus 
revealed the intellectual culture of Brazil. Look, in 
a conference such as this, it is essential for us to 
give the impression of great culture. As I said to 
Azeredo Castro, political errors can always be forgi­
ven, attitudes corrected, but mediocrity is inexcus­
able . 2
Nabuco to Azeredo Castro, Frankfort, Germany, Au­
gust, n.d., 1907, AJN; and letter fragment in Nabuco's hand 
and signature, evidently written from Germany to someone in 
Rio about August, 1907 (contains reference to the above let­
ter) , AJN.
2 —Nabuco letter fragment / Germany, August, 1907_7/
AJN.
-68-
A Hamburg newspaper, after criticizing Rui for speaking too
often and too long, conceded that he had become one of the
3notable figures of the conference. Nabuco told Graga 
Aranha,
There is no doubt that he / Rui_7 has forced all at the 
conference to recognize the intellectual force that he 
is. The important thing for Nations such as us is to 
appear, to take part, to reveal our high culture. Poli­
tical errors can be corrected; mediocrity and intellec­
tual nullity have no remedy.4
Nabuco correctly recognized, however, that the political
effects of Brazil's participation could only be judged after
5the close of the conference.
* * *
Having prevailed in his effort to avoid attendance
at the Hague conference in second place, Nabuco now made
plans for a leave of absence to rest and seek the curative
waters of European spas. After his lonesome five-month trip
to Brazil during the previous year, he was determined that
his family should accompany him this time if at all pos- 
£sible. Nabuco still had no official approval of leave from 
Rio-Branco and he informed the foreign minister of the
3Ibid.; and Nabuco to Graga Aranha, Wiesbasen,
August 5, 1907, AJN.
4Nabuco to Graga Aranha, Baden-Baden, July 25-26, 
1907, AJN.
5Nabuco to Graga Aranha, Wiesbaden, August 5, 1907,
AJN.
0See Shannon to Nabuco, Brockport, N.Y., December 
10, 1906, AJN; Nabuco to Rio-Branco, Washington, December 
12, 1906, AJNr Leao Zagury, London, March 15, 1907, AJN; and 
Azerado Castro to Nabuco, London, March 17, 1907, AJN.
7urgency of the matter.
Now that the question of Brazil's representative to
the Hague Conference was settled, Rio-Branco devised a plan
to assign Nabuco a special mission in conjunction with his
leave in Europe. He then cabled his proposal to Nabuco.
Personal. According to information from our compensa­
tion division, your payment while on leave will be fif­
teen contos. The President agrees that this would be 
insufficient. However, since you agree to provide pre­
paratory information to Rui we are able to pay, for this 
special mission of service, two contos, gold, per month 
and also six contos, gold, to help with expenses. If 
you agree, we will expedite the necessary orders by of­
ficial telegram. Rio Branco.8
Nabuco, in this telegram, had finally received ap­
proval for the leave of absence for treatment, but had not
gotten permission to take his secretary, despite several
grequests to that end. Nabuco then cabled his reply to Rio- 
Branco:
I do not know how long I will be able to remain in Eu­
rope on the amount allotted. I expect extensive treat­
ment and therefore request that you reconsider helping 
with the cost. Just the round-trip passage for my fam­
7 "In case you intend to concede my leave, I request 
that you do so in time for me to depart in May, since the 
price of summer passage is prohibitive." Nabuco to Rio- 
Branco, Washington, April 18, 1907, AHI, 235/3/IB, tel. rec.
O Rio-Branco to Nabuco, Rio, April 23, 1907, AHI, 
235/3/15, tel. exp., partially marked for encoding. Al­
though Nabuco had repeatedly requested leave, Rio-Branco 
had continued to ignore the request and to insist that Na­
buco be a member of the Hague delegation. This was Rio- 
Branco' s first official concession of leave for Nabuco.
gSee for example Nabuco's requests of February 25th 
and March 1st. Nabuco to Rio-Branco, Washington, February 
25, 1907, AHI, 235/3/1B, tel. rec.; and Nabuco to Rio- 
Branco, Washington, March 1, 1907, AHI, 235/3/IB, tel. rec., 
partly encoded, translation supplied.
ily raises the price by six contos, gold. I am taking 
them because it is impossible to reduce by one-half 
their expenses here. Velloso wishes to accompany me,
- and, even while travelling, I always need the services 
of a secretary. I request you give these items favor­
able consideration.10
Before receiving a reply, Nabuco informed Rio-Branco that he
had already sent Rui all the information available and that
11he had doubts about using leave for an official mission. 
Nabuco still insisted on official leave for his health 
treatment, without any official duties.
Finally Rio-Branco acceded to Nabuco's request for 
additional compensation, provided Nabuco accepted official 
duties of aiding the Hague delegation. Just three weeks 
before Nabuco's departure for Europe, Rio-Branco sarcasti­
cally cabled Washington,
If it is convenient for you to enlighten the Brazilian 
Hague delegation about activities of prior peace confer­
ences, the government proposes for you to spend four or 
five months in Europe with payment of 24 / contos_/, 
gold, and also 12 /contos_7* gold, to help with expenses 
of passage. Say whether or not your state of health 
will permit you to accept this commission, which will 
not require a great expenditure of e n e r g y . 12
Rio-Branco had still ignored the plea of Nabuco that Velloso
be allowed to accompany him. Nabuco reminded him of the
Nabuco to Rio-Branco, Washington, April 24, 1907,
AJN. A year earlier Nabuco had already complained to Rio-
Branco that his expenditures were great and that it was dif­
ficult for an ambassador to live on his salary, especially 
one like himself with a large family. Nabuco to Rio-Branco, 
Colorado Springs, April 29, 1906, ABR-B, 74/1 rec.
11Nabuco to Rio-Branco, Washington, April 27, 1907,
AHI, 235/3/IB, tel. rec., partly encoded, translation sup­
plied.
12Rio-Branco to Nabuco, Rio, May 9, 1907, AHI, 
235/3/15, tel. exp., partially marked for encoding.
oversight and the Baron finally wired that the secretary was
13authorized to go.
Since his return from Brazil the previous year, 
Nabuco had supplied information to Rio-Branco on the up­
coming conference, and as the convening date approached he 
devoted an increasing amount of time to this effort. He 
talked with Elihu Root, who confidentially showed him the 
instructions he planned to issue to the American delegation 
relative to the Drago Doctrine. The two had a long, friend­
ly visit and the Secretary of State granted Nabuco's request
that he be allowed to communicate the purport of the in-
14structions to Rio.
Brazil was not, however, the only nation seeking
status at the conference. In late February, the Argentine
representative had approached the British Prime Minister,
Sir Edward Grey, with a proposal that one of the vice-
presidents at the Hague Conference be from South America,
and that Argentina receive that honor. Grey instructed the
British Ambassador in Washington to ascertain the American
15position on the subject. However, Argentina had not yet 
broached the subject in Washington and the Americans did not
13Nabuco to Rio-Branco, Washington, May 11, 1907, 
AHI, 235/3/IB, tel. rec.; and Rio-Branco to Nabuco, Rio,
May 11, 1907, AHI, 235/3/15, tel. exp.
14Nabuco to Rio-Branco, Washington, May 9, 1907, AHI, 
235/3/IB, tel. rec., partially encoded, translation sup­
plied; and Root to Nabuco, Washington, May 10, 1907, AJN.
15James Bryce to Root, Washington, February 26,
1907, DS, 40/89.
expect the conference to elect a South American vice-
president, assuming the Second Conference would be organized
much as the First, where only one vice-president was elec- 
16ted. After learning of Argentina's renewed efforts to
secure a vice-presidency at the Hague Conference, Nabuco
attempted to contact Elihu Root, who was out of Washing- 
17ton. Nabuco prepared a memorandum for the secretary of
state, and immediately upon his return (May 25th) he re­
quested a meeting for Monday, May 27th. Root already had an 
engagement for Monday, but since Mrs. Root was out of town, 
he suggested that Nabuco drop by his house that afternoon
1 O(Saturday, May 25th) about five o'clock for a little talk.
Nabuco accepted the invitation, and had a long conference
with Root and delivered his confidential memorandum. At
this time he learned that the Argentine representative had
already spoken to Root about American support for his coun-
19try's delegate at the conference.
In the seven-page memorandum, Nabuco pointed out
■I gRobert Bacon (Acting Secretary of State) to James 
Bryce, Washington, March 16, 1907, DS, 40/90.
17Rio-Branco to Nabuco, Rio, May 20, 1907, AHI, 
235/3/15, tel. exp., marked for encoding; Nabuco to Rio- 
Branco, Washington, May 22, 1907, AHI, 235/3/IB, tel. rec.; 
and Rio Branco to Nabuco, Rio, May 20, 1907, AHI, 235/3/15. 
Nabuco had first learned of the initial Argentine efforts on 
March 1st. Nabuco to Rio-Branco, Washington, March 1, 1907, 
AHI, 235/3/IB, tel.rec., partially encoded, trans. supplied.
18Root to Nabuco, Washington, May 25, 1907, AJN.
19Nabuco to Rio-Branco, Washington, May 26, 1907, 
AHI, 235/3/IB, tel. rec., partially encoded, translation 
supplied.
that the Russian and Dutch delegates dominated the First
Hague Peace Conference, which had a president (Russian), an
honorary president (Dutch), and one vice-president 
20(Dutch). He went on to say,
We hear that there is an intention of appointing 
three Vice-Presidents of the Conference this time in­
stead of one and I wish you to be good enough to ascer­
tain privately, through your Diplomatic Agents, from 
Holland and Russia, as between them the two Countries 
organized the last Conference, if there is such inten­
tion and what Nations they have in view for the Vice- 
Presidencies; also, as much as could be known now, how 
it is intended to divide the other honours of the Con­
ference, which are the (a) Honorary Presidencies,
(b) Presidencies, (c) Vice-Presidencies, of Committees 
or of Sub-Committees. In the last Conference that dis­
tribution appears by the proceedings of the Conference 
to have been left to Holland, whose first Delegate, 
Jonkheer van Karnebeek, was called by the German Ambas­
sador Count Munster the main spring, the cheville- 
ouvriere of the Conference.
This time . . . the distribution of honours must be 
made on quite a different plan. . . .
If Latin America were to have only one of the hon­
ours of the Conference, we think none of its Nations 
should take precedence over Brazil, the largest and the 
most populated of all of them. . . . But we expect the 
Conference will distribute its honours to this Continent 
more liberally, and in this case the very least that 
could be done for Latin America . . . would be to re­
serve for it two of the honours; one for Portuguese 
America, that knew how to keep together through all 
vicissitudes, and the other for Spanish America, which 
less fortunate broke into fragments during the Indepen­
dence crisis.
The sincere friendship that binds Brazil and the 
United States . . . encourages me to expect that you 
will do your best to induce the distributors of the hon­
ours of the Conference to give the first Delegate of 
Brazil one of its Honours (outside of those which natu­
rally in these Conferences appertain to Netherlands and
20Nabuco to Root, Washington, May 25, 1907, "Private 
Memorandum on the Hague Conference left by the Brazilian Am­
bassador for the Secretary of State, State Department, Wash­
ington, D.C.," hereinafter cited as "Private Memo", DS, 
40/290; carbon copy in CRB, Haia, Pasta XXII.
to Russia) second to none that be given to the Chief 
Delegate of any other Nation attending the Conference. 
The intervention of your Delegation to that effect 
would be most welcome to us, but as the combination be­
tween Russia and Holland may be in progress now, your 
influence needs perhaps be exercised before the meeting 
of the Delegates, privately, near the organizers of the 
Conference at the Hague and at St. Petersburg for a lib­
eral recognition of this Continent in the honours of the 
Conference, and in any case for our precedence in them, 
among the Republics of Latin America, that recognition 
being due to our size, our population, and our history, 
your interest in us being justified by our long standing 
and steady friendship.21
Root told Nabuco not to worry about the United 
States; the chief American concern would be to increase the 
respect of Europe for the Latin American nations. He prom­
ised Nabuco he would instruct the American representatives 
at St. Petersburg and The Hague to intervene with those gov­
ernments for support of Latin American honors.at the confer­
ence. He told Nabuco that Rui should be one of the notable 
figures of the conference. Root also reported that at his
urging Yale University had just decided to invite Rui to
22give its annual series of spring lectures in 1908.
22Nabuco to Rio-Branco, Washington, May 26, 1907, 
AHI, 235/3/IB, tel. rec., partially encoded, trans. sup­
plied. The invitation to deliver the Dodge lectures was in­
deed an honor, as earlier lecturers had been men such as a 
Supreme Court Justice, a Secretary of War, and a Secretary 
of State. Root himself had delivered the 1907 lecture.
Anson P. Stokes, Jr. (Secretary, Yale University) to Rui,
New Haven, Conn., May 23, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XV; Nabuco 
to Root, Washington, note, May 29, 1907, AJN; John Barrett 
(Director, International Bureau of American Republics) to 
Rui, Washington, June 25, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XV; John 
Barrett to d ’Estournelles de Constant, Washington, June 29, 
1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XV; Lee McClung to Rui, aboard the 
Deutschland, July 4, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XXIII; John Bar­
rett to Rui, Washington, July 23, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XV;
Nabuco's close friendship with Root continued to be 
quite fruitful, for on May 29th he allowed Nabuco to read 
the complete confidential instructions which were to be 
given to the United States delegation to the Hague Confer­
ence. He was allowed to make notes and to cable a resume of
23the United States position to Rio-Branco. Root carried 
out his promise of support for Brazil and cabled the Ameri­
can legation at The Hague to ascertain the situation in ref­
erence to the distribution of offices at the upcoming con- 
24ference. In response to this iniative, the foreign minis­
ter of the Netherlands informed the American minister at The
/
Hague that he would consult with the Russian delegate before 
drawing up a slate of offices to be presented to the confer­
ence, and that he would do all he could to see that the
South American representatives would receive their share of 
25the honors.
Before departing for Europe on June 1st, Nabuco be­
gan writing letters to his friends who were delegates to the
Elbert J. Baldwin to Rui, Karlsbad, Germany, August 3, 1907, 
CRB, Haia Pasta XV; and Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, telegram 
no. 176, n.d., CRB, Haia Pasta XI.
23Nabuco to Rio-Branco, Washington, May 30, 1907, 
AHI, 235/3/IB, tel. rec., encoded, translation supplied; 
Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, May 30, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta VI, 
Reservado No. 1; and Nabuco to Rio-Branco, Paris, June 21, 
1907, AJN. These were the final proofs of the instructions; 
although not yet approved by President Roosevelt, this was 
the most authoritative information available before Nabuco 
left for Europe.
24David J. Hill (American Minister at The Hague) to 
Root, The Hague, May 29, 1907, DS, 40/305.
26Hague Conference, explaining to them who Rui was.
This action was necessary because this was Rui's first dip­
lomatic mission beyond the borders of Brazil and he was vir­
tually unknown outside his own country despite his strong 
involvement in Brazilian politics, government, and society 
for over twenty-five years. After arriving in Europe, Na­
buco continued to write letters to the delegates on Rui's 
27behalf. Upon the Brazilian ambassador's arrival, he asked
Rui for a list of the delegates so that he cound expand this
. . 28 project.
In response to Nabuco's appeal, Count Maurice Prozor
wrote that he wished Nabuco were the Brazilian delegate. He
29said he had nothing against Rui, "But he is not you."
Prozor, a Russian delegate, felt that what was important was 
that Brazil get the honor and that her representative could 
be honored with the honorary presidency of the First Commis-
26Nabuco to d'Estournelles de Constant, Washington, 
April 10, 1907, AJN; and Nabuco to d'Estournelles, Washing­
ton, April, 15, 1907, AJN. See also Nabuco to Root, Wash­
ington, "Private Memo," May 25, 1907, DS, 40/290.
27Nabuco to Rui, Paris, June 13, 1907, CRB, Pasta 
J. Nabuco; Count Prozor to Nabuco, The Hague, June 16, 1907, 
AJN; and Nabuco to Rui, n.d., note on front and back of cal­
ling card, CRB, Pasta J. Nabuco, "Cartoes."
28Nabuco to Rui, Paris, June 13, 1907, CRB, Pasta 
J. Nabuco. Despite Nabuco's valuable assistance, Rui ap­
parently never knew that he had an official mission to 
assist him in preparing for the conference. See Viana, Rui 
& Nabuco, p. 74; and Nabuco to Rui, Miami, February 4, 1909, 
quoted in Viana, Rui & Nabuco, pp. 99-101.
29Count Prozor to Nabuco, The Hague, June 16, 1907,
AJN.
30sion. In working with the Dutch government to apportion 
the honorary positions at the conference, the Russian dele­
gate supported Brazil's claim. Rui attributed the strong
support of Count Prozor in favor of Brazil directly to Nabu-
31
g o 's  "Private Memorandum" to Root.
During May, Rui had been busily occupied with the 
final preparations for his European voyage. Prior to his 
departure on May 21st he went by Pena's office, but the 
president was out. He later apologized to Pena for not com­
ing to his house for a final "abrago" before departing, but
said he was inundated by a heavy stream of people coming to
32accompany him to the ship. Rui sailed aboard the English
packet, Araguaya, which made a port call at Rui's hometown
of Salvador, Bahia. There he was received with great en-
33thusiasm and popular demonstrations.
Meanwhile Rio-Branco had been preparing for the 
conference by collecting and sending copies of materials to 
Rui. He sent books, newspaper clippings, confidential in­
structions, and memorandum to aid in Rui's preparation and 
to be used as references during the conference. The Baron 
also made final appointments to the Brazilian delegation and 
worked out the complete details of the order of prece-
31Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, June 19, 1907, 
ABR-B, 18/8.
32Rui to Afonso Pena, Rio, May 22, 1907, AAP; and 
Pena to Rui, Rio, May 22, 1907, AAP.
33,,Ruy Barbosa," A Bahia, May 24, 1907, p. 1.
dence.^
In addition to the actions already taken in prepar­
ing for Brazil's debut at the Second Hague Peace Conference 
Rio-Branco made other careful preparations. He insisted
that the Brazilian legation at The Hague reserve ample quar
35ters for Rui and his family in a good hotel. Arriving at 
the Palace Hotel in a resort suburb of The Hague, Rui was . 
impressed:
Scheveningen, the celebrated bathing beach where I am 
located, is a half hour from the capital by car and 15 
or 20 minutes by electric tramway. The quarters, which 
the Baron arranged for me, are almost princely. It is 
enough to tell you that Germany has a suite of equal 
size in the same hotel & France's accomodations are in­
ferior, since they are on the third floor and we are on the first.36
Even Nabuco, the well-travelled diplomat, was impressed by
37the accomodations.
Rui was first nominated as a delegate and minister 
plenipotentiary, the official designation being, "Envoy 
Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary on Special Mis-
34Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, May 3, 1907, CRB, Pasta 
Rio Branco; Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, May 11, 1907, CRB, Haia 
Pasta VI; and Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, May 21, 1907, CRB, 
Haia Pasta, VI.
35Rio-Branco to Hague Legation, Rio, April 18, 1907 
AHI, 211/1/9, tel. exp. He also arranged for the accomoda­
tions for the two delegates (Rui and Eduardo Lisboa) to be 
paid for by the government, but food was to be paid from 
their monthly stipend. Rio-Branco to Hague Legation, Rio, 
April 19, 1907, AHI, 211/1/9, tel. exp.
36Rui to Carlos Bandeira, Scheveningen, June 16, 
1907, CRB, quoted in Viana, Vida de Rui, p. 307.
37Nabuco to Rui, Paris, n.d., note to Rui on front 
and back of calling card, CRB, Pasta J. Nabuco, "Cartoes."
sion to Her Majesty Queen of the Low Countries and Delegate
38of Brazil to the Second Peace Conference at The Hague." 
However, Rio-Branco decided to change Rui's status to ambas­
sador, and the official credentials presented Rui as, "Sena­
tor Ruy Barbosa, Vice-President of the Federal Senate, Am­
bassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary in special mis­
sion to Your Majesty, persuant to the meeting of the 2nd
39Conference of Peace, at The Hague." Nabuco felt that it
was fortunate for Brazil that Rio-Branco had changed his
mind, as Rui was the only delegate from Latin America with
40the title of ambassador. He felt that Brazil's later
selection to an honorary presidency at the conference was
due primarily to this "diplomatic coup" by Baron Rio- 
41Branco.
Upon arriving in Paris on June 10th, Nabuco sought 
42out Rui. They had a long meeting at which Nabuco brought
38Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, April 29, 1907, AHI, 
273/3/1; and decree of nomination, Rio, April 1, 1907, CRB, 
Haia Pasta Decretos.
39Pena to Queen Wilhelmina, Rio, May 17, 1907, CRB, 
Haia Pasta IVB.
40Nabuco to Tobias Monteiro, Vittel, France, July 
12, 1907, AJN. See also James Brown Scott, The Proceedings 
of the Hague Peace Conferences (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1920, The 1907 Conference, I, pp. 18-35; hereinafter 
the proceedings will be cited as Proceedings, C1899) or Pro­
ceedings, (1907).
41Nabuco to Rio-Branco, Paris, June 21, 1907, AJN.
42Rui to Nabuco, "Carta Pneumatique," June 10, 1907, 
Paris, CRB, Pasta J. Nabuco; Nabuco to Rio-Branco, Paris, 
June 21, 1907, AJN; and Nabuco to Rui, n.d., note on back of 
old Hotel Regina menu of June 6, 1907, CRB, Pasta J. Nabuco, 
"Cartoes."
Rui up to date on events in Washington and explained the
steps he himself had taken in relation to the conference.
He also gave Rui the notes he took from the instructions to
43the American delegates shown to him by Secretary Root. In
addition he sent two essays by President Nicholas M. Butler
of Columbia University to give Rui a chance to familiarize
himself with American ideas on subjects to be discussed at
44the Hague Conference.
One of the more interesting items furnished to Rui
by Nabuco was a document containing confidential notes to
45aid Rui in the unfamiliar diplomatic environment. Here 
Nabuco advised Rui that his best informant on matters per­
taining to Hispanic-American countries would be Gonzalo de 
Quesada y Arostegui, one of the Cuban delegates. Quesada 
could be relied on as a friend of Brazil, although he was a 
good friend of Roque Saenz Pena, an Argentine delegate, whom 
he had once served as secretary. Nabuco said that Quesada 
would explain to Rui the value of each of the Hispanic- 
American delegates. Gonzalo Esteva, first delegate of Mexi­
co, was a former colleague of Nabuco's who always appeared 
"Very polished and formal." Nabuco explained that Mexico 
was a rival of Argentina and cooperated with the United 
States. Her third delegate, Francisco de La Barra, was an
43Nabuco to Rio-Branco, Paris, June 21, 1907, AJN.
44Nabuco to Rui, n.d., note on front and back of 
calling card, CRB, Pasta J. Nabuco, "Cartoes."
45Nabuco to Rui, Paris, June 13, 1907, "Notas Confi-
denciaes," CRB, Pasta J. Nabuco.
admirer of Rui. Domingo Gana of Chile was an old friend of
Brazil, but might be somewhat cool since he suspected,
wrongly, that Nabuco helped to prevent Chile's establishment
of an embassy in Washington. Baron de Selir of Portugal had
a brother who was a colleague and good friend of Nabuco in
Washington. Baron de Selir probably would be the best guide
in respect to Holland and the diplomatic corps at The Hague.
Rui should cultivate the friendship of Guido Pusinato, one
of the Italian delegates, who would be the best guide among
46the European diplomats. Nabuco closed with some advice to 
Rui on the position of ambassador, which he said is circum­
scribed by etiquette and ceremony. He optimistically ad­
vised Rui that, since he was not a career diplomat, he would 
be free of the protocol and formalities which encumber the 
position. Nabuco said public opinion was the greatest force 
in the politics of diplomacy. He cited an example of the 
Russian delegate on the occasion of negotiation of the Trea­
ty of Portsmouth. On that occasion Count Sergei Y. Witte 
directed an appeal to the American press which changed their 
attitude from one of hostility to one of general good will 
toward Russia. Nabuco recommended this approach as "good 
diplomacy.,|4̂
After meeting with Rui and providing him all the
46Ibid.
47Ibid. Witte, Russian negotiator of the Treaty of 
Portsmouth (1905), was awarded the title of count because of 
the unexpectedly favorable terms for Russia in the treaty. 
The New Columbia Encyclopedia C1975), p. 2996.
information he felt would aid the Brazilian cause et the
conference, Nabuco wrote a long report to Rio-Branco. He
closed the letter,
I am going to the waters of Vittel, from whence I shall 
be able to furnish whatever information may be requested 
of me, and after the termination of the Conference, I 
shall return to my post as quickly as p o s s i b l e . 48
Nabuco felt he had carried out the bulk of his mission and
was ready for the rest and recuperation of the European
leave he had so earnestly sought.
Rui missed having the experience of a diplomat such 
as Nabuco near at hand. Since arriving in Europe Rui had
become completely absorbed in preparations for the confer­
ence. Despite the strenuous pace, when the Second Hague 
Peace Conference opened on June 15th, Rui had many misgiv­
ings about his ability to handle the task of Brazilian am­
bassador: "Every moment I feel smaller and weaker, in the
face of this event and this position. May God have compas- 
49sion on me."
In the next chapter the conference deliberations 
will be examined, to demonstrate that Brazil, in self in­
terest, abandoned her initial support of the United States 
in favor of the principle of the equality of nations.
48Nabuco to Rio-Branco, Paris, June 21, 1907, AJN.
49Rui to Maria Augusta Barbosa, Scheveningen, June 
16, 1907, CRB, Pasta Rio Branco.
CHAPTER IV 
THE CONFERENCE
The First Ha^ue Peace Conference was called by Czar 
Nicholas II of Russia and met from May 18th to July 29, 
1899.^ Twenty-six nations were represented at the confer­
ence including the United States and Mexico, the only two 
American states which participated. Brazil, though invi­
ted, declined to attend because she felt none of her na­
tional interests would be discussed.
The Second Hague Peace Conference was proposed by 
President Theodore Roosevelt, but was officially convened by 
Nicholas II. Representatives of forty-four nations met and 
deliberated from June 15th to October 18, 1907. At the in­
sistence of the United States all of the Latin American 
states were allowed to send delegates to this conference, 
although Costa Rica and Honduras chose not to participate. 
The two conferences considered problems of the international 
community such as: the limitation of armaments, the laws of
war, and international arbitration. In regard to the arma-
^ o r  details of the origin of the conference see: 
E.J. Dillon, "True Story of the Genesis of the Hague Confer­
ence," Contemporary Review, XCT C1907), 879-82; and Dan L. 
Morrill, "Nicholas II and the Call for the First Hague Con­
ference," The Journal of Modern History, XLVI (June, 1974), 
296-313.
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ments question the conferences felled to reach any agree­
ment, but they did improve the laws of war and codified 
them.2
In October of 1904 United States Secretary of State 
John Hay sent out a circular calling for a second peace con­
ference to meet at The Hague. There was generally an en­
couraging public response, but privately the statesmen were 
not so pleased. Theodore Roosevelt strongly emphasized the 
peace theme in his campaign for the November election. The 
main impetus for the issuance of the circular apparently was 
a resolution (called the Declaration of St. Louis) by the 
Interparliamentary Union. In the declaration the conference 
delegates resolved that the American President should invite 
governments to send representatives to a second peace con­
ference. Representatives of the organization presented the
document to Roosevelt in September and he promised to ap-
3proach other governments.
Meanwhile, the Russo-Japanese War was raging and it 
was thus an inopportune time for a peace conference. The
2For detailed accounts of the conferences see:
Calvin D. Davis, The United States and the First Hague Peace 
Conference (Ithica, N.Y.: American Historical Association
and Cornell University Press, 1962); Davis, The U.S. and the 
Second Conference? Joseph H. Choate, The Two Hague Confer­
ences (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1913);
and William I. Hull, The Two Hague Conferences and Their 
Contributions to International Law (Boston: Ginn & Company,
1908). The text of the deliberations may be found in Scott, 
The Proceedings of the Hague Peace Conferences, cited as 
Proceedings, (1899) or Proceedings, (1907).
3Davis, U.S. and the Second Conference, pp. 91-92, 
106-10, 112; and Jessup, Root, II, p. 67.
war ended with the signing of the Treaty of Portsmouth on 
September 5, 1905 and a week later the Russian ambassador 
appeared at Roosevelt's door in Oyster Bay, New York with a 
letter from the Russian foreign minister. The letter said 
that Russia, "as initiator of the International Peace Con­
ference of 1899," felt it was time to call another confer­
ence. The Russians said they would provide a detailed pro­
gram for a new conference, and Roosevelt agreed to allow the
4Czar to assume the initiative.
The conference was first scheduled by Russia and The 
Netherlands for the summer of 1906. However, the Third Pan 
American Conference was already scheduled for Rio at that 
time. Most Latin American states had too few experts in 
international law to send delegates simultaneously to con­
ferences on different continents and travel was not rapid 
enough to allow attendance at both within a few weeks of 
each other. The dilemma presented by this conflict of dates 
was resolved by Elihu Root, who persuaded the Russians and
5Dutch to postpone the conference until 1907. After some 
reluctance the signatory powers of the arbitration conven­
tion of 1899 signed a document admitting to the second con­
ference the non-signatory powers. Thus all the Latin Ameri­
can states were admitted to the Hague Conference system,
4Davis, U.S. and the Second Conference, p. 123; and 
Jessup, Root, II, pp. 67-68.
5Jessup, Root, II, pp. 68-69; Davis, U.S. and the 
Second Conference, p. 129; and Bacon and Scott, eds., Latin 
America and the United States: Addresses by Elihu Root,
p. 3.
gwhich became an organization of most of the world's states. 
Although they agreed to admit the lesser powers into the 
system, the eight major powers intended to remain in charge 
of the situation as they had been at the first conference.
The second conference met for a total of four months 
and its deliberations can be divided into three rough chron­
ological divisions: the first five weeks, which were pri­
marily devoted to the making of proposals; the sixth through 
seventeenth weeks, during which discussions dealt mostly 
with laws of war on land and sea? and the final ten days,
which were devoted to negotiations relative to arbitration
7and international courts. The conference was organized 
around commissions, subcommissions, and special committees. 
Most of the work of the conference took place in these com­
mittees, rather than at the relatively infrequent general 
(plenary) sessions. Many conference delegates, including 
Rui Barbosa, served on all four commissions and several sub-
Qcommissions, which caused many complications. "If one can
imagine a group of actors trying to perform in several plays
at the same time he can understand the problems of the
gbusier delegates."
The honors of the conference were greatly expanded 
from the first conference so as to please as many delega-
gDavis, U.S. and the Second Conference, p. 183.
7Ibid., p. 187.
8Ibid.; and Hull, Two Conferences, pp. 40-44.gDavis, U.S and the Second Conference, p. 187.
tions as possible. There were a total of thirty-eight such 
positions distributed among twenty-three of the forty-four 
countries represented. The United States was not repre­
sented among the seven active presidents, but was assigned 
two of the thirteen honorary presidencies. Brazil also re­
ceived an honorary presidency, the highest honor bestowed on 
a Latin American country. Mexico, Argentina, and Chile were 
each awarded one of the sixteen honorary vice-presiden­
cies."^
Elihu Root had not sought honors for members of the 
American delegation, but had given them instructions to sup­
port Latin American aspirations as much as possible:
Of course the United States does not care and I assume 
none of your commission cares, about the so-called hon­
ors, while they seem to be regarded as important by the 
Latin Americans. I should say that we better give them 
the benefit of whatever may be coming to us, so far as 
practicable. If we do this, we will be repaid ten times 
over by their appreciation provided they do not think we 
are discriminating in favor of one against another.H
At first the deference to the Brazilians seemed to bear
fruit, as Brazil voted with the United States and against
the rest of Latin America on several points.
* * *
The deliberations of the conference which had the 
most importance for the international status of Brazil were 
the discussions relating to: immunity of private property
"^Proceedings, CL907) , I, p. 18; and Hull, Two Con­
ferences, pp. 33-34.
"^Root to Choate, Washington, May 31, 1907, DS,40/288.
at sea, arbitration of contractual debts (Drago Doctrine), 
the International Prize Court, and the International Court 
of Arbitral Justice (International Court of Justice).
During the first days of the conference, the Fourth 
Commission debated the question of the immunity of private 
property at sea. The importance to Brazil of this discus­
sion was that it was the first subject of interest to the 
United States on which she took a stand. Here Rui supported 
the American delegation in its proposal, much to the delight 
of the Americans and Nabuco, and to the chagrin of some of 
the other Latin American nations, who believed that Brazil
was always going to support the United States uncondition-
12ally in all matters brought before the conference. How­
ever, this apparent accord between the delegations contained 
a faint hint of future discord. It was rumored that Root 
did not want the original American proposal passed; and in 
fact, the American delegation comtemplated abandoning their 
proposal in favor of a very weak Belgian one. Rui and Rio-
Branco were both upset by this prospect and sought Root's
13intervention in the matter. On the final vote, Brazil
12Hildebrando Accioly, "Rui Barbosa na Segunda Con- 
ferencia da Haia," p. 165; Nabuco to Rui, Vittel, France, 
June 29, 1907,CRB, Pasta J. Nabuco; Rio-Branco to Amaral, 
Rio, July, n.d., 1907, AHI, 235/3/15 tel. exp.; Bacon to 
Root, Washington, July 16, 1907, DS, 40/392A; Proceedings, 
(1907), III, pp. 748, 770, 795-96, 826-28, 833, 899; and 
Rui, speech, October 21, 1908, Rui Barbosa, 0 Brasil e as 
Nagoes Latino-Amerlcanas em Haya: Discurso Proferido no
Senado em 21 de Outubro de 1908 pelo Senador Ruy Barbosa 
(Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa Nacional, 1908), p. 11.
13Rio-Branco to Amaral, Rio, July, n.d., 1907, AHI, 
235/3/15 tel. exp.
supported the American project, although the proposal was 
14defeated.
The Drago Doctrine, named for the Argentine prime 
minister, stated that no public debt would serve as the pre­
text for armed intervention or occupation of territory in 
the Western Hemisphere. The Drago Doctrine had occasioned 
lively debate at the Third Pan American Conference in Rio in 
1906, where the United States had attempted to prevent its 
introduction into the deliberations. However, the Rio Con­
ference delegates resolved that the issue be discussed at 
the Second Hague Peace Conference in an effort to have the
doctrine accepted world-wide as a method of diminishing the
15possibility of conflict over purely monetary issues.
In accepting the formal invitation to the Second
Hague Conference, Elihu Root informed the Russians that the
United States reserved the right to introduce the subject of
16the Drago Doctrine at the conference. The American posi­
tion was that the use of force to collect debts should be 
permitted, but only after certain conditions had been met. 
These conditions included the seeking of arbitration and the 
refusal of the debtor to honor the agreement which resulted
14Proceedings, (1907), III, 899; and Davis, U.S. and 
the Second Conference, p. 231.
15Davis, U.S. and the Second Conference, p. 134; and 
Burns, Unwritten Alliance, p. 170. Also see above, Chapter 
II, pp. 30-31.
16Davis, U.S. and the Second Conference, p. 134.
17from the arbitration.
Rio-Branco, on the other hand, had declared to Na­
buco as early as February of 1907 that Brazil had no inter­
est in supporting the Drago Doctrine and did not wish for it 
to be brought up for debate at the conference. He said that
Brazil always paid her debts, and besides, was a creditor to
18Uruguay and Paraguay. Brazil at that time and in the past
had relied on credit to finance her industrial development,
and after having carefully built up good credit, did not
want to give creditors the impression that Brazil might not
19be willing or able to repay.
Rui was critical of both the Argentine (Drago) and 
American proposals, but on instructions of Rio-Branco, re­
jected the Argentine proposal and supported the American 
20one. Rio-Branco fully expected that the proposal would 
eventually be dropped by the Americans because he felt Euro­
pean opposition would prevent unanimous agreement by the 
21conference. Rui took pains to point out that his vote on 
the subject was based on Brazilian public opinion, and not
17 ~Accioly, "0 Barao do Rio Branco e a 2a Conferencia
da Haia," p. 73.
18-,. ,Ibid.
^ Proceedings, (1907), II, p. 310.
20Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, Reservado No. 8, June 18, 
1907, CRB, Haia Pasta IVA; Accioly, "0 Barao do Rio Branco 
e a 2a Conferencia da Haia," 75-77; and Davis, U.S. and the 
Second Conference, p. 257.
21Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, no. 11, June 19, 1907,
CRB, Haia Pasta VII.
22on antagonism toward Argentina. However, at least one
commentator says Brazil was reluctant to support the Drago
Doctrine simply because it was proposed by Argentina, a per- 
23ennial rival. The conference finally voted to accept the 
American version of the proposal to refrain from the use of 
armed force for the collection of contractual debts, unless 
arbitration of them had failed. Professor William I. Hull 
optimistically called the agreement "one of the most impor­
tant achievements of the second conference, and one of the
24greatest triumphs in the history of diplomacy."
The First Commission was assigned the task of draft­
ing a plan for an international court to decide the legality 
of captures made during naval warfare. German and British
plans were submitted and referred to the second subcommis-
25sion, which was to deal exclusively with this question. 
Earlier in a plenary session of the conference, the German 
delegate had surprised the other delegates by announcing 
that his country was in favor of such an international court 
and that he was prepared to submit a plan for consideration. 
The German suggestion was cordially received by both the
22Rui Barbosa, 0 Brasil e as Nacoes Latino-Ameri- 
canas em Haya, pp. 10, 22-23.
23 ~Magalhaes Junior, 0 Homem e o Mito, p. 270.
24Hull, Two Conferences, p. 491. Hull was a profes­
sor of history, international relations, and political econ­
omy at Swarthmore College. Who Was Who in America, Vol. I, 
1897-1942, p. 605.
25Hull, Two Conferences, p. 427.
26British and American delegates.
Brazil was not a member of the committee of exami­
nation which was deliberating the draft convention for an 
international prize court. However, Rui asked to speak be­
fore the committee. On August 22nd he appeared before the 
committee and strongly opposed the ranking of Brazil below
many of the lesser powers in the selection of judges for the 
27court. Davis says,
Barbosa's speech was brilliant— one of the best of the 
conference. He spoke rapidly, emotionally; yet every 
sentence revealed preparation. He analyzed the posi­
tions of all nations with navies and merchant marines, 
proving that Brazil ranked above several European pow­
ers in merchant s h i p p i n g . 28
In hopes of improving Brazil's position, Rui pro-
29posed that every country have a seat on the court. The 
other delegates, however, felt that such a proposal would 
produce an unwieldy court. They felt that some arrangement 
was necessary to limit court membership, and thus were dis­
posed to give priority to countries with the greatest poli-
30tical influence.
Rio-Branco was disappointed with the conference de­
liberations on the Prize Court, and on August 15th cabled
26Ibid.
27Proceedings, (1907), II, pp. 796-98. The method 
of the selection of judges would also be a factor in the la­
ter deliberations on the International Court of Justice.
28Davis, U.S. and the Second Conference, p. 226.
29Proceedings, (1907), II, pp. 796-98.
30Davis, U.S. and the Second Conference, p. 227.
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Rui,
The organizers of the project worked very hard but com­
mitted many injustices, showing a decided preference for 
the European countries and no consideration for the 
countries of Latin America. . . .31
After giving a list of the classification of the countries
and their shipping tonnage, he concluded,
A simple examination of the list above shows how in­
equitable was the work of classification by the organi­
zers of the project and we can not but feel that the 
American delegation, in discord with the protestations 
of esteem which Brazil and generally the countries of 
South America have received from their government, are 
in league with the great European powers to treat, in 
such a fashion, the nations of our c o n t i n e n t . 32
When the project for the International Prize Court
came up before the First Commission for a vote, Brazil,
along with Turkey, opposed it. At the plenary session of
September 21st, Brazil was the only one to vote against the 
33project. At the close of the conference a convention for
a prize court was signed, but it failed to come into force
34because of the failure of states to ratify it.
The project for a court to decide cases arising be­
tween or among nations was given various names, but eventu­
ally came to be known as the International Court of Justice, 
or Court of Arbitration. This proposed court is not to be
31Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio. no. 80, August 15, 1907, 
CRB, Haia Pasta X.
32Ibid.
33Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 113, September 
21, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX; and Davis, U.S. and the Second 
Conference, p. 227.
34Quincy Wright, "Hague Court," Encyclopedia Ameri­
cana (1979), XIII, p. 683.
confused with the Permanent Court of Arbitration (The Hague
Court), which was originated by the First Hague Conference
and which the new court was planned to supplement or sup- 
35plant. The projected body was originally designated as
the High Court of International Justice, but eventually was
36officially called the Court of Arbitral Justice.
The American proposal for a new court was taken as
the basis for discussion. The Germans, British, French, and
Americans were already working on a framework for the prize
court, and the Americans sought the assistance of the other
three in framing the new project. The French chose not to
cooperate in the endeavor, so the Americans, British, and
Germans drafted a new project to present to the appropriate 
37committee.
The major problem with the court project was in con­
nection with the method of appointing judges. There was 
controversy over the number of judges to be on the court.
The Americans felt that a court with one judge from each of 
the forty-four nations would be unwieldy and the leader of 
the delegation, Joseph H. Choate, emerged as the champion of 
proportional representation, insisting that judges from the 
larger and more powerful nations serve for longer periods
35Davis, U.S. and the Second Conference, pp. 264, 
269, 271, 274; and Hull, Two Conferences, p. 420.
3 6Proceedings, (1907), II, p. 706; and Davis, U.S. 
and the Second Conference, pp. 269, 273.
37Choate and Scott to Root, The Hague, August 7, 
1907, DS, 40/410; Choate to Root, The Hague, August 10,
1907, DS, 40/412; Davis, U.S. and the Second Conference, 
p. 264; and Hull, Two Conferences, p. 410.
38than the others. Rui eventually emerged as the champion
of equal representation, struggling to prevent any solution
except on the basis of absolute equality of sovereign 
39states. Rui first tried to kill the court project in com
mittee, using a number of tactics, including the contention
that the committee was not competent to take up the sub- 
40ject. In further attempts to block acceptance of the pro
portional method of selecting judges, Rui proposed a new
41court scheme and several modifications. Choate reacted
violently to Rui's new proposals, which he considered im-
42practical and impossible of implementation.
By the end of August Brazil was unequivocably com­
mitted to defending the principle of the equality of sover­
eign states in the selection of judges for the Interna-
43tional Court of Justice. On August 27th Rui brilliantly 
defended this position in a speech which Davis said, "was
38Davis, U.S. and the Second Conference, p. 265; 
and Hull, Two Conferences, pp. 412, 423-426.
^^Proceedings,(1907), II, pp. 619, 624-27, 645-53; 
Hull, Two Conferences, pp. 423-26; and Davis, U.S. and the 
Second Conference, p. 271.
40Proceedings, (1907), II, pp. 624-27. The commit­
tee in question was Committee B of the First Subcommission 
of the First Commission.
41Adee to Choate, Washington, August 15, 1907, DS, 
40/416A; and Rui to Buchanan, Scheveningen, August 16, 1907 
CRB, Haia Pasta XXIII.
42Adee to Choate, Washington, August 15, 1907, DS, 
40/416A; and Choate to Root, The Hague, August 16, 1907, DS 
40/417.
43Choate to Root, The Hague, August 23, 1907, DS,
40/430.
44probably the greatest speech of the conference.” In the
address Rui eloquently defended the position of the minor 
powers:
Can it be said that equal rights are granted to the 
different countries in the Permanent Court when to some 
of them juridicial function is granted for twelve years, 
whilst to others such function is granted for only a 
single year?
Hitherto, the States, however diverse because of their 
extent of territory, their wealth, their power, had, 
nevertheless, among themselves one point of moral com- 
mensuration. This was their national sovereignty. Up­
on this point their juridical equality could be estab­
lished unshakably. In this fortress of an equal right 
for all, and equally inviolable, inalienable, incontro­
vertible, each State, large or small, felt that it was 
so truly its own master and even as safe with regard to 
the rest, as the free citizen feels safe within the 
walls of his own house. Sovereignty is the great for­
tress of a country. It constitutes the basis of the 
entire system of its juridical defence within the field 
of international law. But what is it we would do? We 
would meet, great and small, around a table, each tak­
ing part in a concert of a touching international 
friendship in order to subscribe to a convention which 
would establish a tariff of the practical value of 
sovereignties, by distributing among them portions of 
authority in proportion to the more or less unjust 
estimation of the weak in the balance of justice of the 
powerful.
All the difficulties with which this project is be 
set come from our losing sight of this fundamental 
fact: the equality between sovereign States.45
The American delegation attempted to modify the 
court proposal so as to appease Brazil and gain her acqui­
escence in the project. However, by this time Brazil felt 
her interests were so intertwined with those of the lesser 
powers that she could not abandon her position without
44Davis, U.S. and the Second Conference, p. 272.
45Proceedings, (1907), II, pp. 647, 648.
their consent:
In the second place, in view of the ties which con­
nect us to other States whose rights we defend on this 
question, we would be in a position of underwriting a 
different proposal than the one already presented by us 
at the conference, without the consent of the majority 
of the excluded countries.
If you agree in the modification proposed by us as 
to the number of members of the court, and if you ob­
tain in advance the support of the excluded States, we 
would be able to attempt this solution. But we believe 
it to be impossible to obtain this support.
But without it we will not have the liberty to fol­
low you because we do not want to be suspected of aban­
doning our principle and the nations who support it be­
cause of the advantage that you offer in giving us a 
seat on the court.46
The situation reached such an impasse that the 
delegates feared a court plan would never be approved and 
a special committee was appointed to make a last attempt to 
solve the problem of the selection of judges. The members
of the special six-member committee included Choate and
47Barbosa. This special committee met several times, but
failed to agree after considering various election
48schemes. When the court project came to a final vote, the
delegates adopted a voeu (draft convention), to be appended
to the conference conventions, in which the project was
adopted with the omission of the provisions for appointing 
49judges. The conference further recommended that the draft 
convention be put into effect as soon as an agreement could
46Rui to James Brown Scott, Scheveningen, August 30, 
1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XXII<
^ Proceedings, (1907), II, 687-89.
48Ibid., II, 689-96.
49Davis, U.S. and the Second Conference, pp. 275-76.
be reached, through diplomatic channels, on the appointment
*  • *  50 of judges.
Rio-Branco praised Rui for his defense of the prin­
ciple of equality:
In reference to arbitration, the principle of equality 
of representation of states has now been recognized, as 
it already had been without difficulty in 1899. This 
time, however, its recognition was due only to the.tal­
ent and competence with which you defended it. It is a 
victory which Brazil and all the other countries, with 
the exception of the eight great powers, owe to you.51
During the conference, the deliberations of most 
interest to Brazil were those relative to the immunity of 
private property at sea, the Drago Doctrine, the Interna­
tional Prize Court, and the International Court of Justice. 
In the first two cases, Brazil supported the United States' 
position, to the dismay of the Hispanic-American delegates. 
However, in the latter two cases, Brazil eventually found 
herself on the same side of the issue as the rest of Latin 
America, and in opposition to the American position.
The next chapter will describe the continued strain 
on the United States-Brazilian relationship as Brazil per­
sistently projected the image of an independent, cultured 
nation.
50James Brown Scott, in introduction to Scott, edi­
tor, The Hague Court Reports, I CNew York: Oxford Univer-
Press, 1916), p. xxvi.
51Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, no. 151, September 10,
1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XII.
CHAPTER V
BRAZILIAN RELATIONSHIPS AT THE CONFERENCE: UNITED
STATES, LATIN AMERICA, AND RUSSIA
As the twentieth century began, Brazil was, despite 
her huge territorial expanse, a relative bantam weight in 
the international arena. The Second Hague Conference was 
an opportunity to make her debut in international politics 
and to attempt to improve her international standing. Bra­
zil aspired to assume the position of a major power, but 
this was an unrealistic goal.
At the end of the nineteenth century, Brazil's eco­
nomic and political focus was in the process of shifting 
from London to Washington. British economic and political 
influence was beginning to decline worldwide and American 
international influence was increasing. For Brazil, New 
York was becoming a more important financial center than 
London. Brazil, by aligning herself with the United States, 
hoped to gain support for her own political and economic 
hegemony in South America. This shift was evidenced by: 
the elevation of the American and Brazilian legations to em­
bassy status in January of 1905, the cordial visit of Sec­
retary of State Root to the Third Pan American Conference 
held in Rio in mid-1906, and the unabashedly pro-American
-100-
stance taken by Rio-Branco and Nabuco.^
During the nineteenth century British influence had
been pervasive in many areas of Brazilian life and culture,
2especially in commerce and economics. In the first eighty
years following Brazilian independence, London was her most
important diplomatic post. Beginning in 1900 Joaquim Nabu-
co became first the unofficial, then the official Brazilian
3minister in London.
After Rio-Branco persuaded the United States that 
the two countries should upgrade their legations to the rank 
of embassy, he transferred Nabuco to Washington and appoint­
ed him as Brazil's first ambassador. Nabuco occupied a spe­
cial position, since he was one of few representatives there 
with the rank of ambassador, and he soon became accepted as 
the dean of the Latin American diplomatic corps in Washing­
ton.^
Nabuco and Elihu Root became good friends, and the 
Brazilian ambassador was instrumental in persuading the
■^Graham, Modernization in Brazil, pp. 311-14; Burns, 
Unwritten Alliance, pp. 95-116; and E. Bradford Burns, edi­
tor, A Documentary History of Brazil (New York: Alfred A.
Knopf, 1966), pp. 306-11.
2See especially, Graham, Modernization in Brazil.
3C. Nabuco, Life of Nabuco, pp. 245-55.
4Burns, Unwritten Alliance, pp. 97-100; and Graham, 
Modernization in Brazil, p. 311. Mexico was the only other 
Latin American country with an ambassador in Washington, 
although Argentina was negotiating with the U.S. at that 
time. The Argentines were shocked and hurt that Brazil had 
an ambassador in Washington before they did. Burns, Unwrit­
ten Alliance, p. 188.
American secretary of state to personally attend the Third
5Pan American Conference. Rio-Branco and his ambassador in 
Washington so closely aligned Brazil with the United States 
that the relationship between the two countries during his 
tenure as foreign minister can be characterized as an "in-
gformal alliance."
Root instructed the American delegates to the Second 
Hague Conference to support the Latin American countries as 
much as possible. He informed Nabuco of these instructions 
and the ambassador in turn conveyed this information to Rio- 
Branco. Initially it appeared that there would be cordial 
relations between the Brazilian and American delegations at 
The Hague. On the first substantive point to be discussed 
at the conference, the collection of public debts by mili­
tary force, Rio-Branco instructed Rui that it would inpol- 
itic to differ with the United States on the matter. This 
stance would alienate most of Hispanic America, but Rui was 
to assure them confidentially that Brazil was going along
with the Americans as far as possible, "only to be agree- 
7able." In spite of this Brazilian assurance, the other
^The Argentines, who were bidding for holding the 
meeting in Buenos Aires, were again upstaged by the Brazil­
ians. To help smooth ruffled feathers, Root visited Argen­
tina and other Latin American countries after leaving Rio. 
Burns, Unwritten Alliance, p. 188.
gSee Burns, Unwritten Alliance, especially pp. 201-09.
7Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, Reservado No. 8, June 18, 
1907, CRB, Haia Pasta IVA. See also Rio-Branco to Rui,
Rio, telegram no. 11, June 19, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta VII, 
partially encoded, translation supplied; and Rio-Branco to
Latin American nations felt she was going to vote with the
3United States throughout the conference.
Brazil also supported the American position on the 
question of private property at sea. Nabuco read newspaper 
reports of the early conference deliberations and congratu­
lated Rui on the position he took.
In today's Figaro I see that you are already getting 
recognition and especially that you have begun to ap­
plaud Mr. Choate. Nothing can put us on better terms 
in Washington than supporting the American delegates in 
their attempts at the Conference to make great strides 
for the Rights of Men.
Unless I am mistaken, I heard that Mr. Root spoke of 
your support as the greatest proof of the sincerity of 
our sympathy for the American people.9
At the beginning of July, William I. Buchanan, a
member of the American delegation, confidentially gave Rui
the new proposals the Americans were going to present on
Rui, Rio, no. 19, July 4, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta VII, par­
tially encoded, translation supplied. (Because of the 
large number of cited cables between Rio-Branco and Rui, 
all such telegrams with numbers will be so identified to 
distinguish them from other telegrams of the same date.
A few of the cables do not bear numbers, and a few others 
were erroneously numbered at the time of transmission.
Most such errors in the numbering of dispatches were dis­
covered by Rui and Rio-Branco and corrected in later ca­
bles. )
3William T. Stead, O Brazil em Haya, edited and 
translated by Arthur Bomilcar (Rio de Janeiro: Typ. de M.
Piedade & Cia., 1908), p. 22; Rui Barbosa, Campanha Presi 
dencial,1919 (Bahia: Livraria Catilian, 1919), p. 275;
and Barbosa, Brasil e as Nacoes Latino-Americanas em Haya, 
pp. 24-37.
9Nabuco to Rui, Vittel, France, June 29, 1907,
CRB, Pasta J. Nabuco. See also, "La Conference de La 
Haye," Figaro, June 29, 1907; and Lemgruber Knopf, Bra­
zilian Legation The Hague, to Rio-Branco, The Hague, June 
29, 1907, AHI, 211/1/3 tel. rec.
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the subject of collection of public d e b t s . A l t h o u g h  Rui 
was becoming skeptical of the tactic of supporting the Uni­
ted States, Rio-Branco instructed him to continue to do
Soon, however, the apparent accord between the two
delegations disappeared and was replaced first by subtle,
then by open hostility. By the latter part of August, the
Brazilians were very upset because the American delegation
was not living up to the fine speech of Elihu Root a year
before when at the Rio Conference he had declared,
We deem the independence and equal rights of the smal­
lest and weakest member of the family of nations entit­
led to as much respect as those of the greatest empire; 
and we deem the observance of that respect the chief 
guaranty of the weak against the oppression of the 
strong. We neither claim nor desire any rights or priv­
ileges or powers that we do not freely concede to every 
American republic.12
On August 27th, in deliberating formation of the Interna­
tional Court of Justice, Rui expressed these sentiments
Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 3, July 3,
1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX; and "proposition of the Delega­
tion of the United States of America concerning the limita­
tions of the employment of force in the collection of ordi­
nary public debts arising from contracts," no date, CRB, 
Haia Pasta XXII. A French translation is filed here also.
■^Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, no. 19, July 4, 1907,
CRB, Haia Pasta VII, partially encoded, translation sup­
plied; Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 6, July 8, 1907, 
CRB, Haia Pasta XX; and Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, 
no. 7, July 9, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX.
12Root, speech, July 31, 1906, Latin American Ad­
dresses, p. 10. Rio-Branco, in reference to this speech, 
said, "The delegation of the United States at The Hague is 
not confirming the beautiful words that Secretary of State 
Root spoke in the July 31, 1906 session of the Inter-Ameri­
can Conference in Rio de Janeiro." Rio-Branco to Rui, no. 
93 / i.e., 92_7, August 20, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta X.
in his brilliant defense of the equality of sovereign 
states.^
The divergence began when the Americans maintained 
complete secrecy about their proposal for a method of 
selecting judges for the International Court of Justice 
(Court of Arbitration). Rui, however, through a mutual
friend, learned the details of the proposal which "humili-
14ated" Brazil. Rui considered it essential that some ac­
tion be taken to counter the planned proposal and Rio- 
Branco instructed the Brazilian charge in Washington to
find Root immediately and inform him of the pending Ameri-
15can proposal. Rio-Branco quoted from Root's speech at
the Rio Conference (see above) where he had declared that
the United States supported the independence and equal
rights of all countries, and then he said, "The project of
the delegation as it stands, would be a humiliation for
Brazil and the other Latin Americans and would completely
16destroy the effect of Root's trip." Rio-Branco warned 
that, unless the project were modified, Brazil would be
■^See above, Chapter IV, pp. 95-98.
14Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 32, August 3, 
1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX.
15Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 34, August 4, 
1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX; and Rio-Branco to Amaral, Rio, 
August 4, 1907, AHI, 235/3/15 tel. exp., partially marked 
for encoding.
1 gRio-Branco to Amaral, Rio, August 4, 1907, AHI, 
235/3/15, partially marked for encoding. Same wording as 
found in Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, / no. 52_7, August 4, 
1907, CRB, Haia Pasta IX.
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obliged to defend the rights of sovereign states. He then
closed with this appeal:
I hope that these ideas receive a favorable reception 
and that we will not have to come to the unpleasant po­
sition of demonstrating our disunity before the confer­
ence. If the Latin American countries are going to be 
treated the way the U.S. delegation has planned, then 
it would have been better if we had not been invited to 
The H a g u e . 1 7
Root was on vacation for the summer, attempting to
recover his health in Clinton, New York, and Amaral left
18immediately for Clinton to speak with Root personally.
Rio-Branco was pessimistic about any positive results from
Amaral's trip and he cabled Rui to be prepared for Brazil
19to pursue an independent course in the matter. Amaral 
filed a fifteen-page report with the Foreign Ministry by 
cable. The Brazilian was a guest at Root's home in Clin­
ton, where the secretary of state said he was not in favor 
of all countries having the same representation on the 
Court of Arbitration, but declared himself to be definitely 
opposed to the project of Choate. Root reassured Amaral 
that he intended for Brazil to have proper representation 
and had recommended to Buchanan always to support the in­
terests of Latin America. Root was incredulous that Choate 
would be considering such a project and promised to have the
18Amaral to Rio-Branco, Washington, August 5, 1907, 
AHI, 235/3/1C, partially encoded,_translation supplied; and 
Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, no. 154 /i.e., 54_7, August 5, 1907, 
CRB, Haia Pasta IX.
19Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, no. 55, August 5, 1907,
CRB, Haia Pasta IX
State Department immediately cable the American delegation
20instructions that Brazil have proper representation.
Root sent the wire as promised and the American delegation
responded with its current proposal, which had not yet been 
21presented. Root then instructed the State Department as
follows: "Cable Choate proposed plan described for select-
22ing members of new court seems excellent. Root."
In seeking a compromise, the delegates at the Hague
convention were constantly modifying proposed plans for the
court. Choate cabled a new proposal to Washington, which
was rejected by Root as being, "very distasteful to South 
23America." Root continued,
We must not on any account sacrifice our position of 
asserting the national equality of American States with 
the other powers of the earth. It is far more impor­
tant to us than the whole court scheme.24
In a further effort to get the Americans to modify
their position, Rio-Branco instructed the Brazilian charge
20Amaral to Rio-Branco, New York, August 7, 1907, 
AHI, 235/3/1C tel. rec., partially encoded, translation 
supplied; and Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, / no. 60_7* August 7, 
1907, CRB, Haia Pasta IX.
21Root to Acting Secretary of State, Clinton, N.Y., 
August 5, 1907, DS, 40/408; Adee to Choate, Washington, 
August 6, 1907, DS, 40/409; and Choate & Scott to Root, The 
Hague, August 7, 1907, DS, 40/410.
22Root to Adee, Clinton, N.Y., August 9, 1907, DS, 
40/411. See also Adee to Choate, Washington, August 10, 
1907, DS, 40/411.
23Root to Adee, quoted in Adee to Choate, Washing­
ton, August 13, 1907, DS, 40/412.
24Ibid.
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25to contact the government in Washington. Amaral carried 
a memorandum to Alvey A. Adee, Acting Secretary of State, 
who cabled copies to Root and Roosevelt. The memorandum 
described Brazil's latest proposal for selecting judges for 
a permanent court of arbitration. Since a vote on the pro­
posal was scheduled in two days, the Brazilians felt time 
was critical. After setting forth the details of the pro­
posal, the memo closed thus:
This course of communicating the views of Brazil to 
the American Government, with a desire of their being 
transmitted by cable to the American Delegation at the 
Hague, is taken because the negotiations between the 
same Delegation of the United States and those of 
Prance, Germany, Great Britain, Russia and other Euro­
pean powers are already greatly a d v a n c e d . 26
Amaral was frustrated in his attempt to get the
American government to act. Indeed, Roosevelt and Root were
both out of town and he cabled Rio-Branco, "It is difficult
to approach the administration during the summer on terms
favorable for negotiation because they are all out of town
27and they do not even know where Root is today." While
25Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, no. 78, August 14, 1907, 
CRB, Haia Pasta X.
26Amaral to Adee, "Memorandum presented to the De­
partment of State by Mr. Sylvino Gurgel do Amaral, Charge 
d'Affaires of Brazil," Washington, August 15, 1907, DS, 
40/621.
27Amaral to Rio-Branco, Washington, August 15, 1907, 
AHI, 235/3/1C tel. rec., partially encoded, translation sup­
plied. The expedient conduct of American foreign policy was 
hampered during the summer of 1907 by the absence of Presi­
dent Roosevelt, Secretary of State Root, and Asst. Secretary 
of State Bacon. For several weeks during the crucial nego­
tiations at The Hague over the method of selecting judges 
for the Court of Arbitration, Second Assistant Secretary of 
State Alvey A. Adee was acting Secretary.
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awaiting instructions from Root, Adee cabled Choate that a
new Brazilian plan had been presented and asked him to get
the details from Rui so that he would be prepared to intel-
28ligently act on any instructions from Root.
The Department of State telegram chased Root from
Clinton to Southampton, to New York City, and finally to 
29White Plains. In the meantime, after a two-day delay,
President Roosevelt had replied that he knew too little of
the details to pass a judgement on the matter, and that he
felt the United States should be largely guided by the dele-
30gates on the spot. Choate also responded before Secretary
Root even received his cable. Choate was adamantly opposed
to the Brazilian proposal:
Brazilian plan of Permanent Court indicated in your 
cable absolutely impossible. If insisted on it will 
wreck the whole scheme of a Court. . . .  Do not ask an 
impossibility. We are doing our utmost to secure a 
Court on terms of substantial equality.3!
28Adee to Choate, Washington, August 15, 1907, DS,
40/416A.
29Adee to Root, Washington, August 15, 1907, DS, 
40/427A? Adee to Root, Washington, August 16, 1907, DS,
P.W. 40 (i.e., filed with case no. 40). The confusion was 
compounded because the latter communication was erroneously 
addressed to New Jersey rather than to New York.
30Roosevelt to Adee, Oyster Bay, N.Y., August 17,
1907, DS, 40/420. Roosevelt already had doubts about posi­
tive results from the Hague Conference. Davis says, "So 
disgusted was he that after the Peace Conference opened at 
The Hague he seldom bothered to keep himself informed about
it." Davis, U.S. and the Second Conference, p. 167.
31Choate to Adee, The Hague, August 16, 1907, DS, 
40/417. Elihu Root was in poor health from overwork and 
spent some time at his home in Clinton, New York. However, 
at the time Adee was frantically attempting to reach him, 
he had been called to the bedside of his dying brother in
Root was upset over Choate's cavalier attitude to­
ward Brazil, but was unable to pressure him into changing
it because of his illness and absence from Washington, and
32because Choate enjoyed the confidence of Roosevelt. Wil­
liam I. Buchanan, one of the American delegates, became 
somewhat friendly with Rui and eventually told him in con­
fidence the story of the selection of the American delega­
tion. When Choate, Porter, and Rose were nominated, Root 
had rejected them because of lack of experience. However,
Root was forced to accept them because of an earlier commit-
33ment by Roosevelt.
Clinton. Root evidently was so exhausted that he was un­
able to remain with his brother in his last days, and ten 
days before his death he left Clinton, stopped briefly at 
his mother-in-law's house on Long Island, then went to New 
York City enroute to White Plains. At White Plains he en­
tered Muldoon's Sanatorium, seeking a cure for his exces­
sive fatigue. Root to Adee, White Plains, New York, August 
21, 1907; Root to Adee, White Plains, New York, August 21, 
1907, DS, 40/445; and Davis, U.S. and the Second Confer­
ence, pp. 265-67. Root first went to Clinton to rest in 
July but he was bombarded by cables from the State Depart­
ment and he was very upset over the fatal illness of his 
brother. By late September he had recovered his health, 
but did not immediately return to Washington but went by 
private rail car for a visit to Mexico City with his fami­
ly, returning to Washington on October 19th. Jessup, Root, 
I, pp. 506-07, 515-17; and II, 23-24, 76-77. Elihu's bro­
ther, Orem Root, Jr., died on August 27th. See Adee to 
Choate, Washington, August 27, 1907,’ DS, 40/435; Amaral to 
Rio-Branco, Atlantic City, August 28, 1907, AHI, 235/3/1C 
tel. rec.; and New York Times, August 23-27, September 26, 
and October 20, 1907.
32Amaral to Rio-Branco, Washington, August 17,
1907, AHI, 235/3/1C tel. rec., partially encoded, transla­
tion supplied; and Amaral to Rio-Branco, Atlantic City, 
August 24, 1907, AHI, 235/3/1C tel. rec., partially en­
coded, translation supplied.
33Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 112, September 
21, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX.
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Rui's friendly relationship with Buchanan differed 
sharply from that with the other members of the United 
States delegation at the conference. In fact, Buchanan was 
different from most of the other American delegates in that 
he was cultured, a diplomat, spoke fluent French, and under­
stood Latin America. Buchanan had quite a bit of experience 
in Latin America, having been an American delegate to the 
Second and Third Pan American Conferences, minister to Ar­
gentina (1894-1900), and having conducted many special mis-
34sions to Latin America. He was Root's Latin American 
"expert" on the Hague delegation; Root wrote the head of the 
delegation:
Buchanan, as you know, is charged with the special duty 
of doing all he can to help the Latin Americans in this 
first appearance on their part as members of the world 
family. We have taken a great deal of pains to get 
them into the conference, and I think most of them feel 
grateful for it and I think it is a good policy to help 
them all we c a n . 35
As early as August 4th, Rio-Branco suggested that 
Rui approach Buchanan for aid on the arbitration court pro­
ject. He briefly spoke with Buchanan at the Brazilian ban­
quet and the American heaped lavish praise on him for the 
sumptuous banquet and extravagant floral decorations. Rui 
finally sent a confidential letter, in French to Buchanan,
34Jessup, Root, I, p. 482; and Who Was Who in Amer­
ica, Vol. I, p. 160. See also Harold F. Peterson, Diplomat 
of the Americas: A Biography of William I. Buchanan (1852-
1909) (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1977),
especially pp. 3, 280, 288-89, 292, and 297-300.
35Root to Choate, May 31, 1907, DS, quoted in Jes­
sup, Root, II, pp. 68-69.
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and they had several long discussions concerning the Bra­
zilian proposal. However, it was already too late to head 
off a clash between the delegations; and Rui had a heated 
exchange with Choate in a commission session on August 
17th.36
After Rui's exchange with Choate, Rio-Branco cabled 
that it appeared that the American government would be un­
able to take the desired initiative because of the absence 
of Root and Roosevelt from Washington. He went on to say, 
"Now we can no longer conceal our divergence with the Ameri­
can delegation. We must now frankly take up the defense of
37our rights and those of the other American nations." Be­
cause Rui had now become so exhausted and discouraged that 
he had asked Rio-Branco to relieve him of his position, Rio- 
Branco closed with some flattery to help encourage Rui to 
continue: "We are certain that you can do this with firm­
ness and moderation and brilliance, attracting to our coun­
try the sympathies of the weak peoples and the respect of 
the strong."36
Og _ _Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, / no. 52_/, August 4, 1907 
CRB, Haia Pasta IX; Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 41, 
August 9, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX; Rui to Buchanan, Schev- 
eningen, Aug. 16, 1907, CRB, untitled collection of bound 
mss; Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 55, Aug. 18, 1907,CRB 
Haia Pasta XX; and Proceedings,(1907), II, pp. 600-03.
3^Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, no. 89, August 18, 1907, 
CRB, Haia Pasta X.
38Ibid. See also Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, 
no. 52, August 16, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX; Rui to Senator 
Azeredo, The Hague, August 16, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX; and 




Soon after the conference began, Rui learned that
the Colombian government had instructed her delegation at
39The Hague to always vote with Brazil. However, as soon
as it became apparent that Brazil intended to vote with the
United States, the other Latin American delegates became
40upset, and disunity began to appear. After Brazil sided
with the United States in the debate over the use of force
to collect public debts, it became necessary for Rui to
assure the Hispanic-American governments that Brazil had no
territorial ambitions, and to assure them Brazil only voted
with the United States in the interest of approximation be-
41tween the two countries.
At one point Rui referred to Gonzalo A. Esteva, the
42Mexican delegate, as "the best friend we have here." Mex­
ico was a rival of Argentina in Hispanic America and Nabuco
felt they were politically much more important because of
43their proximity to the United States. Earlier Mexican 
antipathy toward the United States had subsided, and by 1907
39Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, no. 18, July 3, 1907, CRB, 
Haia Pasta VII.
40Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, no. 36, July 20, 1907,
CRB, Haia Pasta VII.
41Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 22, July 23, 
1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX.
42Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 101, September 
9, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX.
43Nabuco to Rui, Paris, June 13, 1907, "Notas Con-
fidenciaes," CRB, Pasta J. Nabuco.
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Mexico had become almost a "U.S. agent" to the other
44Spanish-speaking nations.
Chile had for the most part maintained friendly 
relations with Brazil, although since 1902 when she had set­
tled her long disagreement with Argentina, she had less rea­
son to rely upon Brazilian friendship to escape her earlier
45isolation on the continent. The Chileans were not upset
over Brazil's initial support of the United States at the
conference, for they understood the reasons for the approxi- 
46mation. Later, in the debate over the International Court 
of Justice, Chile was gratified by Brazil's support of the 
principle of equality of sovereign states and her refusal to 
accept a seat on the court at the expense of Chile and the
45In South America, the period from independence 
to the late 1860's was characterized by regional power pol­
itics. However, continental power politics emerged in the 
late 1860's and continued into the first quarter of the 
twentieth century. During this second period, Chile sought 
to control the balance of power along the Pacific coast of 
South America. When Argentina threatened her hegemony,
Chile at first sought friendship with Brazil as a counter­
balance to Argentina. However, the continued growth of 
Argentina and the uncertainty of the Brazilian entente led 
Chile to seek an agreement with Argentina. This agreement 
was reached by several 1902 treaties which provided for rec­
ognition of a Chilean sphere of influence on the Pacific 
coast and an Argentine sphere of influence on the Atlantic 
coast of the continent. Robert N. Burr, By Reason or Force: 
Chile and the Balancing of Power in South America, 1830-1905 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), pp. 4,
127-28, 145, 168, 186-87, 198-99, and 245-62.
46Burns, Unwritten Alliance, p. 192.
47other smaller nations.
On Rui's voyage to the Hague Conference, the Argen­
tine delegation had also been aboard the Araguaya with him.
Rui met all the Argentine delegates and they developed
48mutual friendships. During the conference, the social
relations were cordial and the families of the two delega-
49tions became quite good friends. The Brazilian minister 
in Paris said the relations with all the South American 
delegations in Paris had been good, and upon Rui's arrival 
in that city he was invited to a dinner by the Argentine 
minister.^
Despite the personal friendship of members of the 
Brazilian and Argentine delegations, the likelihood of of­
ficial cooperation was remote. Brazil and Argentina had 
been in a struggle for supremacy in South America and this 
rivalry was evident at the Second Hague Conference. Close 
association with the United States had been sought by each 
of the countries in an attempt to gain advantage over the
47Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 82, August 31, 
1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX; Proceedings,(1907), II, 687-98; 
and Rui to James Brown Scott, Scheveningen, August 30, 1907 
CRB, Haia Pasta XXIII.
48Barbosa, Brasil e as Nagoes Latino-Americanas em 
Haya, pp. 18-19. During the voyage Rui presented Drago a 
big box of magnificent Bahian oranges. Rui to Rio-Branco, 
The Hague, no. 91, September 6, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX.
49Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 91, September 6 
1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX.
50Piza (Brazilian minister in Paris) to Rui, Paris, 
June 5, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XXI; and Piza to Rui, Paris, 
June 9, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XXI.
51other. Argentina had been particularly upset because Bra 
zil appeared to be strengthening herself by closer associ­
ation with the United States, especially after the exchange 
of ambassadors and the arrival of Nabuco in Washington.
The Argentines had sought to have Buenos Aires des­
ignated as the meeting place of the Third Pan American Con­
ference, but Nabuco succeeded in having Rio selected in­
stead. The Brazilians had gained a great deal of prestige 
by Root's attendance at the Rio Conference, and the secre­
tary of state found it expedient to visit Buenos Aires and
52other Latin American capitals to assuage injured pride.
It was in reaction to Argentine overtures to the United
States that Nabuco wrote his "Private Memorandum" to Root,
asking that he assist Brazil in obtaining a vice-presidency
53for her delegate to the Hague Conference.
Rio-Branco had little respect for Estanislau
Zeballos, the foreign minister of Argentina. The two had
had antipathy for each other since they had represented op-
54posing sides in the Missions Territory dispute. In 1893
51Burns, Unwritten Alliance, p. 186. As the con­
ference opened, Rio-Branco informed Rui that Arabalho, the 
Argentine minister in Washington, was trying to supplant 
Brazil in U.S. friendship, but luckily without results so 
far. Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, no. 11, CRB, Haia Pasta VII, 
partially encoded, translation supplied.
52Burns, Unwritten Alliance, pp. 163, 188; and Jes­
sup, Root, I, p. 747.
53Nabuco to Root, Washington, May 25, 1907, "Pri­
vate Memo," DS, 40/290. See above, Chapter III, pp. 73-75.
54Burns, Unwritten Alliance, p. 184.
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President Grover Cleveland was chosen as the arbitrator in
this dispute, and Rio-Branco and Zeballos represented their
respective countries in special mission to Washington.
Zeballos felt humiliated when Brazil won an overwhelming
55victory in the arbitral award. Rio-Branco had always
felt that Zeballos was mentally unstable, but as a result of
the stance he directed his delegates to take at The Hague,
56Rio-Branco became convinced that he was "definitely mad."
On instructions of their government, the Argentine
delegates became secretive, guarding their intentions from
the Brazilians. They also began courting the Americans and
the British journalist, William T. Stead, to whom they pre-
57sented a silver service. After Rui began to clash with 
members of the American delegation, he began to consider 
cooperating with Argentina against the United States. How­
ever, Rio-Branco said that Brazil must continue to cultivate 
the friendship of the United States, and that voting with 
the other Latin American countries against the Americans 
would give the appearance of the formation of an anti-United
55Burns, History of Brazil, pp. 231-32; and Viana, 
Vida de Rio-Branco, pp. 183-200.
56Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, no. 122, August 28, 1907, 
CRB, Haia Pasta XI; and Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, October 25, 
1908, CRB, Pasta Rio Branco.
57Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 70, August 26, 
1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX. Stead was an influential jour­
nalist of international stature whose influence and sympa­
thy would be of value to any individual or country. See 
below, Chapter VI, pp. 129-32.
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58States league. Rio-Branco felt that the efforts of Argen­
tina to enlist Brazil in such an alliance might have been a
maneuver on their part to discredit Brazil in the eyes of -
59the Americans.
As noted above, Brazil was upset by the American 
proposal on the method of selecting judges for the Interna­
tional Court of Arbitration which placed Brazil in a cate­
gory with very small and weak nations. Brazil then made a 
counter-proposal which would give them a favorable position 
in a category following the great powers. However, this
ephemeral Brazilian proposal left Argentina in an inferior
6 0category, and the Argentines were upset by it. The Bra­
zilians quickly abandoned this proposal in favor of another 
one which solved the problem of the omission of some Latin
American states from the arbitration court by providing that
61all sovereign states had an equal right to select judges.
However, Rui's revised plan caused new difficulties because 
the conference insisted on a court composed of no more than 
fifteen members. Rui did not wish to accept a fifteen- 
member court, as it would discriminate against some smaller 
states, including Chile and Peru. He cabled Rio-Branco:
58Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, no. 118, August 26, 1907,
CRB, Haia Pasta XI.
5 9 Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, no. 129, August 28, 1907,
CRB, Haia Pasta XI.
fi 0Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, no. 122, August 28, 1907,
CRB, Haia Pasta XI.
^Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 81, August 30,
1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX. See above, PP- 95-96.
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We are allied with these States. Abandoning them, be­
sides disloyalty, would remove them from the advanta­
geous position which we occupy. Thus it will be impos­
sible to concur.^2
The Argentine delegates continued to maneuver for 
a more favorable position for their country on the proposed 
court. This led Rio-Branco to conclude that Argentina would 
not cooperate with Brazil, but rather would attempt to se­
cure a seat on the court for herself, regardless of what
63happened to the other Hispanic-American nations. Rio- 
Branco agreed with Rui that Brazil could not abandon those 
nations.^
Without a doubt, Argentina attempted to gain the 
sympathy of the American delegation at the expense of Bra­
zil. Brazil's stance in the latter part of the conference 
was not one to inspire Washington's confidence in her
delegate and thus it was difficult to prevent the success of
65the Argentine tactic.
* * *
Maurice Prozor, a Russian delegate, paid a visit to
62Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 82, August 31, 
1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX.
63Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, no. 138, September 5,
1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XII.
64Ibid. Despite the opposition of the Argentine 
government to Brazil, there continued to be no personal 
rivalry between the conference delegates of the two coun­
tries. One Argentine delegate, Carlos Rodrigues Larretta, 
even accepted Rui's invitation for him and his wife to 
spend the following summer in Rio. Rui to Rio-Branco, The 
Hague, no. 91, September 6, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX.
65Nabuco to Graga Aranha, aboard the R.M.S. Carania, 
September 27, 1907, AJN.
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solicit Brazilian support for a resolution providing for a
third peace conference to be also convened by Russia. Rui
agreed to vote with them and expressed his appreciation for
Russian support of Brazil's position. Rui said that since
the beginning of the conference the three Russian delegates
66had shown sympathy for Brazil. Prozor invited Rui to a
dinner celebrating his wedding anniversary; there were only
twelve invited guests, of whom eight were Russians. Besides
being one of only four foreigners invited to the dinner, Rui
6 7was given the place of honor.
This Brazilian-Russian cooperation continued when 
on September 8th another member of the Russian delegation, 
Fedor Fedorovich Martens, shared a new proposal for the 
Court of Arbitration with Rui. The proposal had originated 
with the French delegation, and Rui was pleasantly sur­
prised to learn that the confidential plan had not yet been
revealed to anyone else, not even to the conference presi-
6 8dent, who was a member of the Russian delegation. The 
following day this Russian delegate wrote a confidential 
letter to Rui explaining some modifications which had been
66Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 113, September 
21, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX. Earlier, in reference to a 
new U.S. proposal in which Brazil was excluded, Prozor told 
Rui the Americans had said that Brazil did not have the 
capacity to be a country of the first order. Rui to Rio- 
Branco, The Hague, no. 89, September 5, 1907, CRB, Haia 
Pasta XX.
6 7Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 113, September 
21, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX.
6 8Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 99, September 9,
1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX.
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69made to the plan. Martens was encouraged by Rui's sympa­
thetic acceptance of the plan,, but he was not sure of the 
American and German reactions:
X fear greatly the national and personal sensiti­
vity which unfortunately plays a great role in the 
lives of men and of nations.
I do not know what Mr. Choate will say.
Yesterday I had the chance to see the Baron Mar- 
schall to whom I spoke about my plan. He seemed to be 
favorable, but appearances are too often deceiving.
I am happy to have found such a sympathetic ear and 
I count on your kind and strong support in the future.7 0
Rui then assured Martens that he could count on his support, 
unless he received orders to the contrary from the Brazilian 
government.^
In her first global conference, Brazil had the un­
realistic goal of being accepted as the ninth power of the 
world. She did, however, succeed in making the other coun­
tries aware of her existence as a nation and in persuading 
them of the culture and intelligence of her representative. 
The Argentine-Brazilian rivalry was evident at the confer­
ence, despite the personal friendship of the individual 
delegates, and Argentina sought to gain advantages for her­
self, at the expense of Brazil. Although Root and Rio-
69Martens to Rui, The Hague, September 9, 1907, 
CRB, Haia Pasta XXIII.
71Rui to Martens, Scheveningen, September 9, 1907, 
CRB, untitled collection of bound manuscripts. Rui was 
particularly excited about the new intimacy of Martens, who 
began to use the familiar form of speech when addressing 
him. Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 99, September 9, 
1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX.
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Branco instructed their delegations to cooperate with each 
other at the conference, conflict soon arose between them. 
The Hispanic-American countries were dismayed by Brazil's 
initial support of the United States, but rallied behind her 
as her posture changed to opposition, in the name of the 
equality of sovereign states. With Root ill and Nabuco in 
Europe, Rio-Branco was unsuccessful in applying pressure in 
Washington to modify the stance of the American Hague dele­
gation .
Nabuco was dismayed at the apparent damage to 
Brazilian-American relations caused by the disagreements at 
the Hague Conference, especially the differences over the 
Court of Arbitration. He made every effort to minimize the 
long-range effects of the conference on the relationship 
between the two countries. Rio-Branco was privately pleaded 
to see Nabuco somewhat discredited, and to be able to dis­
play some Brazilian independence vis-a-vis the United 
States. Rio-Branco, however, was committed to a long-term 
cooperation with the United States and welcomed the gradual 
return to the earlier relationship with that country. Rui 
Barbosa, on the other hand, was not willing to make any con­
ciliatory gestures toward the United States. He had gained 
a Brazilian reputation with the aid of the Brazilian press, 
prompted by Rio-Branco, and he did not wish to diminish his 
political capital. This topic is treated more fully in the 
final chapter.
Chapter VI will examine Brazilian attempts to gain
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further recognition for the country by courting journalists 
and by providing lavish entertainment. That chapter will 
show how Rio-Branco sought to use the occasion of the Second 
Hague Conference to publicize Brazil, expending large sums 
for printed materials and extravagant banquets.
CHAPTER VI 
PROJECTING A PUBLIC IMAGE
An important ingredient in projecting the new Bra­
zilian image of a country worthy of being accepted as the 
ninth power in the world was a campaign in newspapers and 
magazines at home and abroad. During the Second Hague 
Peace Conference, Rio-Branco placed special illustrated 
articles in two magazines and made wide distribution of 
copies of these issues and off-prints of the articles. La­
ter another extensive article was commissioned under the 
guise of an impartial piece of reporting by a British jour­
nalist. Rio-Branco was sensitive to reports about Brazil 
in the foreign press and, as in the case of the New York 
Herald, went to great lengths to halt adverse publicity. In 
addition to commissioned articles, the Brazilian foreign 
minister approved expenditures of large sums for lavish en­
tertainment— the Brazilian banquets rivalling or exceeding 
those of the great powers.
Two weeks after the conference convened, Rio-Branco 
took an opportunity to publicize Brazil among the delegates 
and the press. The June 8th issue of The Sphere, an illus­
trated magazine, carried a supplement about Brazil, and Rio- 
Branco instructed the Brazilian legation at The Hague to
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determine the number of copies that would be needed to dis­
tribute to "all delegates and secretaries of the entire dip 
lomatic corps, principal correspondents of newspapers (not 
forgetting Stead) and for the reading rooms of all the prin 
cipal hotels and restaurants."^ The legation was then to 
cable to London requesting that the determined number of 
copies be sent for distribution as indicated.
After the conference was in session, Rui received a 
letter from Elbert F. Baldwin, editor of the American maga­
zine, The Outlook. Baldwin sent a proposed "editorial" on 
Brazil for the magazine and asked Rui to look it over.
Rui's reply contained additional information for the arti­
cle. Baldwin thanked Rui for his reply and also sent a 
statement from Les Temps which he planned to append to the 
earlier piece. Because of the opportunity of publicity for 
Brazil, Rui took time from_his busy schedule to send sev­
eral letters to Baldwin correcting erroneous material and
2supplying additional information for his magazine.
Toward the end of July, Martinho Botelho, editor of 
Brazil Magazine, wrote Rui from the Rio monthly's overseas 
office in Paris. Botelho proposed that his next issue car­
ry an extensive "descriptive and illustrated" article on 
the Brazilian mission to The Hague. Botelho requested a
^Rio-Branco to Brazilian Legation at The Hague, Rio 
July 2, 1907, AHI, 211/1/9 tel. exp.
2Elbert F. Baldwin to Rui, Scheveningen, July 15, 
1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XXITI; Baldwin to Rui, Karlsbad, July 
18, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XXIII; and Baldwin to Rui, Karls­
bad, July 23, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XXIII.
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meeting with Rui at The Hague to discuss such an article,
which "would make an agreeable and interesting impression
throughout Brazil and would document for posterity, through
text and illustrations, one of the most memorable instances
3of our International prestige."
After meeting with Botelho, Rui gave his permission 
for the article and assigned Baptista Pereira, a secretary 
of the mission and Rui's future son-in-law, to work with 
Botelho on the project. Upon reflection, Rui decided that 
he had best obtain Rio-Branco's permission, since the arti­
cle would involve considerable expense. In making the re­
quest to the foreign minister, Rui noted that the Argen­
tines, "our incessant rivals," had already made great ef-
4forts to influence the European press.
Rio-Branco cabled his approval and in mid-September 
the issue appeared with the article on the Hague Confer-
5ence. The piece by Botelho was primarily an article
^Martinho Botelho to Rui, Paris, July 29, 1907,
CRB, Haia Pasta XXV.
4Rui to Lembruber Knopf, The Hague, August 18, 1907, 
CRB, Haia Pasta XX; and Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no.
55, August 18, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX.
5Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, no. 91, August 19, 1907, 
CRB, Haia Pasta X; Botelho to Rui, Paris, August 20, 1907, 
CRB, Haia Pasta XXV; and Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, un­
numbered, September 24, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XIII, par­
tially encoded, translation supplied. Actually, three 
closely related articles appear successively in the issue 
with a total of 33 pages, 20 of which are devoted entirely 
to illustrations with no text. See, "A Hollanda e a Con- 
ferencia da Paz na Haya;" "0 Brazil na Conferencia da Paz 
na Haya;" and "O Brazil e a Segunda Conferencia de Paz na 
Haya," Brazil Magazine, II (August, 1907), 1-33.
praising Rio-Branco and the individual members of the Bra­
zilian delegation, profusely illustrated with individual
and group portraits, and with scenes of The Hague and the
0Dutch countryside. Botelho distributed 1075 copies at 
The Hague and throughout Europe, and provided Rio-Branco 
with 100 copies for a total cost to the Foreign Ministry
7of E200. Rui paid £120 for the article and distribution 
in Europe. A payment of £80 was later made for the addi­
tional expenses of distribution and for the copies to be
Qdistributed by the Brazilian government.
The story of another special magazine supplement 
began with Rio-Branco authorizing the Brazilian Hague lega­
tion to use some funds to buy influence at the conference:
Lemgruber /"”Knopf_7,
Brazilian Legation, The Hague
Withdrawal of £200 may be made against reserved 
expenses and entrusted to Baptista Pereira. I wish
0
Brazil Magazine, II, 1-33.
7Botelho to Rui, Paris, September 9, 1907, CRB,
Haia Pasta XXV; Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 107, Sep­
tember 18, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX; Receipt signed by Bo­
telho, The Hague, September 18, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XV; 
Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, unnumbered, September 24, 1907,
CRB, Haia Pasta XIII; Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 115, 
September 26, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX; Rio-Branco to Rui, 
Reservado No. 1 (4a secgao), September 27, 1907, CRB, Haia 
Pasta VI; Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 121, September 
30, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX; Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, no. 
172, October 18, 1907, Haia Pasta XII; and Rui to Rio- 
Branco, The Hague, no. 132, October 19, 1907, CRB, Haia 
Pasta XX.
Q
Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 107, September 
18, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX; Receipt signed by Martinho 
Botelho, The Hague, September 18, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XV; 
Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 115, September 26, 1907, 
Haia Pasta XX; and Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, Reservado No. 1 
(4a secgao), September 27, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta VI.
the two men to informally invite two or three or iso­
lated principal correspondents: Stead, Mercadier,
Daily Telegraph, Times, Temps, Debats, seeking to ob­
tain their sympathies for Brazil and her delegation. 
Also, discretely invite some Hispanic American dele­
gates. Rio Branco.9
Two days after this telegram, Rui reported that he 
had had a long visit with William T. Stead, editor of the 
Courrier de la Conference, unofficial journal of the con­
ference. Rui reported:
Today I received a long visit from Stead. We conversed 
about subjects relative to the conference. We are on 
the way to a good friendship. Yesterday the Courrier 
characterized the Brazilian proposal in the conference 
as the most notable of a l l .
That same day Lemgruber Knopf filed this report: "The Am­
bassador / Rui_7 and I are on the way to a good friendship 
with S t e a d . R i o - B r a n c o  was delighted when he learned
12of Rui's growing friendship with the British journalist.
A day later, on July 23rd, Stead wrote to Rui that 
he had arranged for a meeting on Wednesday evening, July 
24th. About six South Americans were to be present and 
Stead asked Rui to recommend any other South American dele-
9Rio-Branco to Lemgruber Knopf, Rio, July 20, 
1907, AHI, 211/1/9 tel. exp., partially marked for encod­
ing.
■^Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 21, July 22, 
1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX.
■^Lemgruber Knopf to Rio-Branco, Brazilian Lega­
tion at The Hague, July 22, 1907, AHI, 211/1/3 tel. rec., 
partially encoded, translation supplied.
12Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, no. 39, July 23, 1907,
CRB, Haia Pasta VIII.
13gates he should invite. On Friday of that week Stead
invited Rui to his pacifist conference, but this time Rui
14declined to attend, pleading pressing business.
* * *
William T. Stead (1849-1912) was born in the same 
year as Rui. Stead was the son of a Congregational minis­
ter, and his remarkable ability as a journalist was recog­
nized early when he was appointed a newspaper editor at the 
are of twenty-one. Stead's reputation reached its zenith 
between 1883 and 1890, when as editor of the Pall Mall 
Gazette, he instituted what Matthew Arnold called the "new 
Journalism." Under Stead's direction the formerly sedate 
paper began to initiate many new political and social pro­
grams and movements, all in a very dashing and unconven­
tional manner. Stead gave up editing daily newspapers in 
1890 when he founded the Review of Reviews, and added an 
American edition of the magazine in 1891. Stead took part 
in the "social gospel" movement, and after an 1894 visit to 
Chicago, wrote the book, If Christ Came to Chicago. As a 
social reformer he became one of the strongest supporters
of the peace movement which resurged after the Czar's call
15for the First Hague Peace Conference of 1899.
13Stead to Rui, Scheveningen, July 23, 1907, CRB, 
Haia Pasta XXIV:
14Rui to Stead, The Hague, July 26, 1907, CRB,
Haia Pasta XX.
15Frederic W. Whyte, "William Thomas Stead," Dic­
tionary of National Biography, Supplement 1912-1921, 
pp. 507-09; and George E. Mowry, The Era of Theodore Roose-
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Stead went to St. Petersburg and interviewed Czar 
Nicholas II prior to the First Hague Conference. He did his 
best to mobilize American and European public opinion in 
support of the proposed conference. Stead went to The Hague 
and, with his family, moved into a villa. At the first con­
ference he attracted much attention, when he published a 
daily chronicle using the presses of the leading Hague news­
paper. Stead was something of a nuisance in gathering ma­
terial for his paper, and in pursuit of information became 
a self-appointed friend of Frederick W. Holls, the secretary 
of the American delegation. However, Stead's persuasive 
powers in the press were well recognized and the American
delegation sought his aid in this manner on at least one 
16occasion.
In 1907 Stead again appeared at The Hague for the 
peace conference and, with the backing of Baroness von 
Suttner and other peace leaders, set up a headquarters for 
the peace movement. The headquarters, called Le Cercle 
Internationale, provided a stage where each afternoon con-
17ference delegates and peace advocates gathered for debate.
velt and the Birth of Modern America, 1900-1912 (New York:
Harper & Row, 1958), pp. 27-28. See also Frederic W. Whyte,
The Life of W.T. Stead, 2 vols. (New York: Houghton Mifflin
Co., 1925 and Edith K. Harper, Stead the Man: Personal Rem­
iniscences (London: W. Rider & son, ltd., 1914).
1 6Davis, U.S. and the First Conference, pp. 23-24,
56-58, 104-05, 154.
17Davis, U.S. and the Second Conference, p. 195.
Davis states that their debates "were often better organ­
ized and more interesting than those of the conference," 
p. 195.
131
Stead again published and edited a four-page daily newspaper 
entitled Le Courrier de la Conference. Here he attempted to 
make a complete record of everything that took place at the 
conference. This daily paper in French proved helpful be­
cause it was the only place the diplomats could find a com-
18prehensive view of what they were doing.
Stead, through his articles and editorials, wielded 
a great influence and later chroniclers of the conference 
relied heavily on his contemporary record. Professor Wil­
liam I. Hull, who himself attended the Second Hague Confer­
ence, admitted his heavy reliance on Stead's Courrier:
In common with all readers of the Courrier, the author 
of this book owes a large debt of gratitude to Mr. Stead 
for the enterprise and public spirit shown by him in in­
forming the public so fully of the work of the confer­
ence, and in stimulating and informing the members of 
the conference as well.i9
Stead's influence was even greater on persons not at 
The Hague. In Brazil, for instance, the Courrier was re­
ferred to as the official chronicle of the conference and
its articles were accorded as much prestige and credence as
20the London Times, or Le Figaro. Also, Stead's paid adver­
tisement which appeared as a supplement to the November 1907 
issue of the Review of Reviews, was acclaimed as recognition 
of the value of Brazil and her delegate by an impartial
18Whyte, Stead, II, p. 290; and Davis, U.S. and the 
Second Conference, p. 195.
19Hull, Two Conferences, pp. vii-viii.
20_George R. Chamberlin, American Consul, Pernambuco, 
October / i.e., September_7 24, 1907, DS, 1113/5.
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judge. A Portuguese translation of the supplement appeared
with appended materials and was touted as a "book" by Stead.
This deliberately false impression was allowed to persist in
Brazil for over fifty years. Only recently was the record
set straignt by Raymundo Magalhaes Junior, a modern critic
21of Rui Barbosa.
* * *
The fact that Brazil had money to spend on public 
relations did not escape the notice of Stead, who in his 
capacity as owner and editor of the Review of Reviews, wrote 
to Rui:
It seems to me that Brazil has been spending a great 
deal of money of late in advertising in one way and 
another. If the advertising fund is exhausted, then 
you do not need to read further. For this is a pro­
posal for what I venture to think would be a most ef­
fective advertisement at a price, which,.although high, 
is not more than it is worth.22
Stead went on to explain that the Review often pub­
lished a special supplement at the end of the magazine.
These supplements were called "Business Write-ups," and one 
paid a special rate for the publicity secured through these 
special pages. Stead then continued,
What I am writing to propose to you is that you 
should take, on behalf of the Brazilian Government, from 
ten to twenty pages of such an illustrated write-up to 
appear as a special supplement in the "Review of Re­
views" for October, the subject being "Brazil and its 
Delegation at the Hague" and the price twenty-five
21See Stead, 0 Brazil em Haya; and Magalhaes, Rui, 
o Homem e o Mito, especially the chapter, "As 'Aguias de 
Haia1 e o Falso Livro de William T. Stead," pp. 281-91.
22William T. Stead to Rui, The Hague, September 6,
1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XXIV.
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pounds (£25) per page.
In return for this expenditure of from £250 to £500, 
according to the number of pages devoted to the supple­
ment, you would receive:
1) A specially written sketch of the triumph which Bra­
zil has achieved at the Hague, which I would sign.
2) A copiously illustrated popularly presented descrip­
tion of Brazil— shorter than the Figaro pamphlet, but 
calculated to interest the public in Great Britain.
3) A narrative of the work you have done here, with por­
traits of yourself the Delegation etc.23
Stead further explained that, besides the 60,000-copy 
worldwide circulation of his magazine, he would distribute 
the supplement to "every sovereign, minister of state and 
ambassador in the Almanack de Gotha,1 and 5,000 copies to 
public libraries, bankers, chambers of commerce, merchants, 
news rooms, Members of Parliament and members of Congress.
In an effort to sell his proposal, the British jour­
nalist closed with an allusion to Argentina, whose delegates 
had been doing their best to outdo Brazil since before the 
peace conference convened:
I enclose you a rough sketch of the suggested sup­
plement and would beg you the favor of an early reply. 
For, if you do not like the idea it may find acceptance 
in another quarter. But uhtil I hear that Brazil re­
jects it I will not take it elsewhere. Of course no 
other supplement would appear in the October "Review of 
Reviews" than this, if you accept my o f f e r . 24
In an apparently related action, the same day (Sep­
tember 6th) that he wrote to Rui proposing a special supple­
ment of Brazil in the Review, Stead published a group por­
trait of the Brazilian delegation in the Courrier and pro­
posed that one member of the permanent court be a Bra­
24Ibid.
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25zilian. The photo was made earlier on the orders of Rio-
Branco, and in an apparent bid for publicity, he had also
26instructed that a print be sent to Stead.
Rui found Stead's proposal for the article entirely
acceptable and cabled Rio-Branco the details, urging his
prompt acceptance, closing thus:
He /~Stead_7 requests a prompt reply "for if you do not 
like the idea it may find acceptance in another quar­
ter." I believe he is referring to the Argentines who 
certainly will not refuse if they are offered an oppor­
tunity to appear superior to us in this situation. I 
think the proposal is eminently acceptable.27
Rio-Branco immediately responded to Rui's cable:
I welcome with great pleasure the proposal from the Re­
view of Reviews. I want 500 more copies to be sent to 
this ministry for distribution to chambers and libraries 
of Brazil. I shall cable some recent statistical data 
which he needs along with some passages of opinion about 
Brazil from illustrious travellers^ He will soon re­
ceive "Bresil," by Elisee Reclus / volume 19 of his 
Geographie Universelle _7 which speaks of the similar­
ity between Brazil and the United States. If with the
requested increase the price is increased, I request you
give me the total so that I may cable the necessaryfunds.28
Rui negotiated with Stead as instructed and the 
journalist calculated that the addition would bring the
25Lemgruber Knopf to Rio-Branco, Brazilian Lega­
tion at The Hague, September 6, 1907, AHI, 211/1/3 tel. rec.
2 6Rio-Branco to Lemgruber Knopf Brazilian Legation 
at The Hague, Rio, July 28, 1907, AHI, 211/1/9 tel. exp.
27Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 94, September 
7, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX. Lins says that Rui reported 
to Rio-Branco that the Argentines were prepared to spend a 
million gold pesos in publicity for their delegation. Lins, 
Rio Branco, II, p. 571.
28Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, no. 145, September 7,
1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XII.
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supplement to a total of thirty-two pages at a cost of 
29£800. Stead said, "The addition of 32p to the Review
would be unusual but I would rather this was done than to
30fail on any point." Rio-Branco accepted the adjusted
31price and cabled Rui to accept the proposal. Stead was 
very pleased about the expansion of the supplement, but with 
his other commitments, it became increasingly apparent that 
the copy would not be ready in time for the October issue 
of the magazine. In addition, there was some delay in get­
ting the statistics and other materials which Rio-Branco
29Rui to Stead, The Hague, September 8, 1907, CRB, 
Haia Pasta XX; Stead to Rui, The Hague, letter, September 9, 
1907,CRB, Haia Pasta XXIV; Stead to Rui, The Hague, tele­
gram, September 9,1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XXIV; Rui to Stead, 
The Hague, September 9, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX; and Stead 
to Rui, The Hague, September 18, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XXIV.
30Stead to Rui, The Hague, September 18, 1907, CRB, 
Haia Pasta XXIV. At the Baron's request, Stead eventually 
sent Rio-Branco 500 copies of the magazine and 500 separate 
reprints of the article. Stead to Rui, London, December 9, 
1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XXIV; and Rui to Rio-Branco, Paris, 
December 10, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX. Rui later requested 
sixteen specially bound copies of volume 19 of Reclus' 
work. He wanted this volume by the eminent geographer for 
distribution as a present to the leading delegates of the 
conference. Rui to Virgilio Gordilho, The Hague, September 
28, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX; Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, 
no. 135, October 16, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX; Nelidov to 
Rui, The Hague, October 15, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XXIII; 
and David Jayne Hill to Rui, The Hague, October 15, 1907, 
CRB, Haia Pasta XXIII.
31Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 108, September 
19, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX; Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague,
no. 114, September 23, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX; Rui to
Stead, The Hague, September 24, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX; 
Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, unnumbered, September 24, 1907,
CRB, Haia Pasta XII, partially encoded; Rui to Stead, The 
Hague, September 25, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX; and Rio- 
Branco to Rui, Rio, Reservado No. 1 (4a secgao), September
27, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta VI.
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32wanted included in the article. Stead now diplomatically
requested a delay in publication in the following terms,
I have made some progress with it /""the article_7. But 
on reflection I have come to the conclusion that it 
would be premature to publish it in the October issue. 
The Conference has still 14 days (it may have 21) to run 
and in these last days who knows how much may happen 
that might materially effect the destiny of Brazil at 
the Hague. Therefore I must postpone the publication of 
the article till the November number when we shall I 
hope be able to have the story as triumphant at its 
close as it has been from the beginning.33
Rui concurred with Stead's request, characterizing it as
34"eminently reasonable."
On October 9th Rui delivered a long speech which 
served admirably for the triumphal ending for Mr. Stead's 
article. Stead was ecstatic and dashed off the following 
note to Rui: "Bravo. Bravo. Bravo. A thousand Congratu­
lations Finis Coronat opus. Can I have your speech tomor- 
35row." The speech, a defense of Brazil's position in op­
position to the formation of the Prize Court and the Court 
of Arbitration, appeared in the Brazilian press on October
32Rio-Branco to Rui, PetrSpolis, no. 154, September 
18, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XIII; Rui to Rio-Branco, The 
Hague, no. 115, September 26, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX; and 
Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 117, September 28, 1907, 
CRB, Haia Pasta XX.
33Stead to Rui, The Hague, September 28, 1907, CRB, 
Haia Pasta XXIV.
34Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 119, September 
29, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX.
35Stead to Rui, The Hague, October 9. 1907, CRB,
Haia Pasta XXIV.
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3616th and made a great impression there. However, the
American ambassador in Brazil accurately characterized the
speech as "somewhat bombastic, inaccurate and superflu- 
37ous." Rui proudly quoted to Rio-Branco Stead's note and
38passages from the Courrier praising his speech.
On October 2Oth, Rui paid Stead the £800 as pre­
viously agreed for the "advertisement" in the Review of Re- - 
39views. The following week Stead sent Rui a rough proof 
of the article and asked him to look it over. In regard to 
the extremely flattering section about Rui's and Brazil's 
position at The Hague, Stead apparently was attempting to 
convince himself when he said, "I would not on any account 
overstate anything, as nothing would be more likely to cre­
ate a reaction, but I think I have kept myself well within
the facts in emphasizing the importance of the part which
40you played there." Upon reading an advance copy of the
36 ^'Conferencia da Haya," Jornal do Commercio, October
17, 1907.
37Irving B. Dudley (American ambassador in Rio) to 
Root, Petropolis, October 17, 1907, DS, 40/617.
38Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 127, October 9,
1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX; and Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, 
no. 128, October 10, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX.
39Receipt signed by Stead, October 20, 1907, CRB,
Haia Pasta XV._ See also Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, Reservado 
No. 1 (4a secgao), September 27, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta VI; 
and Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 140, October 20, 1907,
CRB, Haia Pasta XX.
40Stead to Rui, London, October 20, 1907, CRB, Haia 
Pasta XXIV. See also W.T. Stead, "Brazil at the Hague,"
Review of Reviews (London), XXXVI (November, 1907), "Spe­
cial Art Supplement," 1-32.
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supplement/ Rui was very pleased and cabled Stead, "Received
kind letter and advance copy. Very well. Thanks for your
— — 41benevolent apreciation /_ sic / on my own person and role."
After substantially completing the supplement. Stead
conceived the idea of making an English translation of Rui1s
42speeches at the Hague Conference. Rui had already asked
for, and received permission to collect and publish all his
speeches and other relevant documents in the original 
43French. Rio-Branco at first authorized Stead to make 
English translations of Rui's discourse on the Court of Ar­
bitration and several other, related documents. These were 
then published in a pamphlet "for distribution in England
and the United States with the object of clarifying our po-
44sition to the official world and public opinion." As part
of the agreement Stead was to translate, edit, and distrib-
45ute the pamphlet worldwide. Rui's speeches at the Hague 
Conference were published in French and Stead made an Eng­
lish translation which came to 100 pages and 5,000 copies
41 — _Rui to Stead, / Paris_/, November 17, 1907, CRB,
Haia Pasta XX.
42Stead to Rui, London, October 26, 1907, CRB, Haia 
Pasta XXIV.
43Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 51, August 15, 
CRB, Haia Pasta XX; Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, no. 81, August 
16, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta X; and Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, 
no. 176, November 5, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XII.
44Rio-Branco to Rui, Petropolis, December 1, 1907, 
CRB, Haia Pasta XII.
45Rui to Stead, Paris, December 12, 1907, CRB, Haia
Pasta XX.
were printed. The price was about £160, including world-
46wide distribution of 4,000 copies.
The articles in both the Review of Reviews and the
Brazil Magazine proved to be very popular in Brazil and the
entire editions of both were sold out soon after they ap- 
47peared in Rio. Joaquim Nabuco read the Review advertising 
supplement on Brazil and was quite pleased with it, although 
he conceded it exaggerated Rui's role. Nabuco sent Root a 
copy of the article, and it made a favorable topic of con-
46Stead to Rui, London, March 11, 1908, CRB, Haia 
Pasta XXIV. On orders from Rio-Branco, Amaral had trans­
lated, then persuaded the Herald to publish, the complete 
transcript of Rui's speech of August 20th. Rio-Branco now 
instructed Nabuco to translate Rui's speech of October 9th., 
and to secure publication in its entirety in the Herald. 
Rio-Branco requested that the two speeches be put together 
in a pamphlet, "for distribution to influential politicians 
there." Rio-Branco wanted the pamphlet to have a preface, 
"demonstrating that the major points of our project are the 
principles of equality of sovereign states and freedom of 
selection of the arbitrators by the litigants, thereby 
conserving in the makeup of the new permanent court of paid 
judges, the organization of 1899." The New York magazine, 
The Independent, later published an English translation of 
Rui's October 9th discourse, describing it as the most no­
table document of the conference. Nabuco requested Rio- 
Branco 's authorization to see that the magazine made wide 
distribution of the number. Nabuco was forced to stop 
distribution of the number after he discovered a long pas­
sage in the translation which was not in the published 
French version. Amaral to Rio-Branco, New York, no. 15, 
August 26, 1907, AHI, 235/3/1C tel. rec._partiaily encoded; 
Amaral to Rio-Branco, New York, no. 26 / i.e., 16_7, Au­
gust 26, 1907, AHI, 235/3/1C tel. rec.; Rio-Branco to Na­
buco, Rio, November 4, 1907, AHI, 235/3/15 tel. exp.; Na­
buco to Rio-Branco, Washington, January 11, 1908, AHI, 
235/3/2 tel. rec.; and Nabuco to Rio-Branco, Washington, 
January 12,1908, AHI, 235/3/2 tel. rec.
47Rxo-Branco to Rui, Rio, December 7, 1907, CRB,
Haia Pasta XII.
48versation among the Washington diplomatic corps.
Other publications soon took note of the money spent 
by Brazil on advertising and several inquiries were re­
ceived, including one from the advertising firm which pub­
lished Chamber's Journal. The editor of Chamber1s was 
hoping to reproduce, in whole or in part, the Review article 
for E15 per page. He closed his appeal by saying that the 
magazine "is read by the best class of people, and should,
we think, appeal to you for the purpose of the publicity
49which you are desiring to obtain."
* * *
Just as it appeared that Brazil was making excellent
progress in her relations with the foreign press, a new 
threat emerged. The New York Herald began publishing exten­
sive dispatches from Aubrey Stanhope, their special corres­
pondent at The Hague. Stanhope was very derogatory of Bra­
zil and the position her delegate was alleged to have taken. 
Rio-Branco was furious about what he considered unfair 
treatment of Brazil and instructed Rui to cable the complete 
text of the Brazilian proposal, including punctuation, to
48Nabuco to Root, Washington, December 18, 1907,
AJN; and Nabuco to Rui, Washington, December 31, 1907, CRB, 
Pasta J. Nabuco.
49John Haddon to Rui, London, November 22, 1907,
CRB, Haia Pasta XXV. During the conference, Rio-Branco was 
always concerned with the mood of the press, at home and 
abroad. For selected examples see: Rio-Branco to Rui,
Rio, no. 79, August 15, 1907; no. 80 bis / i.e., 80A_7 t Au­
gust 16; no. 103, August 22; no. 105, August 22; no. 123, 
August 28; no. 124, August 28; no. 128, August 30; and 
Petropolis, no. 155, September 20, 1907,
141
Amaral the Brazilian chargS in Washington. The Baron then
instructed Amaral to make a careful English translation,
which the Herald agreed to publish. The complete transcript
and associated comments and portraits of Rui and Rio-Branco
occupied the front two pages of the August 26th issue of the 
50paper.
Rio-Branco also cabled Lemgruber Knopf about Stan­
hope and said,
Spe if you can convince him that in Brazil the govern­
ment and the people are completely siding with our am­
bassador and that now, informed of the situation, all 
of the governments of South America and Mexico are sid­
ing with us.51
The Brazilians were unable to convince the journalist and
Stanhope, evidently relishing the role of gadfly, wrote Rui
the following letter requesting an interview:
Your Excellency
In view of the attacks being made upon you as 
wrecker and general obstructor of the Conference, I 
think perhaps you might wish to say Something for pub­
lication. Accordingly I place myself at your disposi­
tion & beg you will give me a reply "Yes" or "No." If 
yes, please let me know at what hour I can see you.52
50Amaral to Rio-Branco, Washington, August 21, 1907, 
AHI, 235/3/1C tel. rec.; Amaral to Rio-Branco, Washington, 
August 22, 1907, AHI, 235/3/1C tel. rec.? Amaral to Rio- 
Branco, Washington, August 23, 1907, AHI, 235/3/1C tel. 
rec.? Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, no. 105, August 23, 1907, CRB, 
Haia Pasta XI? Amaral to Rio-Branco, New York, no. 15, Au­
gust 26, 1907, AHI, 235/3/1C tel. rec., partially encoded? 
and Amaral to Rio-Branco, New York, no. 26 / i.e., 16_7, 
August 26, 1907, AHI, 235/3/1C tel. rec.
51Rio-Branco to Lemgruber Knopf Brazilian Legation 
at The Hague, Rio, August 26, 1907, AHI, 211/1/9 tel. exp.
52Aubrey Stanhope (Special Correspondent of the New_ 
York Herald) to Rui, The Hague, Wednesday / August 28, 1907/ 
CRB, Haia Pasta XXV.
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Rui immediately replied to the journalist:
Dear Sir,
I shall be very glad to receive you, and talk with 
you on any subject, and whenever you wish, but I will 
not defend myself against the gratuitous and injurious 
imputation of being the "wrecker and general obstructor 
of the Conference."
As a representative of my country I do not care 
about anything except doing my duty according to my con­
science, the instructions of my government and the opin­
ion of my countrymen. Besides this my behavior is fully 
explained & justified in the considerations preceding 
my proposal, which have already been published in their 
entirety in the New York Herald's United States' edi­tion. 53
Rui considered the matter closed, but much to his surprise,
Stanhope appeared unannounced at his hotel that afternoon
and for almost an hour attempted to intimidate the Brazilian
54ambassador with "incredible charges." The correspondent
had already filed a derogatory dispatch to the Herald that
same day before he went to see Rui. Stanhope was evidently
attempting to gather material to justify the report he had 
55filed. 3
Amaral sent an eleven-page telegram to Rio-Branco 
with extensive quotes from the New York Herald of August 
28th. The dispatch from Stanhope at The Hague was very de­
rogatory to Rui and to the Brazilian position in opposition
53Rui to Stanhope, The Hague, August 28, 1907, CRB, 
Despachos & Cartas? penciled rough of same in CRB, Haia 
Pasta XXV.
54Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 77, August 28, 
1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX.
55See Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, no. 127, August 29,
1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XII.
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56to the American proposal for a permanent court. Stan­
hope's telegram, published in the Herald, contained numerous 
quotes from "South American" and other unidentified dele­
gates belittling Rui's conduct at the conference. Rio- 
Branco immediately ordered Amaral to speak with the editor-
in-chief about the matter in the name of the Brazilian gov- 
57ernment.
Rui refuted Stanhope's report of an interview with 
him, saying he never granted an interview, but limited him­
self to a rebuttal, which he had'already sent by letter.
Rui learned from an acquaintance that Stanhope had been sent
to see Rui by Horace Porter, a member of the American dele- 
58gation. Rio-Branco felt that Stanhope had "exaggerated 
Rui Barbosa and injured Brazil" by his "indelicate comport­
ment," and by publishing many lies including one in which
59he said Brazil was no more than a country of negroes. The 
Brazilian foreign minister also said that Stanhope's in­
trigues were very prejudicial to the influence of the United 
States in Brazil and to the friendly posture of Roosevelt
56Amaral to Rio-Branco, Atlantic City, August 28,
1907, AHI, 235/3/1C tel. rec.
57Ibid.; and Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, no. 127, August 
29, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XII.
58Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 84, September 1,
1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX.





Brazil also carried on her public relations campaign
by entertaining lavishly. Social functions were an indis-
pensible part of diplomacy at the Second Hague Conference
and Brazil accepted the challenge. The Brazilian delegation
became known for its hospitality, and its banquets were
61noted as among the most lavish at The Hague.
Even before the work of the conference began, it was
obvious that there was quite a bit of importance attached to
social events and that social life would demand as much of
62the delegates as would the conference sessions. The Dutch 
queen, government, and aristocracy, as well as the delegates 
gave dinners for each other throughout the summer. One of 
the largest receptions was given by the American delegation 
on July 4th.
6 0Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, no. 131, September 1,
1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XII; and Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, no.
128, August 30, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XII.
61Stead said, "The dinners of the Conference were 
almost as useful as its proces verbaux. And the Brazilian 
dinners were the most magnificent of all. At the Palace 
Hotel sixty-six dinners were given by the various delega­
tions between June 14th and August 28th. Of these Brazil 
gave eight— the same number as France— Germany gave nine, 
the United States thirteen. As a host Brazil was among the
greatest of the great Powers in the number of her banquets.
But in the splendor and luxury of her hospitality she was 
easily the first of all the nations." Stead, "Brazil at The 
Hague," p. 18.
6 2Davis, U.S. and the Second Conference, p. 198; 
and Hull, Two Conferences, p. 18. Rui would later say,
"The terrible weight of banquets is now almost unbearable." 
Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 31, August 2, 1907, CRB, 
Haia Pasta XX.
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The South American delegations in particular vied
with each other and with some European delegations in show-
6 3ing hospitality. However, the Brazilians exceeded most of
the others in expenditures and lavish decorations for their
banquets. "Nothing came up to the Brazilian dinners for the
good taste and magnificence of floral decoration, and the
fascination of the combined effect of music, mirrors, lights,
64paintings, flowers, and foliage." Indeed the banquet 
given on August 8th in honor of the nations of the New World 
was acknowledged to be the most ostentatious of the entire 
conference.^
At this most lavish Brazilian banquet, the hall of 
the Palace Hotel was decorated in a tropical motif evocative 
of Rio de Janeiro. There was a miniature lagoon surrounded 
by palms, ferns, and orchids, all brilliantly illuminated 
with various combinations of electric lights. Flowers for
63Davis, U.S. and the Second Conference, p. 198; 
and Hull, Two Conferences, p. 18. Choate, the head of the. 
American delegation, said, "The delegates, among them­
selves, exchanged civilities not always according to their 
wealth and ability, but ever in the same cordial and fra­
ternal spirit, and it will not surprise you to hear that 
our delegation, although making the utmost of the modest 
allowance made to it by the State Department for that pur­
pose, was left far in the rear by some of the younger South 
American nations, who seemed to place in the hands of their 
delegates the means of most rich and brilliant entertain­
ments." Choate, The Two Hague Conferences, p. 90.
64Stead, "Brazil at The Hague," p. 18.
65Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no, 41, August 9, 
1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX; Courrier de la Conference, Au­
gust 9, 1907; Courrier de Scheveningen, August 9, 1907; and 
Diario de Noticias, August 12, 1907.
66Ibid.
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decorating the tables and halls cost in excess of £300, and
many of them were specially imported from London and 
6 7Paris. The extravaganza made a great impression, espe-
68cially on the Americans. The dinner given for the Euro­
peans two weeks later was also a big success, with ten am­
bassadors present. In reference to this latter occasion Rui
said, "If nothing else we at least left the extraordinary
69impression of cultured good taste."
* * *
In summary, Rio-Branco sought to use the occasion of 
the Hague Conference to publicize Brazil and he expended 
large sums for printed materials and extravagant banquets.
r
This public relations campaign began with an attempt to gain 
the sympathy of influential correspondents at The Hague.
Rui, at the urging of Rio-Branco, made the acquaintance of 
William T. Stead, an influential British journalist and pro­
prietor of the Review of Reviews. Stead, as editor of the 
Courrier de la Conference, gave extensive and sympathetic 
coverage to the Brazilian delegation, especially after Rio- 
Branco had agreed to place an expensive advertising supple-
67Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 41, August 9, 
1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX; and Stead, "Brazil at The Hague," 
p. 19.
6 8Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no, 41, August 9, 
1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX. Rui quotes the Courrier de la 
Conference and Courrier de Scheveningen concerning the 
"extravagant and incomparable banquet." Rui to Rio- 
Branco, The Hague, no. 43, August 10, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta 
XX.
69Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 64, August 23,
1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX.
ment in his illustrated magazine.
The Brazilians gained additional exposure by spon­
soring publication of other articles and pamphlets, which 
were given world-wide distribution. Rio-Branco was also 
keenly aware of adverse publicity. Upon publication of 
anti-Brazilian material in the New York Herald, he immedi­
ately sent Amaral for a personal interview with the editor. 
Brazil also furthered this public relations campaign by 
entertaining lavishly at many extravagant banquets, sparing 
no expense to make a favorable impression on the conference 
delegates.
Next to be examined is the dilemma posed by the 
clash between personal status and national status in the 
relationships among the three Brazilian leaders. The fol­
lowing chapter will deal with personal differences and show 




The three Brazilian statesmen most intimately in­
volved in the preparations for, and deliberations of the 
Second Hague Conference were Baron Rio-Branco, Rui Barbosa, 
and Joaquim Nabuco. These individuals were three of the 
leading figures of Brazil at the time and, although they had 
disagreements, for the most part they cooperated during the 
conference. The sustained cooperation of Rui was especially 
surprising, as it was out of character for him.1 He was a 
very independent sort, not disposed to share labors or acco­
lades with anyone. His vacillation in the decision to ac­
cept the appointment and his attitude during preparations
for the conference, made Rio-Branco sorry to have nominated 
2him. Nabuco, for his part, could easily have held a grudge 
against both Rui and Rio-Branco because of the manner in 
which he was excluded from the conference delegation. In­
deed, some of his friends felt he had been treated unjustly
^acombe, Rio-Branco e Rui Barbosa# pp. 85-86.
2Graga Arahna to Nabuco, Petropolis, May 28, 1907,
AJN.
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3and had every reason to retaliate. Rio-Branco had reason 
to be wary of Rui, for as a member of the Brazilian commis­
sion negotiating with Bolivia over Acre, he had disagreed so
violently with Rio-Branco and the other member that he had
4resigned from the commission. Rio-Branco was in a delicate 
position with regard to Rui and Nabuco because, after pri­
vately offering to appoint Nabuco as head of the Brazilian
delegation to the peace conference, he chose Rui instead and
5withdrew the offer of the leadership from Nabuco. Despite 
the potential for conflict, the three men generally ignored 
their differences and cooperated in promoting and defending 
the interests of Brazil.
Rui worked hard making preparations for the confer­
ence after his arrival in Europe. He continued at a frantic 
pace during the first few days of the conference. Less than 
two weeks after the conference began, in his first numbered 
telegram to Rio-Branco, he complained that he was already
gfatigued by the "continuous, exhausting work." Within a 
month of the inauguration of the conference, Rui felt so 
overwhelmed by the weight of his responsibilities as dele­
gate that he felt they had already exceeded the capacity of
3Raymundo Bandeira to Nabuco, Rio, April 24, 1907,
AJN.
4Lins, Rio Branco, pp. 289-93.
5See above, Chapter II, pp. 41-44.
gRui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 1, June 29, 1907,
CRB, Haia Pasta XX.
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7his weakened health. By July 25th, a week later, Rui told 
Rio-Branco that he was so sick that he might have omitted
Qthe number on his last cable. Rui had now reached the
point where he tendered his resignation:
My telegram in response to the senate alluded to my 
poor health-. It is aggravated by fatigue and the ter­
rible climate, and now I would like to request to be 
relieved of this position which was given me through 
the gracious friendship of yourself and the govern­
ment. Since the principal work of the conference is 
done, Lisboa could perfectly well complete the rest.9
Rio-Branco quickly responded to Rui's request to 
leave the conference and come home. He said President Pena 
was very upset with the prospect of his resignation and 
wanted him to continue. Furthermore, if Rui left, Rio- 
Branco felt that it would be interpreted as a break with the 
government.^  Rui then protested that Rio-Branco had read 
more than he intended into his cable. He went on to say 
that he was sincerely dedicated to the Baron, and that if 
he and the government considered his continuation necessary, 
he would not insist on leaving."^ In reply, Rio-Branco in­
structed Rui to avoid fatigue, and, to boost his morale, 
praised him highly for a speech he had made nearly a month
7Rui to President of the Senate (Rio), The Hague,
July 17, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX.
gRui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 23, July 25,
1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX.
^Ibid.
■^Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, no. 43, July 25, 1907,
CRB, Haia Pasta VIII.
■^Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 24 (reservado),
July 26, 1907, Haia Pasta XX.
earlier.^-2
Evidently the actual event that sparked Rui's at­
tempted resignation was related to a garbled telegram re­
ceived in Rio from The Hague. Rui had cabled a resume of
the French text of his latest speech and Rio-Branco had then
13requested a re-transmission m  Portuguese. Rui reacted as
if he supposed the request was made in order'to reprimand 
14him. However, Rio-Branco immediately assured Rui that he 
had only requested a Portuguese resume because of errors in 
transmission and recording of the original cable, that he 
was very busy with official correspondence, and that he per­
sonally handled the task of giving public notice based on 
correct communication from Rui and desired, soon after
looking over Rui's dispatches, to be able to give them to
15the wire service of the Jornal do Commercio.
Within two weeks of this incident Rui was again com­
plaining about how hard he was working. He felt that he was 
not getting any help from the other delegates, whom he felt
12Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, no. 44, July 27, 1907,
Haia Pasta VIII. Rio-Branco explained his delay in sending 
congratulations by saying that only the day before had he 
read the June 28th speech of Rui in its entirety.
13Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, no. 41, July 24, 1907,
CRB, Haia Pasta VIII. The text reads in part: "Resume of
the speech translated here with some errors. . . . Request 
you send me a Portuguese resume to be communicated to the 
newspapers. Rio Branco"
14Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 23, July 25, 
1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX; and Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio. no.
41, July 25, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta VIII.
15Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, no. 42, July 25, 1907,
CRB, Haia Pasta VIII.
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were even creating difficulties for him. Of the secretaries 
he observed that the only useful one was Fernando Dobbert, 
his nephew. ̂
After Amaral's futile attempts in Washington to 
persuade the Americans to modify their proposal relative to 
the Court of Justice, Rui again submitted his resignation.
In reply, Rio-Branco cabled Rui praising his work and say­
ing, "We expect that you will finish the work there and we
are sure that you will complete it with advantage for the
17country and the augmentation of your prestige." It is 
probable that the subtle references to the president (i.e. , 
"we") did not go unnoticed by Rui. Rio-Branco also evi­
dently organized a "fan club" to further boost Rui's ego,
because ' in the next several days Rui acknowledged numerous
18telegrams of congratulations.
Although again agreeing to continue, Rui was very
19disillusioned with the work of the conference. He ca-
16Rui .to Senator Azeredo, The Hague, August 12, 
1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX, partially encoded, translation 
supplied. Rui reiterated the statement about Dobbert after 
the close of the conference. Rui to Azeredo, The Hague, 
October 22, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX.
17Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, no. 86, August 17, 1907, 
CRB, Haia Pasta X.
18See, for example, Rui to Ministro Industria, The 
Hague, August 23, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX; Rui to Governa- 
dor Estado Bahia, The Hague, Aug. 22, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta 
XX; Rui to Secretario Camara Deputados, Estado Minas, The 
Hague, Aug. 22, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX; and Rui to Maria 
(cable address for Rui's communications with his family in 
Rio), The Hague, August 23, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX.
19Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 64, August 23,
1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX.
bled his son about the frantic pace he was maintaining at 
the conference: "Tell Carlito and all our friends who in­
quire about the absence of letters from us. You can not 
imagine our lives. Despite this, the family has written,
2Qbut I shall only be able to do so after the conference."
Rui continued to complain about the pace he was
forced to maintain and said there simply was not enough
time to do everything, and informed Rio-Branco that he was
always absorbed with work from five o'clock in the morning
21until midnight. Just a week before the conference ad­
journed, he cabled his family in Rio that he was, "sick,
disanimated, and disgusted and I am seriously thinking of
22withdrawing completely."
At the close of the conference, Rui felt his health
had suffered from continuous overwork:
Also it is necessary for me to leave on Sunday for 
Paris with my family, the more so because of the re­
action against four months of continuous work, and be­
cause the labors have caused a considerable deteriora­
tion in the state of my health. I have thus concluded 
my mission here and am only awaiting your last instruc­tions and orders.23
Rui became very indignant when he did not receive a
cable from Rio-Branco for two days. He sent a "hot" tele-
20Rui to Tenente Ruy Barbosa, The Hague, August 25, 
1907, Haia Pasta XX.
21Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 96, September 7 
1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX.
22Rui to "Maria," The Hague, October 10, 1907, CRB, 
Haia Pasta XX.
23Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 135, October 16
1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX.
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gram to Senator Azeredo saying he was afraid this was an
intentional censure: "This absurd silence causes fright
here, everyone taking it as an expression of intentional
24censure, rather than the gratitude I deserve." Rui also 
sent telegrams to his family and to Senator Pinheiro Macha­
do, requesting immediate intervention of the latter to bring
25to an end the "enigmatic" silence of Rio-Branco. Rui also 
sent a telegram to the president, informing him that his 
mission would end with the signing of the conventions on the 
following Saturday, October 19th. He attempted to neutral­
ize the imagined censure by Rio-Branco in his closing re­
marks: "I did my best to honor our country and I believe
that I left her greater in the eyes of the world. I request 
26your orders."
What had happened in Rio was that Rio-Branco found 
it necessary to leave his post for a trip to Sao Paulo.
The Hague Conference had continued longer than was antici­
pated and Rio-Branco felt he must go as planned. While away 
he had Rui's telegrams forwarded to him. Rio-Branco had in­
formed Rui of the trip and of his intention to return to Rio
27on Sunday, October 6th. On the same day that he sent the
24Rui to Azeredo, The Hague, October 17, 1907, CRB, 
Haia Pasta XX.
25Rui to Pinheiro Machado, The Hague, October 17, 
1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX; and Rui to "Maria," October 17, 
1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX.
2 6Rui to Pena, The Hague, October 17, 1907, AAP.
27 —Rio-Branco to Rui, Petropolis, no. 161 / A_7,
October 2, 1907, CRB, Hague Pasta XIII.
telegrams to Senator Pinheiro Machado, Senator Azeredo, and 
President Pena complaining of Rio-Branco's silence, Rui re­
ceived two cables from the foreign minister which explained
28his lack of correspondence. He explained that he had not
made any transmissions from the 13th to the 16th of October
because of other urgent business and because of great fa-
29tigue from his trip to Sao Paulo. In a third telegram he
said that he also had been preoccupied with communicating
to the press about the Hague Conference. Rio-Branco then
attempted to smooth Rui's ruffled feathers with a bit of
praise: "Without a representative of your stature, Brazil
could not have attained the position which she won in this 
30conference." Rui was conciliatory, thanking Rio-Branco
for his praise and in turn praising the foreign minister:
"We never could have gotten the result which we obtained if
I had not been able to count on your solidarity, support,
31and the aid of your brilliant zeal and patriotism."
* * *
Nabuco had never doubted that Rui would make a good 
delegate for Brazil at the Hague Conference. Shortly before
28Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 136, October 17, 
1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX.
2 9 Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, no. 170, October 17, 1907, 
CRB, Haia Pasta XIII; and no. 171, October 17, 1907, CRB, 
Haia Pasta XIII.
30Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, no. 173, October 18, 1907, 
CRB, Haia Pasta XIII.
31Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 136, October 17,
1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX.
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the conference opened he wrote the following to a friend:
"I always felt Ruy Barbosa would assume his natural level in
the Conference, rising above all others by intellectual
32power and euridition." Nabuco apparently had no animosity 
toward Rui because of the events surrounding the selection 
of the Brazilian delegate to the Hague Conference. He ac­
cepted a secret mission to Europe, in spite of his poor 
health, and provided Rui with useful information and advice, 
both before and during the conference.
After meeting with Rui in Paris and delivering to 
him the confidential notes on conference delegates, Nabuco 
went to take the curative waters of European spas. He evi­
dently followed the conference proceedings in the press, but 
had little direct contact with the conference or conference 
delegates for almost two months. By the middle of August 
his health was much better and he began to take more inter­
est in the conference deliberations, where he took note of
the controversy over the method of selecting judges for the
33proposed permanent court of arbitration.
Nabuco was strongly opposed to the American formula 
for the selection of judges, and declared that he disap­
proved the classification of nations into categories of 
great and small in a court of justice. If that were to be 
the case, he felt it would have been better if the great
32Nabuco to Rodrigo Octavio, Vittel, France, July 4,
1907, AJN.
33Nabuco to Rio-Branco, Wiesbaden, August 17, 1907,
ABR-B, 74/2 recibidas.
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powers had not invited the others, but had simply reached an
34agreement among themselves. However, despite this opposi­
tion, Nabuco was not convinced that support of the equality
35of all nations was in Brazil's best long-term interest.
He was pleased with Rui's success, and wrote:
My Dear Ruy
You can imagine the satisfaction which your tri­
umphs have given me and the pleasure with which I view 
the repercussions of them in our country. Your agency 
has doubtless sent you numerous newspaper clippings in 
which the position you have won at the Conference is 
—recognized throughout Europe. Today I received a let­
ter from Prozor in which he told me how you commanded 
the respect of the Conference and that your Speeches 
are no longer measured by length, but by weight.36
Nabuco told Rui that he appreciated the difficult decisions
Rui was forced to make at the conference:
I greatly sympathize with the delicate position in 
which you find yourself, forced by national dignity to 
combat the accord reached by the great Powers on the 
Prize Court, and I hope that a solution will be pos­
sible which will satisfy it / i.e., the national dig- 
nity_7. I understand that your opposition on this point 
was above all on principle, with the fear, or foresight, 
that if the system of rotation were voted for the Prize 
Court without change, then it would be inevitable that 
it would be applied to the Court of Arbitration.37
Nabuco denounced the system of rotation of judges, and felt
that this issue would determine whether or not the small
34Nabuco to Graga Aranha, Wiesbaden, August 17, 
quoted in Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, no. 145, September 7, 
1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XII.
35Undated, unaddressed letter fragment in Nabuco's 
hand. (See footnote 41, below.)
36Nabuco to Rui, Langenschwalbach, August 26, 1907, 
CRB, Pasta J. Nabuco. The draft of this letter with the 
date of August 27, 1907, is found in AJN.
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nations would leave the conference in a better position than 
when they entered.
The Brazilian ambassador to Washington then made
some astute observations about the actions of the American
delegation at the peace conference:
I do not understand the attitude of the American Dele­
gation on the point / of rotation_7/ for it appears 
they have lost sight of our Continent, preoccupied only 
with an accord among the great Powers, who quickly 
would involve the United States in the belligerent sys­
tems which they represent. The American spirit of mag- 
namity is evident in the organization of the Pan Ameri­
can Bureau, in which the vote of the United States with 
her 80 million population is equivalent to that of Pan­
ama or Honduras. The American delegation at The Hague 
is now deviating most surprisingly from that spirit.38
In closing, Nabuco congratulated Rui for the brilliance with 
which he defended the equality of sovereign states and their 
equal right to permanent representation in any institution 
founded by the Hague Conference. However, Nabuco was evi­
dently afraid his remarks would be misconstrued and he ap­
pended a postscript to explain that his remarks about equal­
ity of sovereign states of different sizes did not apply to
parliaments and tribunals, where the law of proportion must 
39be respected.
As the conference wore on, Nabuco became more and 
more concerned about the situation at The Hague. Rui's 
"triumphs" were being proclaimed around the world, and Na­
buco felt there would be a reaction and Brazil might be the 
loser in the long run:
A i J 4 . U  t
39Ibid.
We noisily triumph, with bursts of fireworks end 
rockets. Diplomatic victories must be very modest in 
order not to disgrace the vanquished. There has al­
ready been much shouting about the "defeat" of Drago 
by Ruy; now they will shout about that of the United 
States! Rui has filled a most brilliant role, but he 
would be the first to desire that during the rest of 
the Conference not the least resentment arises between 
us and the United States. Our grudge might be settled, 
but at what cost.40
Nabuco was concerned for the future of Brazilian-American
relations, and the ambiguity of Brazil's stance:
Our interest is a quasi alliance with the United 
States, a perfect accord. A Brazil supported by Ameri­
can friendship would be a much more secure field. . . . 
I sympathize very much with the difficult position of 
Ruy, faced with the accord of the great Powers in the 
proposal, which he feels forced by national dignity to 
combat. But since we would not be able to prevent the 
fact of unanimity if it were to be done without us, 
protesting the entire project in the name of equality 
of sovereign States is tenuous on our part, because we 
aspire to be counted among those selected. I do not 
attach as much importance to the composition of the 
Prize Court, as to that of the Court of Arbitration.41
It became obvious that the Hague Conference was 
going to last much longer than Nabuco had anticipated and 
he began to make plans to return to his post in Washington, 
even before it ended, if necessary. However, he felt that 
it was absolutely essential that he see Rui before he left 
Europe. He wanted to reassure Rui of the good intentions 
of the American government at the conference and to hear 
directly from Rui the story of his relations with the Amer-
40Nabuco to Gurgel do Amaral, Bad Langenschwalbach, 
September 5, 1907, AJN.
41Undated, unaddressed letter fragment in Nabuco's 
hand, with notation, "Not sent," also in Nabuco's hand.
This fragment was very likely originally written as a part 
of the above letter to Amaral (see footnote 40}.
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ican delegation whiich. apparently contradicted those inten­
tions. Nabuco wished to discern whether or not Rui was 
satisfied with the attitude of the Americans, or if there 
had been any misunderstanding in relation to their attitude.
He wanted to meet Rui in Paris, but said he would come to
42The Hague, if necessary, to talk with him.
Rui was very busy and apparently did not relish a 
meeting with Nabuco, where the seasoned diplomat would cer­
tainly pressure Rui to settle his differences with the Uni­
ted States delegation. He did not respond to Nabuco for 
eleven days, then sent a cable apologizing for the delay.
Rui gave the excuse that he was very busy and felt that 
Brazil's position was becoming more and more tenuous in 
relation to the court project. He reported that the Amer­
ican proposaL.had been defeated by the unanimity of the Latin 
American nations in opposition to it. He said there were 
new attempts being made to revive the project, but that the 
Brazilian government was unalterably opposed to a court 
based on inequality of representation. Rui told Nabuco that 
public opinion in Rio was really stirred up over the ques­
tion and that Rio-Branco had admirably supported him in the
matter. He was so busy with daily committees and confer-
43ences that he could not go to Paris to meet Nabuco.
42Nabuco to Rui, Langenschwalbach, August 26, 1907, 
CRB, Pasta J. Nabuco. See also Rui to Rio-Branco, The 
Hague, no. 106, September 15, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX.
43Rui to Nabuco, The Hague, September 6, 1907, CRB,
Haia Pasta XX.
However, before Nabuco received Rui's wire, he ca­
bled that he was going to Paris and would be awaiting word 
there from Rui. He also praised Rui's efforts which he said
had caused Brazil to be practically considered one of the 
44great powers. Nabuco felt that only the strong opposition 
of the other Latin American nations would prevent the Uni­
ted States from supporting Brazil for a position in the same
45category as the United States.
Rui agreed with Nabuco that Brazil needed support 
in the stand against the United States and he was pleased 
that many nations were siding with Brazil during this deci­
sive phase of the conference. Rui felt that Brazilian pub­
lic opinion would take pride in the decisive role of Brazil,
and in a cable to Rio-Branco he proudly referred to Nabuco's
46comment that Brazil was being treated as a great power.
Despite the crucial point in the conference deliber­
ations, Rui finally met with Nabuco in Brussels. Rui..went to 
that city on official business, and Nabuco came from Paris 
to see him. Rui was relieved to have a brief respite from
the conference deliberations and gave Nabuco a first-hand
47account of events at The Hague to that date.
44Nabuco to Rui, Langenschwalbach, September 7,
1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XVII.
45Ibid.
46Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 95, September 7, 
1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX.
47Nabuco to Rui, Paris, September 13, 1907, CRB,
Haia Pasta XVII; Nabuco to Virgilio Gordilho, note on back
of calling card, Paris, September 14, 1907, AJN; Nabuco to
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Following his meeting with Rui at Brussels, Nabuco
went to London on September 21st, from whence he departed
for New York on the 24th. While Nabuco was in London, Rui
sent him a number of documents pertaining to the conference
and brought him up to date on the latest happenings at The 
48Hague. Nabuco felt that with the materials and the first­
hand report from Rui, he better understood the situation and 
the reason for Brazil's stance at the conference. He wrote 
Rui that on the basis of these documents, cable traffic at 
the embassy, and conversations with his contacts in Washing­
ton and with Gurgel do Amaral (Brazilian charge in his ab­
sence) ,
I believe the letters of Choate and other American 
delegates attempt to make Brazil the scapegoat of the 
Conference in the eyes of President Roosevelt and Amer­
ican public opinion. With the documents you sent me I 
can proceed to demonstrate the spirit which animated
Immediately upon his return to Washington, Nabuco 
set about to neutralize the anti-Brazilian feeling there. 
He continued to worry about the repercussions of the Hague
Rui, Paris, September 14, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XVII; Rui 
to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 106, September 15, 1907, CRB, 
Haia Pasta XX; Rui to Nabuco, The Hague, September 14, 1907, 
CRB, Haia Pasta XX; Nabuco to Rui, Wimerux, The Netherlands, 
September 17, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XVII; Nabuco to Rodrigo 
Octavio, Wimerux, September 18, 1907, AJN; and Rui to Rio- 
Branco, The Hague, no. 107, September 18, 1907, CRB, Haia 
Pasta XX.
48Rui to Nabuco, The Hague, September 22, 1907, CRB, 
Haia Pasta XX; and Nabuco to Rui, London, September 24,
1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XVII.
49Nabuco to Rui, London, September 24, 1907, CRB,
Haia Pasta XVII.
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Peace Conference, and its effect on Brazilian-American rela­
tions. Nabuco feared that Brazil's perceived success had 
caused her to temporarily forget her dependence on the Uni­
ted States. At times the Brazilians seemed to think that
50Brazil, and not the United States, was the greater power.
Nabuco was very disheartened by the Hague Peace Con­
ference, and felt that his efforts in Washington were all in 
vain and that politically, he had no real reason to remain 
as ambassador. He pessimistically wrote to Graga Aranha:
The Hague undid all of my work, which I never con­
sidered permanent anyway. In international relations, 
as with people, friendship depends on a continual ex­
change of sympathy and a perfect communion of sentiment. 
The press there / Rio_7 has represented the Conference 
as a duel between Brazil and the United States, termina­
ting in our noisy victory. It has placed Root in a con­
tradictory position. . . .51
Nabuco decried the fact that for a while the impression of
the conference affected Brazilian sympathy for the United
States, but he believed that soon the mood would pass, and
after the planned reception for the American Naval fleet in
Rio, the situation would return to the idyllic one which
52existed during Secretary Root's visit. Nabuco felt that
the saga of The Hague was an abberation, a mistake of Mr.
53Choate, made while Root was very sick.
50Nabuco to Rodrigues Alves, Washington, January 7,
1908, AJN.
51Nabuco to Graga Aranha, Washington, December 5,
1907, AJN.




Nabuco was of the opinion that Rui deserved recogni­
tion for the long months at The Hague where he was "always 
fresh and ready to fight" for the rights of Brazil. To Rio- 
Branco he wrote a long letter suggesting that a great recep­
tion be prepared for Rui upon his return to Brazil. Nabuco
felt that all Brazilians could take pride in the reputation
54of a cultured nation which Rui had created for Brazil.
Nabuco also congratulated Rui on his brilliant de­
fense of the principle of absolute equality of all states in 
international organizations. On the other hand, the Brazil­
ian ambassador to Washington did not personally agree with 
that principle because he faced the same situation in the
f
Bureau of American Republics where the island of Santo Do-
55mingo, with two-nations, had more value than Brazil. Na­
buco felt that Brazil had taken the position she did at The 
Hague in self defense, but lest she feel it had really mag­
nified her position, it should be remembered that she had 
not gained anything more than had Haiti and Santo Domingo.
He was convinced that the only real gain made by Brazil at
the conference was the reputation she had gained of a cul- 
56tured nation.
Although Nabuco was aware that Rio-Branco was 
closely orchestrating Rui's performance at The Hague (see
54Nabuco to Rui, Washington, October 22, 1907, CRB, 




below, especially page 166), he persisted in flattering Rui 
and giving him credit for any accomplishments at the confer­
ence. Nabuco was motivated by friendship with Rui, by a de­
sire to boost Brazil through her conference delegate, and by 
a hope that Rui's new popularity and political ambitions 
would somehow distract Rio-Branco from his anti-American 
stance. Thus with this tactic of promoting Rui, Nabuco 
hoped to simultaneously boost Brazilian prestige, begin res­
toration of the special Brazilian-American relationship, 
and repay Rio-Branco for his attempt to undermine Nabuco1s 
position and influence in Washington.
* * *
There has been disagreement over the amount of free­
dom that Rui was allowed in the making of decisions relative
57to Brazil's posture at the Hague Conference. Opinion has
ranged from the assumption that Rui single-handedly made the
decisions, to the assertion that all decisions were made in 
5 8Rio. Graga Aranha, as a functionary of the Foreign Minis-
57Contemporary opinion was also divided over the 
issue. Hilario de Gouveia reported, "The stance of Rui at 
the Hague Conference has made a great impression here, some 
attributing everything to Rui, others to Rio Branco, de­
pending upon their particular sympathies." Hilario to Na­
buco, Rio, September 3, 1907, AJN.
58See Lacombe, Rio-Branco e Rui Barbosa, pp. 89- 
90; Freyre, Ordem e Progresso, I, p. 236; Viana, Vida de 
Rio Branco, pp. 381-85; and Accioly, "0 Barao do Rio Branco 
e a 2a Conferencia da Haia," pp. 64-68. Rio-Branco and Rui 
themselves gave different versions at different times and 
under various circumstances. For example: Cl) Rio-Branco
in a speech to a group of students said that the work of the 
conference was done by Rui, and he only exchanged ideas with 
him and transmitted the ideas of the president on different 
questions. Rio-Branco, speech, Rio, December 28, 1907,
166
try in Rio, observed that portion of the Hague drama at 
close range and offered this opinion of Rui's contributions:
There is nothing original in the stance of Rui at 
the Conference. He has done nothing more than polish 
and amplify the orders and ideas of Rio Branco. . . .
He Rio-Branco_7 has sent to The Hague all of the true 
feelings of his antipathy at the Conference, all of his 
secret thoughts on the question of arbitration and on 
the collection of public debts. The telegrams which are 
sent to Rui are decisive, definite, and detailed. . . . 
Rui shall have an ostentatious reception for having de­
veloped the ideas of Rio-Branco and for being the 
"paladin" of the weak and overwhelmed nations at the 
Conference. What a c o m e d y ! 59
What is readily apparent is that there was a great
deal of communication between Rio-Branco and Rui as is at­
tested by the large volume of telegraphic communications be-
6 0tween the two during the conference. Cables were ex­
changed on an almost daily basis, often with several sent on
A Imprensa, December 30, 1907, p. 1. (2) Rio-Branco told
the Chilean minister that at The Hague Rui "acted strictly 
under orders." Chilean Minister (Rio) to Minister of For­
eign Relations (Santiago), Rio, December 10, 1907, quoted 
in Burns, Unwritten Alliance, p. 239, footnote 13. (3) Rui
said that the genius of Rio-Branco aided him greatly at The 
Hague. Rui, speech, Paris, October 31, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta 
XXII. (4) Rui later proclaimed that he was not acting di­
rectly under orders from Rio-Branco at the Second Hague Con­
ference. ^Rui, speech, Juiz de Fora, February, 1910, quoted 
in Magalhaes, Rui, o Homem e o Mito, p. 294.
59Graga Aranha to Nabuco, Rio, August 19, 1907,
AJN. Graga can not be considered a completely impartial 
observer, since he worked closely with Rio-Branco and he 
felt that Rui had taken the appointment which rightfully 
belonged to his close friend, Nabuco.
60There are 184 numbered telegrams (numbers 1-176, 
with some numbers duplicated) from Rio-Branco and 144 (.num­
bers 1-142, with some numbers duplicated) from Rui, with 
additional unnumbered cables bringing the total to at least 
377. See CRB, Haia Pasta VII through XIII, and XX. Burns, 
Unwritten Alliamce, p. 119, erroneously sets the number at 
"nearly 175 telegrams exchanged between them."
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the same day. Rui was so accustomed to daily contact with 
Rio-Branco, that when on one occasion he did not receive a 
telegram from the foreign minister for three days, he became 
extremely agitated and cabled several friends in Rio re­
questing their aid in determining the reason for the si­
lence. ̂
Before his departure from Rio, Rui had received a
great deal of information and instructions on the anticipa-
6 2ted subjects of debate at the Second Hague Conference.
This, combined with information sent from Washington, and 
monographs from Rui's extensive personal collection, provi­
ded the Brazilian representative with ample material for 
study before the conference and reference material during 
the conference. During the deliberations at The Hague, Rio- 
Branco quite often cabled instructions to Rui by referring
to the appropriate page in one of the volumes of works on
6 3international law.
From the opening of the conference Rui followed his 
instructions, only asking for clarification in certain
^See above, pp. 153-55.
62See, for example, the following 22-page letter:
Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, May 21, 1907, AHI, 273/3/1; and the
following telegrams from Rio-Branco to Rui: no. 1 (.June 11,
1907), no. 2 (June 11), no. 3 (June 11), and no. 5 (Junel2), 
CRB, Haia Pasta VII.
6 3See, for example, Rio-Branco to Rui, no. 3 (June
11, 1907), no. 4 (June 12), no. 31 (July 16), CRB, Haia
Pasta VII.
64cases. On one occasion during this early part of the con­
ference, Rui failed to follow Rio-Branco's instructions.
The foreign minister immediately brought the failure to
Rui's attention, but assumed that Rui had made his speech
65before the arrival of the telegram from Rio. Before long,
Rui began to develop a plan of his own, which was submitted
fito, and approved by Rio-Branco. Rui shared his plan with 
Buchanan of the American delegation before submitting it to 
the conference. The Americans requested that he not intro­
duce the plan. Rui felt "very isolated" on the question and
requested "an urgent reply" from Rio-Branco as to whether or
6 7not he should present the project.
Rio was very upset about the American proposal for 
selecting judges for the International Court, which placed 
Brazil in a category with the very small nations. Rio- 
Branco shared Rui's concern about the proposal and instruc­
ted the Brazilian charge in Washington to see Root in an
6 8attempt to prevent introduction of the American plan. It 
gave Rui great satisfaction to know that Rio-Branco was in
64Nabuco to Rio-Branco, Paris, June_21, 1907, AJN;_ 
and Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 27, / July 29, 1907_/, 
CRB, Haia Pasta XX.
65Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, no. 35, July 20, 1907,
CRB, Haia Pasta VII.
6 6Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 11, July 14,
CRB, Haia Pasta XX.
68Rio Branco to Rui, Rio, /"no. 52_J, August 4, 
1907, CRB, Haia Pasta IX. Also, see above, Chapter V, 
pp. 105-07.
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complete accord with him in reference to the American pro- 
69posal. Rio-Branco agreed that Brazil must defend herself, 
but tempered his response by instructing Rui to defend the 
Brazilian position in such a way that it would not be impos­
sible for Brazil to agree to a different proposal if their
70own ideas did not win out.
Rio-Branco was disposed to retain complete control
of Brazil's position at the Hague Conference. However, as
early as June 19th he had allowed Rui sufficient discretion
to survey the situation and to proceed in the manner that he
felt was most in the national interest:
You, being the first delegate, are the second in com­
mand and all the personnel are under your direction.
The communications of the delegation to the government 
are to be made by you. You have ample powers so that, 
in view of the situation there and of the advantages, 
to always maintain the best relations with the other 
governments; above all the United States, Chile, Eng­
land, Germany, Italy, Prance; and to proceed as it ap­
pears most advantageous to the interests of the na­
tion. 71
Rio-Branco also recognized that the delegate on the 
scene often had a better grasp of the situation than the 
government in Rio. In reference to one proposal to be pre­
sented at the conference, Rio-Branco gave Rui the option of 
executing the plan he had proposed, or of remaining silent. 
"Whichever of these two decisions you take will be accepted
69Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 35, August 5, 
1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX.
70Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, no. 65, August 9, 1907, 
CRB, Haia Pasta IX.
71Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, no. 12, June 19, 1907,
CRB, Haia Pasta VII, partially encoded, trans. supplied.
72by us as the most correct."
In the discussions relating to the Court of Arbitra­
tion, Rio-Branco reminded Rui of the powers conceded to him 
earlier, then gave him three possible courses of action,
leaving it to Rui to adopt what he considered the best 
73course. Despite this concession Rio-Branco still listed
the choices in the order of preference, intimating that it
would be preferable for Rui to select the course most fa-
74vored by the Brazilian government. Rui however preferred
Rio-Branco's second choice, which he modified slightly. Rui
felt that Brazil should maintain the position of supporting
the equality of sovereign states, which he had assumed. He
requested the government's permission to modify the proposal
and he explained that his reasons for this choice were: to
maintain the friendship of the Hispanic-American countries,
75to satisfy his conscience, and to satisfy public opinion. 
Rio-Branco's second proposal was to defend the organization 
of the Permanent Court as provided by the First Hague Con­
ference in 1899. One of the provisions approved by that 
conference was that each of the member nations, regardless
72Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, no. 25, July 14, 1907,
CRB, Haia Pasta VII, partially encoded, translation sup­
plied.
73Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, no. 71, August 12, 1907, 
CRB, Haia Pasta IX.
74Ibid.; and Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, no. 83, August 
16, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta X.
75Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 53, August 17,
1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX.
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of size or power, had equal rights in appointing judges to 
the court.^6
Rui continued to insist that Brazil defend the ju-
77ridical equality of states in international organizations. 
Rio-Branco finally agreed to discuss the matter in detail 
with President Pena. After the consultation, the Baron ca­
bled the government's permission for Rui to continue to de-
78fend the principle of the equality of sovereign states.
Rio-Branco then sent two telegrams analyzing Rui's proposal
in detail, and telling him, paragraph by paragraph, what was 
79acceptable.
There continued to be a great deal of discussion, by 
cable, between Rui and Rio-Branco on the principle of equal­
ity of sovereign states, especially in reference to the se­
lection of judges for a permanent court. The foreign minis­
ter allowed Rui to defend the principle for the time being, 
but Rio-Branco was prepared to abandon it at the proper 
time. Rui continued to insist that Brazil must defend that
76 —Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, / no. 52_7, August 4,
1907, CRB, Haia Pasta IX; Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, no. 79, 
August 15, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta X; and Rio-Branco to Rui, 
Rio, no. 83, August 16, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta X.
77Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 67 (August 24, 
1907), no. 68 (August 24), no. 69 (August 25), CRB, Haia 
Pasta XX.
78Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, no. 113, August 25, 1907,
CRB, Haia Pasta XI; and Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, no. 116,
August 26, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta IX.
79Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, no. 118, August 26, 1907,
CRB, Haia Pasta XI; and Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, no. 119,
August 26, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XI.
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position to the end, and that they could not lose, even if
8 0the proposal were defeated. Rio-Branco finally instructed
Rui to abondon the principle of equality and to vote for the
81American proposal for the permanent court. Rui strongly 
protested the order, declaring that Rio-Branco did not un­
derstand the actual situation at The Hague. Rui believed it
was futile to vote for the project, as both Scott and Bu-
82chanan had told him the proposal would be abandoned. Rui 
said, however, that he would reluctantly comply with the in­
structions of the government:
I shall comply with the instructions, but I know it 
will be a great error. If the American project were 
to be defeated or withdrawn, we would have the victory 
because it would disappear from the field of combat, 
defeated by our unique principle. That is the unani­
mous opinion here.83
Rio-Branco was persuaded by Rui's appeal, and again gave Rui
permission to proceed in the way that he deemed most advan-
84tageous to Brazilian interests.
Rio-Branco continued to go along with Rui up to a 
point, but would not give Rui permission to maintain his
8 0Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 79, August 30, 
1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX; Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 
80, August 30, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX; and Rio-Branco to 
Rui, Rio, no. 130, CRB, Haia Pasta XII.
81Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, no. 132, September 3,
1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XII.
82Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no, 88, September 4, 
1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX.
83Ibid.
84Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, no. 134, September 4,1907,
CRB, Haia Pasta XII.
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position indefinitely. Rui continued to insist that Brazil 
should maintain her stance, saying that they would change 
from winners to losers if it were abandoned. Rui said he 
was absolutely sure of his position and he further stated 
that only the support of Brazil was saving the principle of 
equality of nations. He also expressed the opinion that the 
Americans would be satisfied with the victory of the princi­
ple of equality and that there was no support for the other
85Brazilian position, which Rio-Branco favored.
* * *
Rui attracted a certain amount of attention to him­
self by his support of the principle of equality of nations 
and his refusal to support the United States' stand on the 
selection of judges for the court of arbitration. Rui's 
speech in opposition to the American proposal was widely 
printed in the international press and drew a letter of
praise from H. Moulin, professor of International Law at the
86French University of Dijon. A special correspondent for 
several United States newspapers was sent from London for an 
interview with Rui. The reporter declared to Rui that the 
general opinion of the American people supported his posi­
tion, and that he intended to correct the earlier erroneous
85Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 112, September 
21, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX.
86H. Moulin to Rui, Dijon, France, September 11,
1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XXIII. There were many requests for 
copies of this speech (see Haia Pasta XXV).
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87report of the Herald correspondent.
In Rui's notable speech of October 9th (see above 
Chapter VI, pp. 136-37) he unequivocably supported the prin­
ciple of equality of sovereign states, and absolutely rejec-
88ted any possibility of compromise. However, Rui did not
receive permission from Rio-Branco to assume that inflexible
89stance until the eve of the speech. Nabuco, for his part, 
disagreed with this Brazilian position because it was in 
conflict with his goal of Brazilian-American friendship.
The renewed friendship of Rui and Nabuco continued 
in spite of the circumstances surrounding the selection of 
Rui as the Brazilian delegate to the Second Hague Peace Con­
ference and the conflicts between the Brazilian and American 
Hague delegations. During the conference, out of patriotism
and friendship, they continued to cooperate with each other
90and with Rio-Branco for the good of Brazil. Rio-Branco, 
despite repeated assurances to Rui of his freedom of choice, 
maintained firm control over Brazil's position at The Hague, 
including many details. He made most of the apparent con-
87 —Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 102 / A_7* Sep­
tember 10, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX.
88Proceedings, (1907), II, pp. 147-56.
89Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 125, October 8,
1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XX; and Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, no.
163, October 8, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XIII.
90Nabuco to Rio-Branco, Washington, December 30,
1907, CRB, Pasta Rio Branco, draft located in Pasta J. Na­
buco; Nabuco to Rui, Washington, December 31, 1907, XXVI; 
and Rui to Nabuco, Rio, November 12, 1908, CRB, Pasta J.
Nabuco. See also Lacombe, Rio-Branco e Rui, pp. 86-87.
cessions to Rui in order to prevent the resignation of the 
Brazilian delegate. However, Rio-Branco finally did allow 
Rui to defend the principle of equality of states to the end 
of the conference. Despite their differences of opinion 
over Brazil's stance at the Second Hague Conference, the 
three Brazilian statesmen continued to cooperate in the in­
terest of patriotism, and they publicly continued to show a 
great respect for each other.
The following chapter will describe Rio-Branco's 
efforts to enhance the self-image of Brazil and will show 
Nabuco's endeavors to prevent Brazilian national pride from 
creating a permanent break with the United States.
CHAPTER VIII 
NURTURING A NATIONAL IMAGE
During the Second Hague Peace Conference there had 
been an outburst of anti-American sentiment in the Brazilian 
press, and the American consul in Pernambuco reported that 
it began with the manipulation of news dispatches from The 
Hague, but soon broadened into a more general antipathy to­
ward the united States.^
In Brazil the subject of the Hague Conference was 
greatly exaggerated, especially the role of Rui Barbosa.
The press presented Rui as the dominant intellect of the 
conference, and proclaimed recognition of that fact by the 
leading newspapers of Europe and the United States. Stead1s 
Courrier de la Conf erence was given the same credence as such 
papers as the London Times .and Le Figaro, and was widely 
quoted to support an exaggerated role for Rui. The Brazil­
ian press especially played up their delegate's antagonism
to Choate, and used that as a pretext to arouse distinct ill
2feeling against the United States,
Nabuco, Rui and Rio-Branco all cooperated during the
■^George Chamberlin (American Consul) to Assistant_ 
Secretary of State, Pernambuco, October / i.e. September / 




conference to increase Brazilian prestige. Nabuco withdrew 
from the limelight diring the conference, happy to see Bra­
zil boosted, but fearing an end to the special relationship 
with the United States. By his absence he disassociated 
himself from the anti-American stance, in hopes that he 
could later repair any damage. Rui accepted all the credit 
for Brazil's position at the conference, although it was 
dictated by Rio-Branco. Rui was entirely willing to cooper­
ate with Rio-Branco in order to boost his own prestige at 
home and abroad. Rio-Branco boosted Brazil (and inciden­
tally Rui) at the expense of the United States, while at the 
same time undercutting Nabuco's position.
The Brazilian populace was convinced that as a re­
sult of the conference, Brazil's international status was 
increased and their country had become recognized as the 
ninth power in the world and as a spokesman for all the 
smaller nations. The credit for this achievement was given 
to the Brazilian government, especially Rio-Branco, and to 
Rui Barbosa, Brazilian advocate before the world powers. 
After the conference Rio-Branco reversed the anti-American 
stance of the Brazilian press, protesting that the disagree­
ments at the conference had been between the leaders of the 
respective delegations and not between the two countries. 
Nabuco supported and encouraged this renewal of friendship 
and did all he would to minimize the damage from the confer­
ence to Brazilian-American relations. Rui, for his part, 
reverted to his independent stance, refusing to cooperate in
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repairing the damage. He really seemed to believe the Bra­
zilian press reports of his exploits and his victories over 
the representatives of the great powers. He felt he had 
taken a stand based on principle and refused to compromise. 
He believed he had gained national and international recog­
nition, and he was not about to do anything he felt would 
diminish his prestige at home.
Rio-Branco was the person most responsible for the 
Brazilian public opinion toward the conference, as he per­
sonally edited the telegrams and commentary from The Hague,
3preparing the information for release to the press.
An example of the exaggerated importance given to 
the role of Brazil and her representative at The Hague can 
be seen in the following excerpt from a Rio newspaper:
An occasion of pride to all Brazilians should be 
the attitude assumed by the eminent chief of our dele­
gation at The Hague in relation to our position in the 
Permanent Court of Arbitration, being the Anglo-German- 
American project.
Thus at this moment all political attention in the 
world is turned to the figure of our glorious Ambas­
sador, who took the initiative, in accord with our emi­
nent Minister of Foreign Relations, of championing for 
the nations of the American continent the respect due 
to their independence and sovereignty.
The Brazilian proposal formulated by Mr. Ruy Bar­
bosa is a proof of the civilization of our country, of 
our high judicial spirit, of the conscience with which 
we serve the grandeur of the American name. The Hague 
Conference gave us the opportunity to call the atten­
tion of the world to our country, whose great political
3Viana, Vida do Rio Branco, pp. 382-83; Rio-Branco 
to Rui, Rio, no. 41, July 24, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta VIII; 
and Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, no. 42, July 25, 1907, CRB, Haia 
Pasta VIII.
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and moral progress found in the genius of Mr. Ruy Bar­
bosa its most admirable exponent.4
Among the great number of exaggerated press comments 
published in Rio at this time, there appeared only one paper 
with a more balanced view of the situation at The Hague:
The classification of Brazil as a power of the fifth 
order, the classification proposed to the Hague Confer­
ence, is going to arouse many people from a sleep to 
which the majority of our population were being put by 
the telegrams from over there.
Evidently with the news items which are coming to us 
from The Hague it is happening that a great part of the 
public is being misled. . . .  To them it appears that 
the labors of the Peace Conference consist principally 
of listening to what Mr. Ruy Barbosa says. The rest is 
secondary.
Now, when one reads the European journals, he is 
filled with wonder at the contrast. They speak, it is 
true, of the work of our representatives, but speak of 
them modestly and only occasionally.
. . . .  Those who are unacquainted with the rest of 
the labors of the Peace Conference are likewise believ­
ing that there the entire world turns to make obeisance 
to Brazil. For them the exact representation of that 
meeting would be that of a numerous group of the most 
eminent men of all countries, listening open-mouthed and 
awe-struck, to the interminable discourses of Mr. Ruy 
Barbosa. The picture appears to them worthy of being 
hung alongside that of the gospel which depicts our Lord 
as a child amongst the doctors.
Yet nothing is more untrue.5
The article then explains that other countries obtained re­
sults at the conference by quiet diplomacy, rather than by 
noisy speeches. Then it continues:
And this /“quiet diplomacy_7 is what the unmeasured 
pride of our Ambassador would never permit him to do. • 
Lulled by the music of his own words, accustomed to be­
ing treated as an infallible pontiff, he goes on orating 
and perorating indefatigably, while others devote them-
4"Tribunal de Arbitragem," A Tribuna, August 23,
1907.
^"Ordem do Dia," A Noticia, August 22, 1907.
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selves to tasks less spectacular but infinitely more 
useful and affording more practical results for the 
nations whom they represent.
Fortunately, however, the case which is now throwing 
us into consternation will perhaps not have bad results. 
For while the speeches of Mr. Ruy Barbosa may be noisily 
going on, the silent diplomacy of our chancery will, 
through the execution of telegraphic instructions, do 
all that may be possible to correct the ridiculous clas­
sification. If this should be accomplished the ingenu­
ous will believe that all was accomplished for the most 
part by some interminable memorial or prolix speech of 
our Ambassador.6
In light of the situation in Rio, the American am­
bassador cabled the following to Washington: "Exaggerated
importance role of Brazil at The Hague prevalent, suscepti­
bilities hurt, the United States blamed, feeling probably
7transient but worth quieting." Dudley reported that Rui 
was the theme of seventy-five percent of the telegrams pub­
lished in Rio from The Hague, and that A Noticia was the
Oonly paper not daily eulogizing his work.
President Boosevelt thought that something should be 
said to placate Brazil regarding the United States' position 
on the Court of Arbitration. The Department of State
gIbid. A Noticia apparently was the only newspaper 
which did not follow the official line of the Ministry of 
Foreign Relations. The editor of A Noticia blamed the over­
emphasis on the actions of Rui on Rio-Branco's practice of 
releasing cables from The Hague directly to his friend at 
O Jornal do Comm^rcio. The other papers, aware of 0 Jor- 
nal's source, closely echoed the sentiments of that very in­
fluential paper. See A Noticia, August 22, 1907; Griscom to 
Root, Petropolis, July 16, 1906, DS, 1113/2; and Griscom to 
Root, Petropolis, October 13, 1906, DS, 1070/5. Also see 
above Chapter II, pages 50-52.
7Dudley to Root, Petropolis, August 26, 1907, DS, 
40/476; a copy of the same is: DS, 40/480.
gDudley to Root, Petropolis, August 26, DS, 40/476.
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drafted a statement to be sent to Rio-Branco on the subject 
and submitted it to Root at Muldoon's Sanatorium for his ap­
proval. Root endorsed the statement, after adding a para­
graph, and it was cabled to Dudley for delivery to the Bra-
Qzilian foreign minister. The final text of the cable to
the American embassy in Rio is as follows:
Tell Minister for foreign affairs emphatically: quote:
From the beginning of the Hague conference the delegates 
of the United States have in pursuance of their instruc­
tions bent every effort to secure satisfactory represen­
tation of all our countries in the desired permanent 
court. The influence of the sieter /_ sic _/ republics 
of the American hemisphere has all been thrown in this 
direction.
It is hardly necessary to say that any plan proposed 
which might be justly distasteful to Brazil could not 
for that reason be entirely satisfactory to the United- 
States.
At the same time, although we of the American na­
tions can arrange our own conferences exactly as we 
wish, stil / sic _7, at the Hague, we must all yield 
something to European views when consistent with our 
dignity and interests. Unless we did this we should 
have to dissociate ourselves entirely from the Hague and 
its progressive efforts for world-wide peace and har­
mony.
The proposal to require that each country shall name 
a permanent member of the court is equivalent to defeat­
ing the proposed court in which we are much interested 
not for our own special benefit but upon general public 
grounds. We hope Brazil will not insist upon such a po­
sition but will agree to some plan which involves no 
discrimination against American nations and no deroga­
tion from the sovereignty of any but proceeds upon some 
basis by which the selection of a reasonable number of 
judges may be accomplished. It would be most unfortu­
nate if the opposition of American republics were to
9 — -7Adee to Root, Washington, / September 1, 1907_/,
DS, 40/no number; Root to Dudley, Washington, September 3, 
1907, DS,_40/437; and Adee to Choate, Washington, September 
6, 1906 J_ i.e., 1907_7f DS, 40/445. Only the first line of 
the above cable was coded. Since the wire was in plain text 
it was easily copied by the Brazilian "Secret Service" and 
sent to Rio-Branco. Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, no. 134 bis 
/ i.e., 134A_7f September 4, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XII, par­
tially encoded, translation supplied.
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prevent a practical result for the good of mankind to 
which European nations equal in population consent.10
Rio-Branco gave his reply in an interview with Dud­
ley and in a subsequent memorandum.^ Rio-Branco persis­
tently argued that the differences were between Brazil and 
the American Hague delegation, rather than between the two 
governments. Rio-Branco was evidently distressed primarily 
because Brazil was not consulted during the preparation of
the court project and was taken aback by the low rank as- 
12signed her. The foreign minister was convinced that
Choate was hostile to Brazil and repeatedly criticized the
attitude of the leading United States delegate at The 
13Hague. Rio-Branco was against establishment of a court of
arbitration, preferring to submit questions of arbitration
14to the head of a government. Apparently Rio-Branco was
■^Root to Dudley, Wash., Sep. 3, 1907, DS, 40/437.
11Dudley to Root, Petropolis, September 6, 1907,
DS 40/444; and Dudley to Root, Petropolis, September 11, 
1907, DS, 40/539.
12Dudley to Root, Petropolis, September 11, 1907,
DS, 40/539.
13Ibid. Rio-Branco's conviction seemed to be jus­
tified when he received news from The Hague that Choate had 
purposely omitted Rui's name from a list of judges he con­
sidered qualified to serve as members of the proposed court. 
Rui to Rio-Branco, The Hague, no. 89, September 5, 1907,
CRB, Haia Pasta XX; Dudley to Root, Petropolis, September 7, 
1907, DS, 40/446; and Rio-Branco to Amaral, Rio, no. 17, 
September 6, 1907, AHI, 235/3/15 tel. exp. Rio-Branco then 
instructed Amaral to verbally deliver a protest to Root 
over the omission of Rui's name from Choate's list. Rio- 
Branco to Amaral, Rio, no. 18, September 6, 1907, AHI, 
235/3/15 tel. exp.
■^Dudley to Root, PetrSpolis, September 11, 1907,
DS, 40/539.
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reluctant to depart from the method of arbitration he had 
used so effectively in delineating the boundaries of his 
country.
Despite the disagreement over organization of the 
proposed court, Rio-Branco maintained a "most friendly 
spirit" in his conversations with the American ambassador. 
Rio-Branco said that Brazil was most anxious to maintain 
cordial relations with the United States. He also expressed 
the opinion that they had the common bond of both being sus­
pected by the Spanish-American countries of a design to con­
quer some of their territory or establish some form of pro-
15tectorate over them.
Ambassador Dudley was convinced that Brazil's sup­
port of the equality of sovereign states at The Hague was a 
pretext to cover her true opposition to the Court of Arbi­
tration based on her unfair classification as a fifth-rate 
power:
I had a conversation with Dr. da Cunha, of the Peru- 
Brazilian Mixed Commission, an intimate friend and coun­
selor of Baron do Rio Branco. He told me that the sole 
explanation of Brazil's opposition to the Tribunal has 
been what is considered the unfair classification of 
that country, an action which is not attributed to you 
or the President, but to our delegation at the Hague 
acting under instructions which, it is surmised, did not 
specifically cover this detail. He further said that 
the violation of the equality of nations charged to be 
involved in the classification was an afterthought and a 
pretext. That objection, it is admitted, has been met 
by the amendment, but there is aversion to accepting it
15Ibid.; and Rio-Branco to Dudley, memorandum, Sep­
tember 5, 1907, DS, 40/542.
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16upon other grounds.
Despite the message from Root which Dudley carried
to Rio-Branco on September 5th, the press in Rio continued
to keep the controversy alive by publishing articles from
American newspapers sympathetic to Rui's viewpoint, and by
reprinting the offensive and slurring references to Brazil
17which had appeared in the New York Herald.
* * *
During the conference Nabuco was very concerned
about Brazilian-American relations and he was happy to see
18that Rui began by supporting the United States. However, 
as the relations cooled between the two delegations he be­
came increasingly alarmed. Because of the length of the 
conference, it was necessary for Nabuco to return to Wash­
ington before the deliberations ended, but he met personally 
with Rui before departing for Europe. He wanted to hear the
story first-hand to be able, if possible, to help repair any
19damage to Brazilian-American friendship. Nabuco was 
pleased about the publicity Rui and Brazil had received from 
the conference, but he wondered at what cost it had been
16Postscript, dated September 14, 1907, to Dudley to 
Root, Petropolis, September 11, 1907, DS, 40/539.
17Dudley to Root, PetrSpolis, October 14, 1907, DS,
2098/69.
18Nabuco to Rui, Vittel, France, June 29, 1907,
CRB, Pasta J. Nabuco.
19Nabuco to Rui, Langenschwalbach, August 26,1907,
CRB, Pasta J. Nabuco; Nabuco to Rui, Paris, September 13,
1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XVII; and Nabuco to Rui, Wimerux, The 
Netherlands, September 17, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XVII.
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.t . ,20 obtained.
Nabuco resumed his duties as ambassador on October 
212, 1907. Rio-Branco was anxious to convince him that Bra­
zil had been forced to take the position finally assumed at
the conference, "because the dignity of the nation was in 
22jeapordy." He urged Nabuco to examine the correspondence
23at the embassy to verify that fact. Rio-Branco felt that,
after calm reflection, the United States would recognize
that Brazil was proceeding in good faith at the conference
and that the American representatives at The Hague were dam-
24aging the hemispheric policy of Roosevelt and Root.
Rio-Branco had concluded that the misunderstanding
was with the American delegation at the conference, and not
with President Roosevelt and Secretary Root, who had both
25continued to manifest friendship toward Brazil. The Bra­
zilian foreign minister felt that there was no need for the 
Brazilian government or people to change their attitude
20Nabuco to Rodrigo Octavio, Wiesbaden, August 7,
1907, AJN. See above, Chapter VII, pp. 159-62.
21Nabuco to Rio-Branco, New York, October 3, 1907,
AHI, 235/3/1C tel. rec.; and Nabuco to Robert Bacon (Acting 
Secretary of State), Washington, October 8, 1907, DS,
4737/5.
22 —Rio-Branco to Nabuco, Petropolis, October / 3J ,
1907, AHI, 235/3/15 tel. exp.
23Ibid.
24Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, no. 129, August 31, 1907,
CRB, Haia Pasta XXII.
25Ibid.; and Dudley to Root, Petropolis, September
11, 1907, DS, 40/539.
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toward the United States because of the events at The Hague.
Rio-Branco was convinced that the friendship between the two
countries would not be affected by these events, and he told
American Ambassador Dudley that Root knew that Rui, like
himself and Nabuco, was a sincere friend of the United 
26States. In reference to the United States, Rio-Branco 
said,
Our policy toward that country is unchanged, despite 
Choate and the approval which that unfortunate delega­
tion received in the message. To us that delegation 
was unfaithful to the Pan American policy followed since 
Blaine and affirmed on various occasions by President 
Roosevelt and Secretary Root.27
Nabuco also chose to believe that Brazil's quarrel 
had been with the American delegation, and not with the gov­
ernment. He continued to believe in the good will of Root, 
a personal friend:
What a great man, what a good friend! The story of The 
Hague was an abberation, a gaffe of Mr. Choate alone, at 
a time when Mr. Root found himself almost incapacitated 
because of great fatigue, which is still visible today 
in his changed expression.28
2 6Ibid.; Dudley, however, was dubious about Rio- 
Branco' s denial_of anti-American motives, but said that, 
"Nevertheless / the denial_7 discloses a pleasing anxiety 
to defend and save unimpaired the cordial understanding 
between the United States and Brazil brought about by Sec­
retary Root's visit to this country." Dudley to Root, 
Petropolis, August 26, 1907, DS, 40/476. Dudley could not 
understand Rio-Branco's insistence that the Brazilian dis­
agreement was only with the U.S. Hague delegation and not 
with the U.S. government. Rio-Branco to Dudley, memo,
Rio, September 5, 1907, DS, 40/541; and Dudley to Root, 
Petropolis, September 11, 1907, DS, 40/539.
27 __ Rio-Branco to Nabuco, Rio, no. 1, January / 2_7,
1907 / i.e., 1908_7, AHI, 235/3/15 tel. exp.
28Nabuco to Rodrigues, Washington, December 29,
1907, AJN.
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Nabuco was anxious to see Root and clear up any mis­
understanding arising out of the conference. Unfortunately 
he would not be able to talk with the secretary of state 
until he returned from his trip to Mexico on October 19th. 
However, knowing Root's sympathy toward Brazil, and his sta­
ture in the government, he did not think the discord between
29the two conference delegations would leave any resentment.
Privately, Nabuco was not so optimistic. He felt 
that Brazil had been excessivley preoccupied with her own 
position at The Hague and had taken the situation too ser­
iously. He said, "We are the only nation which is impas-
30sioned over The Hague." Nabuco was so pessimistic that he 
told Graga Aranha that, as far as foreign policy was con­
cerned, there was no reason for him to continue in his post. 
He believed that the conference had undone all of his work 
in Washington. He realized that the friendship between Bra­
zil and the United States depended upon mutual respect and 
cooperation. He was distressed that the Rio press had rep­
resented the conference as a duel between the two countries,
31terminating in a Brazilian victory. He even came to the 
point where he believed that Brazilian-American relations 
had been so altered that it would have been better if there
29Nabuco to Rio-Branco, Washington, October 5, 1907, 
AHI, 235/3/1C tel. rec.; and Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, no.
162, October 8, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XIII.
30 _Nabuco to Tobias / Monteiro_7/ Washington, October 
9, 1907, AJN.
31Nabuco to Graga Aranha, Washington, December 5,
1907, AJN.
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had been no conference:
In reference to The Hague, it would have been better if 
there had not been a Conference. It caused a great con­
fusion in our ideas and made us forget for a while that 
there is only one possible foreign policy. The American 
Delegation was much rebuked; Choate does not have the 
ideals of Root in respect to our Continent, but at the 
first blow to us Root intervened. The more quickly we 
forget this incident, which however served to enhance 
the Brilliance of Ruy, the better for us. At times, it 
appears that we are the. Great Power and the United 
States is the small one.32
Even before he was able to speak with Root, Nabuco 
began to make preparations for giving him assurances of Bra­
zil's friendship with the United States. The ambassador 
sent a personal cable to Rio-Branco informing him that Edith 
Root, daughter of the secretary of state, would marry on No­
vember 27th. Nabuco's wife was planning to leave London on 
November 2nd to return to Washington and Nabuco suggested
that she could bring a small wedding gift for the bride-to-
33be, "if you wish to give Root this proof of friendship." 
Rio-Branco approved of the idea and Nabuco sent the gift 
with an accompanying note:
Dear Miss Root,
I have received from Baron do Rio Branco to hand you 
in the name of the Brazilian Government, the accompany­
ing little souvenir to remind you,_on your wedding day, 
of the interest our people feels / sic J  in your future 
happiness.
The fact that you marry the grandson of General 
Grant, whose name is cherished among us by the proofs he 
gave us of his friendship, makes the wedding doubly mem­
orable to us.
32Nabuco to Rodrigues Alves, Washington, January 7,
1908, AJN.
33Nabuco to Rio-Branco, personal, Washington, Octo­
ber 23, 1907, AHI, 235/3/1C tel. rec.
With my best wishes believe me
Yours very truely, 
Joaquim Nabuco34
While Nabuco in Washington was working to restore 
the Brazilian-American pre-conference cordial relations, 
Ambassador Dudley in Rio observed that the controversy sur­
rounding the debates on the Permanent Court of Arbitration
at The Hague had affected relations between the two coun-
35tries, but he believed the effect to be temporary.
* * *
The "fame" of Rui, as trumpeted by the Brazilian 
press and in paid magazine articles, preceded Rui to Paris, 
Salvador, and Rio. At each of these places he received a 
welcome fit for a conquering hero. Rui revelled in the adu­
lations of his countrymen and acted as if he believed the 
reports that he alone had defied the great powers of the 
world in the name of Brazil and had been victorious.
Following the peace conference Rui went to Paris, 
where he was warmly received by the Brazilian colony. The 
celebration there in the Hotel Continental on October 31st 
was highlighted by a discourse by the Brazilian minister in 
Paris. After Rui responded to the speech, he was presented 
with a large bronze statue representing Glory crowning
34Nabuco to Edith Root, Washington, November 9,
1907, AJN.
35Dudley to Root, PetrSpolis, October 14, 1907,
DS, 2098/69.
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36Genius. The symbolism of the gift could hardly have been
more appropriate, for the Brazilians had always considered
Rui to be a genius, and now they felt he had brought glory
and honor to Brazil by his role at The Hague. This was to
be only the first of several receptions during the course
of his triumphant return to Brazil, culminating in the gala
37celebration in Rio. During this period the Rio press re­
ferred to Rui as,"The Eagle of The Hague," and the epithet 
was echoed with pride by the Brazilian populace.
In 1907 Rui's name was still remembered in connec-
38tion with the Encilhamento, which he was accused of caus­
ing by his actions as finance minister nearly twenty years 
before. It was widely believed that his role at The Hague 
was calculated to improve his popular image, and he was ac­
cused by the American consul in Pernambuco of trying to at­
tain this goal at the expense of the good relations with the
36 ^Virginia Cortes de Lacerda and Regina Monteiro
Real, Rui Barbosa Em Haia (Rio de Janeiro: Casa de Rui
Barbosa, 1957), pp. 83-84; and Viana, Vida de Rui, p. 319.
37On the return voyage there was a jubilant cele­
bration in his native Salvador, Bahia, after a port call 
in Pernambuco. A planned stop in Lisbon, including an au­
dience with the king, was cancelled because Rui's wife in­
jured her foot in a fall. "O Maior Dos Brasileiros," A 
Bahia, December 28, 1907; "0 Embaixador Ruy Barbosa," Diario 
da Bahia, December 29, 1097 / i.e., 1907_7; Rui to Consel- 
heiro Lampreia, Paris, December 12, 1907; and Rui to Bra­
zilian Minister in Lisbon, Paris, December 12, 1907.
38The Encilhamento was a period of inflation and 
easy credit, fuelled by speculation, which produced bogus 
companies and unsound finance. This period of financial 
instability began in Brazil soon after the overthrow of the 
monarchy in 1889, and reached its peak in 1898. Burns, A 
History of Brazil, pp. 212, 223.
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39United States.
Public opinion in Brazil was being prepared by Rio- 
Branco for a great demonstration in Rui's honor, upon his 
return from Europe— a popular saying at the time was, "Bra­
zil was discovered at The Hague." Part of this preparation
was the exaggeration of his exploits and, coincidentaly, the
40denigration of the American stance. An example of the 
propaganda is the following material, excerpted from William 
Stead's Courrier, which appeared in the Jornal do Commercio 
on October 14th:
'But of all the two hundred and twenty-five dele­
gates, the man who caused the most profound impression 
was Dr. Ruy Barbosa. He is the principal figure of the 
Conference. He surpassed for Brazil the emulation of 
the other South American powers and conquered the re­
spect and admiration of the European delegates.
'When he demanded that the smaller countries should be 
represented on the Court of Arbitration on an equal 
footing with the Great Powers, . . . / Dr. Barbosa be- 
came_7 the real leader of South America in the Confer­
ence, and not of South America only but of all the les­
ser powers of Europe as well.
'Joseph H. Choate, presenting the American doctrine, 
was the champion of the Great Powers.
'I learn that upon his return to his country the 
Brazilians will endeavor to make Barbosa president at 
the next election. He ought to be a splendid chief 
executive.'41
39George Chamberlin to Assistant Secretary of 
State, Pernambuco, October / i. e., September_7 24, 1907, 
DS, 1113/5.
40Dudley to Root, Petropolis, October 14, 1907,
DS, 2098/69; Victor de Sa, Ruy e os Constituintes de 91 
(Rio de Janeiro; Departamento De Imprensa Nacional, 1950), 
p. 60; and Orlando Ferreira, Ruy Barbosa e Seus Detractores 
(Uberaba, Minas Gerais; Typ. Jardim, 1921), p. 93.
^ Jornal do Commercio, October 14, 1907, quoting 
Willaim Stead in Courrier de la Conference.
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Outwardly at least, the propaganda in the Rio papers
did not affect the friendliness of the Brazilian government
42toward the American government. In fact, both the Brazil­
ians and the Americans desired a return to cordial relations 
and both sides expressed the hope that the Rio port call of
the "Great White Fleet" in January of 1908 would allow the
43opportunity for restoration of the former relationship. 
Indeed, Dudley felt that relations would soon return to nor­
mal for,
Important reasons of self-interest, indeed, strongly 
counsel Brazil to cultivate the good-will of the United 
States, and I believe it beyond question, notwithstand­
ing her recent course, that President Penna and Baron 
Rio Branco would sacrifice much to avert its loss. I 
may also observe that, in connection with proceedings 
at the Hague, no word has been spoken in Congress in 
criticism of the United States.44
The government in Washington took care to advise Nabuco that
cordial feelings were still entertained toward Brazil, and
that the hope was for an eventual satisfactory solution to
45the problem of the Court of Arbitration.
42Dudley to Root, Petropolis, October 14, 1907,
DS, 2098/69.
43Ibid.; Nabuco to Rodrigues, Washington, December 
29, 1907, AJN; and Nabuco to Rio-Branco, Washington, Jan­
uary 11, 1908, AHI, 235/3/2 tel. rec. The naval squadron 
was Theodore Roosevelt's sixteen-ship fleet which circled 
the globe between December 1907 and February 1909; for an 
account of the visit to Rio see Robert A. Hart,. The Great 
White Fleet (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1965),
pp. 96-121.
44Dudley to Root, Petropolis, October 14, 1907, DS,
2098/69.
45Bacon (Acting Secretary of State) to Dudley, 
Washington, November 14, 1907, DS, 2098/70.
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Despite Nabuco's continuing support for a close 
Brazilian-American friendship, Rio-Branco apparently did not 
continue to be so unreservedly pro-American. By the end of 
1907 Rio-Branco had receded from his position where he main­
tained that the disagreements had simply been between the 
two Hague delegations. Hilario de Gouveia told Nabuco that 
Rio-Branco was now doing his best to minimize the Brazilian 
popular support for the United States. He said that Rio- 
Branco had intended to boycott the banquet given in honor of
the American naval squadron, but Rui's last-minute refusal
46forced him to attend.
Until the end of 1907 the State Department had been 
predisposed to believe that Rui was acting on his own ini­
tiative in his disagreement with Choate at The Hague. In a
speech on December 28, 1907, Rio-Branco quoted a portion of
47his telegraphic instructions to Rui. When a copy of the 
speech was received in Washington, the Second Assistant Sec­
retary of State sent it to Root with the following handwrit­
ten memo attached:
Dear Mr. Secretary
This will interest you. Rio Branco herein gives the 
text of the instructions sent to Ruy Barbosa, upon which 
the latter acted in his squabble with Choate.
We had supposed that Ruy Barbosa's egotism and chau­
vinism were responsible for his course, but it now seems 
that he merely obeyed orders. I suspected as much at 
the time, from some remarks made by Gurgel do Amaral in
^Hilario de Gouveia to Nabuco, Rio, March 10, 1908,
AJN.
47Rio-Branco, speech, Rio, December 28, 1907, quoted
in A Imprensa, December 30, 1907.
his execution of Rio Branco's cabled instructions to
him* _AAA / Alvey A. Adee_/
Nabuco was distressed at Rio-Branco's new attitude
and informed the foreign minister that he should be looking
for a replacement for him if Brazil's foreign policy were to
change from friendship with the United States. Nabuco also
told Rio-Branco, "You will remember that I only accepted
this post so as to accomplish in it the policy of approxima-
49tion with America. . . . "  Later Nabuco wrote a friend,
asking his help to improve the situation in Rio:
During your stay in Rio, do what you can in favor of 
the approximation with the United States. . . . You, 
who are one of Rio-Branco's intimates and who had a 
part in the creation of this Embassy, could render so 
great service to the country by sustaining the policy 
of approximation. . . ."50
* * *
Upon Rui's return from the Hague Conference, he 
received a hero's welcome. A cannon shot rang out from the 
fort, causing great excitement among the populace of the 
city. On December 29, 1907, this salute from Morro do Cas- 
tello announced that Rui's ship had crossed the bar at the 
entrance to the harbor of Rio de Janeiro. The waiting 
crowd, in a delirium of patriotism and gratitude, broke into
48Adee to Root, memorandum, January 23, 1908, at­
tached to: Dudley to Root, Petropolis, December 30, 1907,
DS, 40/689.
49Nabuco to Rio-Branco, Washington, January 18,
1908, ABR-B, 74/1 recibidas.
50Nabuco to Gomes Feirerra, Washington, February 18,
1908, AJN.
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spontaneous and enthusiastic applause. A multitude of 
launches, boats, and small steamers escourted the ship as 
it slowly entered Guanabara Bay. A band played continuous­
ly, and as the ship passed by, onlookers waved hankerchiefs 
and shouted "viva's".
After anchoring, the ship was boarded by the ranking 
admiral of the Navy and other high, officials anxious to 
greet the returning delegate. So many persons came aboard 
that even standing room was difficult to find. A represen­
tative of the academic community pronounced a beautiful dis­
course, effusively welcoming the illustrious Brazilian.
As Rui was transfereed by launch from the ship to 
the quay, there was a surge and movement of the throng, at­
tempting to catch a glimpse of the great Brazilian. The 
crush of humanity broke the cordon formed by policemen, and 
the crowd surged nearer. As Rui disembarked, he was greeted 
by the Brazilian vice-president and the foreign minister.
The Cais Pharoux, the point of debarkation, and the 
Praga Quinze de November immediately behind, were gaily 
decorated. Along the quay were rows of flags and banners, 
and the lamp posts were completely decorated with foliage. 
Scattered about the area were bunches of beautiful fresh 
flowers.
Because of the crowd, it was difficult for the dig­
nitaries to begin the procession, which finally commenced 
with a fanfare of clarions by military bands. The Avenida 
Central was filled with people wanting to greet Rui and thus
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demonstrate to him that his act of "exceptional patriotism" 
was appreciated. People also lined the Avenida Beira-Mar, 
and as the procession arrived in front of the Presidential 
Palace, the Brazilian President invited the honoree to a re­
ception, where he was affectionately toasted by the coun­
try’s leaders.
The procession resumed and entered the Rua Sao Cle­
mente, which was decorated along its full extent in a fes­
tive aspect. Enormous banners were hung along the street, 
and flags of the nations were unfurled from closely-spaced 
flag staffs along the route. Placards were much in evi­
dence, with such inscriptions as "The Country Salutes Her 
Greatest Son," "Rights Are Equal For All Nations," and "To 
The Paladin Of Peace." The balconies of the buildings along 
the street were festooned with bright and festive colors.
A reception was held where a series of multi-colored 
electric lights were strung across the street in front of 
the residence of the returning delegate. Here the reception 
committee presented him with a plaque which read, "To Ruy 
Barbosa, From The People, 30 December 1907." That afternoon 
an official vehicle called to take Rui back to the debarka­
tion point for another reception on the quay, where an or­
chestra played the National Anthem. That evening he was
51further honored at a gala banquet.
51The above description is based on contemporary 
newspaper accounts, especially A Imprensa, December 30 and 
31, 1907; and Diario de Noticias, December 30 and 31, 1907. 
For the description of a similar reception for Rui held 
earlier in Salvador, Bahia, see A Bahia, December 28 and 30, 
1907; and Diario da Bahia, December 29, 1907.
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While on opposite sides of the ocean, Rui and Rio- 
Branco had managed to cooperate quite effectively in car­
rying out Brazil's foreign policy. However, it appeared 
that there might now be a strain in the relations between 
the two, for it would be difficult for them to equally share 
the glory after Rui's return to Rio. After Rui's triumphant 
return, Rio-Branco was jealous of the spectacular reception 
accorded him. The Baron even boasted of a banquet given in 
his own honor, which he said was more extravagant than any 
given for Rui. Rio-Branco was also very critical of Rui for
neglecting to pay him a visit in the ten weeks after his re-
52turn from Europe.
Nabuco, in hopes of dispelling any ill-feelings
against Brazil stemming from the Hague Conference, urged Rui
to accept an invitation from Yale University to deliver a
53series of lectures. In May of 1907, at the suggestion of
Root, Rui had been invited to give the 1908 Dodge Lectures
54on the theme, "The Responsibilities of Citizenship." Na­
buco was grateful to Root for the invitation and said that 
it would be a great honor for Rui to speak after the Secre-
52Hilario de Gouveia to Nabuco, Rio, March 10, 1908,
AJN.
53Nabuco to Rui, London, September 24, 1907, CRB, 
Haia Pasta XVII.
54Yale University to Rui, New Haven, May 23, 1907, 
CRB, Haia Pasta XV; Nabuco to Rio-Branco, Washington, May 
26, 1907, AHI, 235/3/IB tel. rec.; and Nabuco to Root, note, 
Washington, May 29, 1907, AJN. See above, Chapter III, 
footnote 22, p. 75.
55tary, who delivered the 1907 lectures.
On behalf of Yale University, John Barrett wrote
some of the university alumni, asking them to contact Rui
5 6and to urge him to accept the invitation. One alumnus, 
on his way to Rio via Europe, was sent with a letter of in­
troduction from Root to personally invite Rui to give the
57Yale lectures, and to answer any questions Rui might have. 
Mr. Barrett also sent Rui another letter, enclosing a clip­
ping from the New York Daily Tribune, which discussed the
benefits of Rui's possible acceptance. He also requested a
58photograph of Rui and urged him to accept the lectureship.
During the conference Rui failed to reply to the
Yale invitation, despite repeated urgings of Nabuco and
Yale alumni. Rio-Branco finally sent an urgent telegram,
encouraging Rui to accept, and explaining that Yale needed a
reply so that in case of a refusal, they would have time to
59obtain a substitute. After hearing from Nabuco, Rio-
55Nabuco to Root, Washington, May 29, 1907, AJN;
and John Barrett to Rui, Washington, June 25, 1907, CRB,
Haia Pasta XV.
56For example see Elbert J. Baldwin to Rui, Karls­
bad, August 3, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XV. To Baron d'Es- 
tournelles de Constant, a conference delegate, he wrote,
"If you have a chance to talk to him and strengthen the 
invitation, I hope you will do so." Barrett to d'Estour- 
nelles, Washington, June 29, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XV.
57Lee McClung to Rui, aboard the Deutschland, July 
4, 1907, CRB, Haia Pasta XXIII.
C Q
Barrett to Rui, Washington, July 23, 1907, CRB, 
Haia Pasta XV.
59 —Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, / no. 176A_7, December 3,
1907, CRB, Pasta Rio Branco; another copy in Haia Pasta XI.
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Branco again cabled Rui urging acceptance and informing him
that the trip would be treated as an official mission. The
foreign minister urgently requested that Nabuco contact Rui
directly, with additional information about the lecture 
6 0series. Rui finally decided to decline the Yale invita­
tion, giving ill health as the reason. Nabuco expressed his 
regrets to Root over the decision, and Root said that he 
understood that fatigue from the conference and the long
absence from home perhaps made the time unfavorable for the 
61invitation. Nabuco conveyed Root's sentiments to Rui and
expressed his own dissappointment that Rui would be unable
6 2to speak in the United States.
Since Rui was unable, or unwilling, to come to lec­
ture in the United States, Nabuco began looking for another 
opportunity for the improvement of Brazilian-American rela­
tions to present itself. He felt that perhaps the Rio port
call of the American Naval squadron in January of 1908 would
..u 63serve the purpose.
Rio-Branco had decided that Rui would be the appro­
priate person to give the principal speech at the upcoming
6 0Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, October 28, 1907, CRB,
Haia Pasta XII; and Rio-Branco to Nabuco, Rio, October,n.d., 
1907, AHI, 235/3/15 tel. exp.
61Nabuco to Root, Washington, n .d ., AJN; and Root to 
Nabuco, Washington, November 9, 1907, CRB, Pasta J. Nabuco.
6 2Nabuco to Rui, Washington, December 31, 1907, CRB, 
Haia Pasta XXVI.
6 3Nabuco to Rodrigues, Washington, December 29,
1907, AJN.
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banquet for the American Naval officers. While Rui was
still aboard ship on his return voyage, Rio-Branco informed
64Nabuco that Rui would be the principal speaker. It gave
Nabuco "great pleasure" to hear of Rui's selection and he
fi Rsincerely congratulated Rio-Branco for nominating him. 
Rio-Branco had, however, neglected to request Rui's partici­
pation, and the day after Rui's return, Rio-Branco asked him
to deliver "the principal toast to the American Nation and 
66her Navy." He apologized for the late date of the invita­
tion, but said he had not had the opportunity to extend it 
earlier. Rio-Branco closed with the appeal that, "The ef­
fect in the United States will be immense after the inci-
6 7dents at The Hague."
Nabuco encouraged Rio-Branco to show the American 
squadron a great welcome, which would have a "great impact" 
on the relations between the two countries. He believed 
that the situation offered them a perfect opportunity to re­
move the bad impression caused by The Hague. Nabuco sug-
64The American ambassador also reported to Root 
that Rui was to be the principal speaker, and closed by 
saying, "His selection, under the circumstances, appears to 
be an exceptionally happy one, and calculated to streng­
then the existing good relations of the two governments and 
countries. Dudley to Root, Petropolis, January 3, 1908,
DS, 40/692.
65Nabuco to Rio-Branco, Washington, December 30, 
1907, AHI, 235/3/1C tel. rec.; copy in CRB, Pasta Rio Bran­
co; Nabuco's handwritten draft in CRB, Pasta J. Nabuco.
66Rio-Branco to Rui, Rio, December 31, 1907, CRB,
Pasta Rio Branco.
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gested that the two presidents should take the opportunity
6 8of the Naval visit to congratulate each other.
At almost the last minute, Rui informed Rio-Branco
that he would be unable to be present at the banquet for 
the American Naval officers. The foreign minister pessimis­
tically cabled Nabuco:
I received with regret the letter of Rui excusing him­
self from delivering the toast at the Monroe / Palace_7 
banquet, saying he was fatigued and sick. I also think 
the incidents in which he figured and the agressions 
suffered / at The Hague_7 impel him to have reserva­
tions about a position which would require him to ap- 
plaude the Pan American policy of approximation. I will 
insist, in the name of the President, but I do not ex­
pect to persuade him.69
In his letter to Rui, Rio-Branco said he did not 
think Rui's excuses were very good. He said that it would 
not be bad, after the incidents at The Hague, for Rui to
make a speech complimenting the United States. Rio-Branco
told Rui that a speech now would demonstrate to the American 
government and people that he did not hold the United States 
responsible for the misunderstandings of her delegation at
The Hague, nor for the exaggerations of the Herald corres-
70pondent.
6 8Nabuco to Root, Washington, January 11, 1908, AHI, 
235/3/2 tel. rec.
69Rio-Branco to Nabuco, Rio, January 11, 1908, AHI, 
234/4/1 tel. exp.
70 -Rio-Branco to Rui, Petropolis, January 12, 1908,
CRB, Pasta J. Nabuco; handwritten draft in Pasta Rio Bran­
co. Rio-Branco apparently desired to show independence from 
the U.S., and thereby promote Brazilian nationalism, but at 
the same time he did not wish to alienate the Americans.
Thus he attempted to temper both the pro-American views of 
Nabuco and the anti-American reputation of Rui.
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Rui responded to Rio-Branco's appeal that he recon­
sider his refusal to deliver the principal toast to the 
American Naval squadron, first thanking him for not insis­
ting that he do it. Then Rui denied that his refusal was 
based on resentments from The Hague, saying "I do not hold 
the least resentment against the great American nation for
71the disrespectful actions of her delegation at The Hague."
In support of this claim he then explained, in great detail, 
an incident in which he came to the aid of Scott and the 
American delegation, rescuing them from a position of great 
embarassment before the entire conference. He then quoted 
an extremely friendly note from Scott to support his conten­
tion. He then summarized his own attitude:
You can thus see that my heart is not the least 
grieved by the actions of the Americans at The Hague.
I continue to hold a great admiration for the United 
States, and I would be most happy if I could concur, 
in a manner which would bring us honor, in making our 
relations closer.72
Rui concluded the letter with an explanation of why he re­
fused to take part in the ceremonies honoring the fleet:
/_ It is_/ a military demonstration, the greatest and 
the least opportune and ostentatious naval force which 
the seas have yet seen.
To praise this martial display during a time of 
peace would not only violate my sentiments, but would 
even contradict my actual role at The Hague.
Your position, as Foreign Minister, is different 
and you must show hospitality and courtesy, which you 
are not able to avoid. If I were in the same position,
I would have to submit to it. However, in my position,
71Rui to Rio-Branco, Rio, January 16, 1908, ABR-B,
8/8 recibidas; typescript in CRB, Pasta J. Nabuco.
72Ibid.
without such constraints, I am not forced to contribute 
an apology to a fact which I deplore.73
Machado de Assis wrote Nabuco to inform him of the 
festive atmosphere in Rio surrounding the visit of the Amer­
ican fleet and concluded by saying,
In the true pathway there is courtesy on both sides, 
and you, who collaborated with Rio-Branco in the work 
of approximation of the two countries, shall receive 
your portion of the satisfaction.74
Nabuco meanwhile had spoken privately with Root and filed
this confidential report with Rio-Branco:
Today I had a glorious conservation with Root. He told 
me, 'There is not the slightest /_ resentment_7 on my 
part.' He did not know of the incidents between the 
delegations; he was sick and was only consulted on vital 
questions. His instructions were that Brazil was to 
always have the highest recognition. He had no more 
than an academic or humanitarian interest in the ques­
tions to be discussed at The Hague. He said, 'If I had 
wished to obtain any advantage for the United States at 
The Hague, I should have asked you to help me. . . .So 
far as our interest goes we did not consider we had any 
involved. For that reason we did not make any effort to 
secure assistance of any country. . . .' He is the 
greatest friend that Brazil has in the world. Please 
show this to the President. N a b u c o . 75
The American and Brazilian presidents exchanged con­
gratulatory telegrams during the fleet visit to Rio, and af­
terward Nabuco was ecstatic and he told Rio-Branco that the 
event was viewed with great importance in the United
73Ibid.
74_ Machado de Assis to Nabuco, Rio, January 14, 1907
/ i.e., 1908_/, AJN
75Nabuco to Rio-Branco, Washington, January 15, 
1908, AHI, 235/3/2 tel. rec., partially encoded, transla­
tion supplied.
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76States. Nabuco saw a copy of the message by President
Roosevelt before it was released to the press. Nabuco
thanked Assistant Secretary of State Bacon for showing it
to him, and continued:
As one who is devoting the remainder of his active life 
in helping enthusiastically to draw closer the ties of 
mutual reliance between the United States and Brazil, I 
consider myself happy in expressing to you my sense of 
the great service that President Roosevelt's Message 
will render in the two Countries to that work of the 
most far reaching consequences and incalculable possi­bilities for b o t h . 77
Root and Rio-Branco also exchanged, through their
embassies, messages which were released to the press several
78days later and served to prolong the effect of the visit.
Through Ambassador Dudley, Admiral Evans, commander of the
79fleet, and Rio-Branco also exchanged cordialities. Dudley
was pleased with the outcome of the fleet visit and sent his
congratulations to Admiral Evans:
We are endeavoring to maintain and, so far as possible, 
advance the exceptionally happy relations which have 
prevailed so conspicuously between the United States and 
Brazil since Secretary Root's speeches in this country,
7 6Nabuco to Rio-Branco, Washington, January 16, 
1908, AHI, 235/3/2 tel. rec.
77Nabuco to Bacon, Washington, January 15, 1908,
AJN.
78 ^Dudley to Rio-Branco, Petropolis, January 16,
1908, DS, American Embassy Brazil: Notes to the Foreign
Office; and Rio-Branco to Dudley, Rio, February 5, 1908, 
DS, American Embassy Brazil: Notes from the Foreign Of­
fice. T Q
Rear-Admiral Robley D. Evans to Dudley, aboard 
the USS Connecticut, Rio, January 19, 1908, DS, American 
Embassy Brazil: Miscellaneous Letters Received; and Dud­
ley to Evans, PetrSpolis, January 23, 1908, DS, American 
Embassy Brazil: Miscellaneous Letters /~Sent /.
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and his contact with leading Brazilian statesmen, in 
1906. I may be permitted, therefore, to congratulate 
myself, and I do you, upon the magnificient / sic _/ 
effect produced upon the relations between the two coun­
tries by the visit of your great fleet at Rio de Jan­
eiro. 80
Since Rui had been announced as the one to give the 
principal toast, his absence from the banquet required an 
explanation. At the banquet Rio-Branco read a message of 
explanation and regret from Rui, which stated that he de­
clined to speak because of the long strain of the Hague Con-
81ference and the precarious nature of his health. Rui's 
statement was published by the New York Herald, and the 
press published the greetings exchanged between Root and 
Rio-Branco and between Roosevelt and Pena. Nabuco pro­
nounced himself satisfied that the mutual sympathy ex­
pressed in the messages would prevent any damage to their
82relationship as a result of the Hague Conference. After 
the fleet departed; Root, Roosevelt, Pena, Nabuco, and Dud­
ley were all of the opinion that the ill effects of The
83Hague on Brazilian-American relations had been dissipated.
80 -Dudley to Evans, Petropolis, January 23, 1908,
DS, American Embassy Brazil: Miscellaneous Letters.
81Dudley to Root, Petropolis, January 27, 1908, DS, 
American Embassy Brazil: Despaches to Department of State.
82Nabuco to Rio-Branco, Washington, January 21,
1908, AHI, 235/3/2 tel. rec.; Nabuco to Rio-Branco, January 
22, 1908, AHI, 235/3/2 tel. rec.; and Nabuco to Rio-Branco, 
January 23, 1908, AHI, 235/3/2 tel. rec.
83Root to Nabuco, Washington, January 23, 1908, AJN; 
Nabuco to President / Pena_7* Washington, January 23, 1908; 
Azeredo Castro to Nabuco, London, January 25, 1908, AJN; 
and Nabuco to Virgilio Gordilho, Washington, January 27, 
1908, AJN.
206
However, Nabuco was concerned because the Americans were now 
apprehensive about a rumored Latin American alliance, inclu­
ding Brazil and Argentina, against them. To calm this fear, 
Pena reassured Nabuco that there was no possibility that the
Brazilian policy toward the United States would be aban-
•, 84 doned.
Nabuco wrote a twenty-page letter to Rio-Branco giv­
ing his view of the results obtained from the naval visit to 
Rio. He felt that the exchange of presidential greetings 
was an historic event, and that the events of The Hague were 
being forgotten. He regretted, however, that not every ves­
tige of resentment was wiped out by the visit and he encour­
aged Rio-Branco to make every effort to protect Brazilian 
integrity by avoiding any actions which could be construed 
as anti-American. Nabuco said he was dedicating the rest of 
his career to maintaining a close relationship between the
two countries, and he repeated that Rio-Branco should re-
85place him if he contemplated a change in this policy.
Ambassador Dudley was of the opinion that all the 
resentment arising from the situation at the Hague Confer­
ence had been dissipated after the naval visit:
While doubtless far other aims than the exchange of in­
ternational courtesies determined the great cruise of 
the battle-ship fleet under Admiral Evans, the recep­
tion given it at this point of call has afforded the
84Nabuco to Rio-Branco, Washington, January 18,
1908, ABR-B, 74/1 recibidas; and Pena to Nabuco, PetrSpolis, 
February 10, 1908, AJN.
85Nabuco to Rio-Branco, Washington, January 18,
1908, ABR-B, 74/1 recibidas.
President and you every reason for gratification. If 
ever there were grounds to suppose that the effect of 
your visit here was marred by subsequent happenings at 
the Hague, I may assure you that now the last trace of 
irritation has been effaced. Such was, in effect, the 
statement made to me by President Penna as we watched 
the departing fleet from his yacht near the entrance to 
Rio de Janeiro harbor. At the same time he remarked 
that his sentiment and that of the members of his Gov­
ernment towards the United States had remained un­
changed by any occurrence since the manifestation of 
friendship it was their pleasure to extend to you in 1906.86
Nabuco never ceased in his efforts to maintain and 
improve the good relations with the United States. In this 
continuing effort he attempted to convince Rui that his 
poblems with the American Hague delegation had been largely 
due to misunderstandings. Nabuco wrote to Rui and sent a 
letter he had received from James Brown Scott explaining 
how Choate came to omit Rui's name from the list of suitable 
candidates for court judges. Nabuco said he believed the 
explanation and did not think that it was a last-minute ex­
cuse. He also explained that many of the misunderstandings 
at The Hague were due to the fact that some members of the
American delegation did not have a good command of French
87and erroneously interpreted many things.
To commemorate Rui's triumphant return from the 
peace conference, President Afonso Pena personally presented 
him with a medal struck especially for the occasion. Riding
86Dudley to Root, Petropolis, January 27, 1908, DS, 
American Embassy Brazil: Despatches to Department of State.
87Nabuco to Rui, Washington, January 20, 1908, CRB,
Pasta J. Nabuco.
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the wave of popularity generated by the glowing reports of 
his success at The Hague, Rui became a presidential candi­
date in 1910, 1914, and 1919. In his campaign he took the 
issues to the people on a scale unprecedented in Brazil, but 
he failed to attain the highest elective position in his 
country.
The actions of Rui and the extensive coverage in the 
Brazilian press exaggerating the importance of Rui's mission 
to the peace conference led to a strain in Brazilian- 
American relations. Rio-Branco and Nabuco attempted to 
persuade Rui to assist in smoothing relations by speaking 
at Yale and at a banquet honoring the American fleet, but 
he refused to accept either assignment. Despite Rui's re­
fusal to cooperate, Rio-Branco in Rio and Nabuco in Washing­
ton, were able to prevent the events at The Hague from 
causing a departure from the friendly relations that existed 
between the two countries.
CHAPTER IX 
SUMMARY
Brady B. Tyson has correctly identified the tradi­
tional Brazilian foreign policy objectives as: expansion
then stabilization of her frontiers, maintenance of a bal­
ance of power in the Rio de la Plata area, gaining recogni­
tion as an important member of the community of nations, and 
friendship with the United States. This study has traced 
the last two of the traditional foreign policy objectives of 
Brazil at the Second Hague Peace Conference interpreted 
through the search for status on the personal, national, and 
international levels.
The Brazilian foreign minister, Rio-Branco, with the 
aid of his ambassador to the United States, Joaquim Nabuco, 
sought a special relationship between Brazil and the United 
States. The respective legations of the two countries were 
elevated to embassy status in 1905 and Nabuco was appointed 
Brazil's first ambassador. Nabuco developed a close per­
sonal relationship with Secretary of State Elihu Root and 
devoted himself to bringing the countries closer together. 
Rio-Branco was jealous of Nabuco's success in Washington and 
felt threatened by what he interpreted as Nabuco's usurpa­
tion of his own pro-American iniative. Nabuco detected Rio-
-209-
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Branco's attitude and felt himself increasingly isolated 
from the foreign minister.
The strained relationship between Rio-Branco and 
Nabuco intruded into the process of selection of Brazil's 
delegate to the Second Hague Conference— the conflict led to 
the eventual designation of Rui Barbosa, rather than Nabuco, 
as delegate. In seeking to attain and maintain personal 
status Rio-Branco, Nabuco, and Rui alternately cooperated 
and clashed with each other, however, for the duration of 
the conference, the three men cooperated with each other in 
the interest of promoting their country in the international 
sphere. The stand of Brazil's representative, dictated by 
Rio-Branco, led to increasing conflict with the United 
States delegation, to the dismay of Nabuco.
The principal Brazilian decision-makers of the con­
ference were members of the ruling elite who sought status 
and prestige for themselves, then endeavored to project 
these characteristics on the national and international 
scene. Rio-Branco and Nabuco were from families who were a 
part of the ruling oligarchy and Rui, after climbing the 
political ladder to become vice-president of the Senate, 
came to be accepted into the group. These men were law 
graduates of broad, cosmopolitan culture and members of a 
small group of literate, European-oriented Brazilians. Na­
buco and Rui were classmates in law school along with Rod­
rigues Alves and Afonso Pena, future Brazilian presidents.
In this elite group, the paths of the three often crossed—
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Nabuco and Rui were fellow members of the imperial Brazilian 
Parliament and Rio-Branco and Nabuco both served in the Bra­
zilian foreign service.
When Brazil accepted the invitation to attend the 
1907 Hague Conference, Rio-Branco needed a nationally known 
person of prestige to represent the country. He selected 
Joaquim Nabuco, then ambassador to the United States. How­
ever, before the choice was made public, Rio-Branco decided 
to also extend an invitation to Rui Barbosa, This created a 
dilemma because Rio-Branco wanted both of them on the dele­
gation, but neither felt he could attend as second delegate.
After delaying until almost the last possible mo­
ment, Rui accepted the nomination as chief of the delega­
tion, and Nabuco then absolutely refused to be a delegate, 
despite the insistence of the president and Rio-Branco. Na­
buco was in poor health, which provided a plausible reason 
for the refusal. The conflicts and political maneuvering of 
the three individuals thus delayed the appointment of the 
Brazilian representative until little time remained for Rui 
to make other than personal preparation before departure for 
The Hague. This delay put Brazil's representative at some 
disadvantage vis-a-vis the other delegates, but left the 
formation of policy firmly in the hands of Rio-Branco.
Nabuco had earlier requested a leave from his ambas­
sadorial duties in Washington in order to seek a health cure 
at European spas. Rio-Branco had not yet responded to the 
request for leave, so the foreign minister devised a confi-
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dential plan to assign Nabuco a special mission in conjunc- 
«
tion with the proposed trip to Europe. Nabuco's friendahip 
with Secretary of State Elihu Root proved invaluable, as he 
learned from him the details of the American stance at the 
upcoming conference, and succeeded in securing American sup­
port for a position of honor for the Brazilian delegate.
With the bickering over delegate selection behind 
them, Rio-Branco, Nabuco and Rui united in their efforts to 
gain recognition for Brazil at the conference. Nabuco and 
Rio-Branco went to great lengths to boost Rui, and thus Bra­
zil, among the conference attendees. In Europe, Nabuco gave 
Rui valuable information concerning the conference, which 
greatly assisted him in the unfamiliar diplomatic environ­
ment. The egotistical Rui was spurred to tremendous expen­
diture of time and energy to live up to their advance bil­
ling. Rio-Branco cabled detailed instructions to Rui, but 
allowed the delegate to receive all the credit. By the end 
of the conference, Rui believed himself to be responsible 
for Brazil's gains there.
During the preparations for the peace conference the 
Argentines attempted to gain, through the intervention of 
the United States, an advantage over the Brazilians. Nabuco 
and Rio-Branco immediately sought to counter the move of the 
traditional rival of their country. Together they succeeded 
in persuading the United States to obtain for Brazil the 
highest honorary position of any Latin American country.
From the time of Rui's appointment to lead the Hague
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delegation, he, Nabuco, and Rio-Branco cooperated with each 
other. However, after the conference, personal animosity 
began to surface again. Rui believed himself the conquering 
hero and harbored presidential ambitions, much to the cha­
grin of Rio-Branco. Nabuco blamed Rui and Rio-Branco for 
greatly straining United States-Brazilian friendship and 
jeopardizing the result of his years of work in Washington. 
Rio-Branco, for his part, was jealous of Nabuco's close, 
personal relationship with American leaders and his single- 
minded pursuit of rapprochement with the United States.
In her first global conference, Brazil was deter­
mined to make a good impression by persuading the other 
delegations of the culture and intelligence of her dele­
gates. Rui, a gifted and verbose orator, monopolized many 
of the discussions and irritated the representatives of the 
great powers. The eight most powerful nations had expected 
to dominate the conference, and the impertinence of the 
delegate firom a second-rate country was annoying to them.
In this conference, Brazil aspired to become accepted as one 
of the great powers, but this was unrealistic.
The most important conference deliberations for Bra­
zil were those pertaining to immunity of private property at 
sea, arbitration of contractual debts, the International 
Prize Court, and the International Court of Justice. The 
Brazilian delegate supported the American position in the 
first two cases, to the consternation of the Hispanic- 
American delegates. Nabuco was pleased to hear that Rui was
214
cooperating with the Americans. However, the Brazilians 
disagreed with the Americans on the Prize Court proposal, 
and violently clashed with them over the proposed court of 
justice.
Because she was not consulted on the proposal for 
the selection of judges for the International Court of Jus­
tice, and because of the low rank assigned her, Brazil re­
fused to endorse the American project, using the pretext of 
defending the equal rights of sovereign states. The other 
Latin American nations, and all the smaller countries sup­
ported the Brazilian position, from which she later found 
herself unable to retreat. As a result, she defended that 
position to the end of the conference and prevented the cre­
ation of the proposed court.
The American Hague delegation had received orders to 
support Latin American aspirations at the conference. How­
ever, Elihu Root was ill during most of the period of the 
conference and was only consulted by the State Department on 
the most important matters. Nabuco, who had a great deal of 
influence in Washington, was in Europe. Thus Joseph H.
Choate, chief of the American delegation, had a great deal 
of discretion during the deliberations. Rui and Choate 
often disagreed and it appeared to evolve into a personal 
feud. Their disagreement threatened to disrupt the Brazil- 
ian-American friendship which had been cultivated by Nabuco,
Root, and Rio-Branco. However, both governments chose to 
interpret the difference as being primarily between the in­
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dividuals involved, and the threatened break never material­
ized.
Rui attempted to do all the work of the Brazilian 
delegation except the clerical duties. He personally pre­
pared and delivered all the speeches of the many committees 
on which he served, regularly working nineteen hours a day. 
Since he was so involved in the conference deliberations, he 
tended to take anti-Brazilian moves personally. Thus he 
blamed Choate when the American and Brazilian positions dif­
fered. His dislike of Choate was heightened when Choate 
omitted Rui's name (intentionally, Rui felt) from a list of 
those considered suitable to serve as judges on an interna­
tional tribunal.
Rio-Branco controlled the outlines of Brazilian pol­
icy at The Hague, but Rui contributed to modification of the 
stance. There was almost daily telegraphic communication 
between them and they cooperated in projecting a favorable 
image of their country. They aspired to have Brazil accep­
ted as the ninth great power of the world, but above all, to 
assure that she outranked her perennial South American ri­
val, Argentina. At the beginning Rui faithfully followed 
Rio-Branco's instructions, but later began to formulate 
ideas of his own which he submitted to Rio for approval.
Rui received approval to defend the proposition of the 
equality of sovereign states, and his persistent insistence 
convinced Rio-Branco that Brazil should maintain that posi­
tion until the end of the conference. The outcome was
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trumpeted in Rio as a Brazilian victory over the great pow­
ers, but the powers were irritated over this tactic of ob- 
strucion which blocked approval of a new court plan.
Brazil's insistence on defending the rights of sov­
ereign states caused her relationship with the United States 
to become strained. Rui, prompted by Rio-Branco, pursued 
this course over the objections of Nabuco, who felt that it 
would lead to permanent damage to the Brazilian-American 
friendship he had so carefully cultivated and nurtured.
Rio-Branco was the one primarily responsible for in­
fluencing Brazilian public opinion toward the conference, as 
he personally edited telegrams from The Hague and released 
the information to the press. The Brazilian press presented 
Rui as the dominant personality of the conference, over­
shadowing the delegates of even the major powers. The Rio 
papers especially emphasized Rui's antagonism toward Choate, 
and used that as a pretext to arouse ill feeling against the 
United States,
One important aspect of the Second Hague Conference 
which has been virtually ignored in earlier studies was the 
Brazilian international public relations effort. The Bra­
zilians began early in the conference to publicize their 
country by distributing reprints of illustrated magazine ar­
ticles to the delegates and reporters, Rio-Branco also 
authorized the withdrawal of a large sum from a special ac­
count to be used to buy influence at the conference by en­
tertaining the principal correspondents. Rui commissioned,
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in a Brazilian magazine, an extensive article lauding Brazil 
and her conference delegation. Over a thousand copies of 
the article were distributed to conference delegations and 
throughout Europe.
Another part of this public relations effort in­
volved William T. Stead, a respected British jourlalist, who 
was editor of Le Courrier de la Conference, an unofficial 
daily chronicle of the conference deliberations. Stead 
wielded a great deal of influence.at the peace conference 
through his articles and editorials. Stead was also editor 
and proprietor of the British Review of Reviews, and in that 
capacity approached Rui about placing a paid advertisement 
about Brazil as a supplement appended to the November, 1907 
issue. The Brazilian government was delighted to accept the 
offer and Rio-Branco suggested additions to the proposal, 
which brought the published supplement to thirty-two pages.
As part of Stead's fee, he also agreed to make a separate 
world-wide distribution of the supplement to statesmen, pub­
lic libraries, and commercial establishments.
Stead was a booster of Rui in the Courrier and made 
frequent laudatory comment about him in his editorials. The 
Review of Reviews article contained general information 
about Brazil, as well as an extremely flattering section 
about the accomplishments of Rui and Brazil at the confer­
ence. The supplement proved to be very popular in Brazil, 
and a Portuguese version appeared, which purported to be the 
translation of a "book" by Stead giving the unbiased assess-
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ment of Brazil's position at The Hague by an imminent and 
impartial foreign journalist.
Rio-Branco's international propaganda campaign suf­
fered a serious blow when the New York Herald began to pub­
lish derogatory reports of Rui and of Brazil's stance at the 
conference. Alarmed, Rio-Branco ordered the Brazilian 
charge in Washington to go to New York for a personal talk 
with the editor, where he persuaded him to publish a front­
page article containing a speech by Rui and portraits of 
Rio-Branco and Rui.
The Brazilian government agreed to fund publication 
of Rui's Hague speeches in the original French text, as well 
as in an English translation by Stead. The English version 
was published in pamphlet form and given world-wide distri­
bution by Stead. Other publications took note of the money 
Brazil was spending on public relations, and several in­
quired if they might be able to also help Brazil in her pub­
licity campaign.
Besides use of publications, Brazil sought to en­
hance her image through sponsorship of social events. The 
Brazilians gave more banquets than most of the other dele­
gations and were acknowledged to be the most extravagant 
with food, wines, and lavish decorations. For their most 
spectacular event the Brazilians imported orchids, roses, 
ferns, and palms to decorate the banquet hall in a tropical 
motif.
After the peace conference .Rui went to Paris, where
the Brazilian community christened him, "The Eagle of The 
Hague." The Brazilian government prepared a huge popular 
reception for his return to Brazil, but there immediately 
arose friction between Rui and Rio-Branco because of the 
difficulty of equitably sharing the honors.
Nabuco talked with Rui about the Brazilian dele­
gate's difference with Choate, and upon his return to his 
Washington post, immediately set about to reassure Root of 
the friendly intentions of the Brazilian government and to 
repair any damages done at The Hague to the Brazilian-Ameri- 
can friendship.
In an effort to smooth Brazilian-American relations, 
Nabuco urged Rui to accept an invitation to deliver a series 
of lectures at Yale University. After Rui- refused to do 
that, Nabuco hoped he would help dissipate any residue of 
ill will by delivering the principal toast at a banquet in 
Rio for the American naval officers of the Great White 
Fleet. Rui also refused to cooperate in this instance, but 
the banquet proved to be a success, and provided the occa­
sion for the exchange of presidential greetings which con­
tributed to the normalization of relations between the two 
countries.
Both the American and Brazilian governments chose to 
believe that the disagreement had been principally between 
their conference delegations and was only an abberation in 
the history of friendship between the two nations, Nabuco 
was upset that Brazilian public opinion had been so aroused.
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and that the exaggerated reports of the clash with Choate 
had caused such a wave of anti-American feeling. Nabuco 
bent every effort to restore the relationship, and he be­
lieved this had been achieved, for the most part, after the 
cordial reception of the American fleet.
The search for status on the personal, national, and 
international levels was the principal motivation for Bra­
zil's attendance at the Second Hague Peace Conference and 
played a role in the selection of her delegate, her stance 
on the conference issues, and her relationship with the 
United States. At the conference Brazil sought recognition 
as the ninth world power. This aspiration jeopardized Bra­
zil's special relationship with the United States, which had 
been cultivated. In the process of promoting Brazil, Rio- 
Branco created a hero's image for Rui Barbosa, who promptly 
sought to use it for political gain.
The traditional Brazilian foreign policy objectives 
of international prestige, and of friendship with the United 
States did not prove to be mutually exclusive, despite some 
incompatibility. Through the tenacious efforts of Nabuco, 
the Brazilian-American relationship was salvaged in spite of 
the hostility of Rui, and the indifference of Rio-Branco. 
Despite the conflicts over status, the conference did gain 
for Brazil the reputation of a cultured and cosmopolitan na­
tion able to give a respectable showing in a meeting with 
the powerful nations of the world.
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